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INTRODUCTION 
A potential watershed moment has now come and gone for Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act.  In 2006, Congress extended the preclearance 
provision for another quarter century—an extension that was (and perhaps 
still is) of debatable constitutionality.
1
  Indeed, Section 5’s constitutional 
                                                 
∗ © 2010. Associate Professor & John S. Grimes Fellow, Indiana University School of Law.  
Thanks to Bob Berman and Josh Douglas for helpful comments.  Thanks to Matthew 
Neumann for research assistance. 
 1. Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 
[hereinafter VRARA].  Technically, Congress extended Section 4, but commentators 
commonly speak of extending Section 5 and this Article will proceed using that common 
parlance.  Michael J. Pitts, What Will the Life of Riley v. Kennedy Mean for Section 5 of the 
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bona fides appeared on full display during the Supreme Court’s October 
Term 2008 in orthwest Austin Municipal Utility District umber One v. 
Holder (AMUDO).
2
  In that litigation, the Supreme Court’s conservative 
majority had a chance to declare Section 5 an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congress’ Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment enforcement powers.
3
  But 
the five conservative Justices engaged in what Yale’s Heather Gerken 
vividly described as “arguably one of the most egregious judicial punts in 
recent memory.”
4
  In an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts 
and fully endorsed by eight of the nine Justices, the Court invoked the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance and took the statutory way out,
5
 
leaving Section 5 bloodied and weakened, but still very much able to come 
out of its corner for another round. 
And the next round for Section 5 looms closely on the horizon.  
Redistricting will commence in 2011 and barring an unprovoked radical 
shift in the mindset of the Court’s conservative majority, Section 5 will 
once again play a major role in redistricting.  The preclearance provision 
impacts electoral line-drawing in sixteen States,
6
  and in each of the 
jurisdictions covered by Section 5 all levels of government
7
 must secure 
federal approval—typically from the U.S. Attorney General
8
—of any 
                                                 
Voting Rights Act, 68 MD. L. REV. 481, 482 n.5 (2009). 
 2. 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009). 
 3. In AMUDO, the Court implied that the Fifteenth Amendment encompasses the 
sole source of Congress’ power to extend Section 5 because at no point in the opinion does 
the Court mention the possibility of the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power. See id.  
However, the preclearance requirement may also implicate Congress’ Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power.  See Michael J. Pitts, Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act:  A 
Once and Future Remedy?, 81 DENV. U. L. REV. 225, 275–76 (2003) [hereinafter Pitts, 
Once and Future Remedy] (discussing the possible importance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment enforcement power to the extension of Section 5). 
 4. Heather K. Gerken, An Uncertain Fate for Voting Rights, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT, June 23, 2009, http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles?article=an_uncertain_ 
fate_for_voting_rights. 
 5. AMUDO, 129 S. Ct. at 2508 (“Our usual practice is to avoid the unnecessary 
resolution of constitutional questions. . . . [w]e therefore . . . do not reach the 
constitutionality of § 5.”). 
 6. Alaska, Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, 
and Virginia are covered by Section 5 in their entirety; parts of California, Florida, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, and South Dakota are also covered.  
28 C.F.R. pt. 51 app. (2009).  However, a few jurisdictions in states that are entirely 
covered, such as Virginia and Texas, have bailed out (i.e., exempted themselves) from 
Section 5 coverage.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Div. Voting Section, Section 5 
Covered Jurisdictions, http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/ covered.php (last visited 
May 21, 2010) (displaying a map of jurisdictions covered by Section 5, including those that 
have bailed out). 
 7. 28 C.F.R. § 51.6 (2009) (“All political subunits within a covered jurisdiction (e.g., 
counties, cities, school districts) are subject to the requirement of section 5.”).  Political 
parties can also be covered by Section 5.  28 C.F.R. § 51.7 (2009). 
 8. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006).  As an alternative to administrative preclearance by the 
Attorney General, a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 can secure preclearance by obtaining a 
declaratory judgment from a three-judge panel of the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  Id.  However, relatively few Section 5 decisions are rendered by the 
district court.  Pitts, Once and Future Remedy, supra note 3, at 233–34 (“Since the onset of 
 redistricting plan.
9
  The next major episode for Section 5, then, marks a 
switch from lofty questions about overall constitutional viability at One 
First Street to nuts-and-bolts questions about enforcement in the 
redistricting context that largely lie within the ambit of administrative 
actors in the Executive Branch.
10
 
When it comes to nuts-and-bolts enforcement during the next 
redistricting cycle, there are a number of looming questions.  There is, 
however, one important question that has yet to be sharply focused on by 
academic commentators, executive branch officials, judicial actors, or 
members of Congress.  It is the question of how to enforce the Section 5 
discriminatory purpose standard.  Put differently, the important question is 
this:  when should a redistricting plan be deemed to violate Section 5 
because it fails to meet the provision’s requirement that no purposefully 
discriminatory plan be precleared? 
Pause for a second and consider how incredible it is that what constitutes 
discriminatory purpose
11
 in the redistricting context remains a very much 
unsettled issue.  Over the years, the Supreme Court has issued several 
rulings defining the parameters of discriminatory purpose both generally 
and in the specific context of voting rights.
12
  For more than forty years, 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act has prevented purposeful voting 
discrimination.
13
  For decades the federal government enforced Section 5 in 
                                                 
Section 5, the vast majority of jurisdictions have opted to submit changes to the Attorney 
General rather than undergo the time and expense involved in federal district court 
litigation.”). 
 9. 28 C.F.R. § 51.13(e) (2009); see also Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 262 (2003) 
(recognizing that Section 5 requires preclearance of redistricting plans). 
 10. It is, however, worth noting that as this Article was proceeding through the editing 
process, three additional challenges to Section 5’s constitutionality had been filed.  See State 
of Georgia v. Holder, No. 10 Civ 1062 (D.D.C. June 21, 2010); Laroque v. Holder, No. 10 
Civ. 0561 (D.D.C. May 12, 2010); Complaint, Shelby County, Al. v. Holder, 10 Civ. 00651 
(D.D.C. Apr. 27, 2010). 
 11. When it comes to Section 5 and the discriminatory purpose standard, it is important 
to note two different types of discriminatory purpose.  The first type of discriminatory 
purpose is that which would violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S. 
Constitution—a so-called “unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.”  The second type of 
discriminatory purpose is an intent to retrogress (i.e., a purpose to make minority voters 
worse off).  See Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish II), 528 U.S. 320, 324 
(2000) (interpreting Section 5 to prevent voting changes adopted with an intent to retrogress 
minority voting strength). 
  Because the phrase “unconstitutional discriminatory purpose” is a bit awkward, this 
Article will use the terms “discriminatory purpose” or “purpose standard” to mean 
“unconstitutional discriminatory purpose” except when it is necessary to clarify the 
distinction between an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory purpose 
that involves an intent to retrogress.  It is, however, important to note that the two types of 
discriminatory purpose can overlap (i.e., an intent to retrogress likely violates the U.S. 
Constitution). 
 12. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 617 (1982) (conducting discriminatory 
purpose analysis in the context of an electoral structure). 
 13. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 60–61 (1980) (holding that Section 
2 can be used to challenge the implementation of electoral rules that purposefully 
discriminate against minority voters). 
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a manner that denied preclearance to redistricting plans on discriminatory 
purpose grounds.
14
  And in 2006, Congress adopted an important 
amendment to the Section 5 discriminatory purpose standard.
15
  In short, 
one might instinctively think that the question of what constitutes 
discriminatory purpose in redistricting would be a bit passé. 
There are several reasons, though, why what constitutes discriminatory 
purpose in the redistricting context remains up for grabs during the 2010 
redistricting cycle.  As an initial matter, discriminatory purpose analyses of 
any sort do not easily lend themselves to bright-line tests; when it comes to 
discriminatory purpose, specific facts and contexts can be quite 
important.
16
  Turning to the specific arena of voting and electoral 
structures, discriminatory purpose jurisprudence was short-circuited by the 
1982 amendment of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act that created an 
easier legal standard with which minority voters could challenge 
discriminatory redistricting plans.
17
  Narrowing the scope to an even finer 
level, the Attorney General’s
18
 most recent Section 5 enforcement of the 
discriminatory purpose standard during a redistricting cycle was 
condemned by the Supreme Court,
19
 calling into question what might be 
considered the key “precedents” in the area.  Finally, the Congress that 
extended and amended Section 5 in 2006 had little incentive to provide 
insight into how the discriminatory purpose standard should be 
administered because open debate on the purpose standard might have 
derailed the extension and amendment process. 
                                                 
 14. See, e.g., Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D.D.C. 1982) (using 
discriminatory purpose grounds to deny a declaratory judgment to Georgia for its post-1980 
congressional redistricting plan), aff’d mem. 459 U.S. 1166 (1983); Michael J. Pitts, Georgia 
v. Ashcroft:  It’s the End of Section 5 As We Know It (And I Feel Fine), 32 PEPP. L. REV. 
265, 276–77 (2005) [hereinafter Pitts, End of Section 5] (describing the Attorney General’s 
enforcement of Section 5). 
 15. In 2006, Congress statutorily overruled the Supreme Court’s decision in Bossier 
Parish II, which had temporarily (for about six years) halted the federal government’s 
ability to deny preclearance to redistricting plans adopted with an unconstitutional 
discriminatory purpose.  528 U.S. at 325 (precluding the federal government from denying 
preclearance on the basis of an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose); see VRARA, Pub. 
L. No. 109-246, § 5, 120 Stat. 577, 580–81 (2006) (restoring the test of unconstitutional 
discriminatory purpose to Section 5 analysis).  These developments are discussed more fully 
later in this Article.  See infra Part I. 
 16. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) 
(“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a 
sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be 
available.”). 
 17. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 131, 134 
(allowing discriminatory electoral structures to be successfully challenged under a “results” 
test). 
 18. Technically, preclearance decisions have been delegated by the Attorney General to 
the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights.  28 C.F.R. § 51.3 (2009).  For simplicity, this 
Article will use the words “Attorney General” to refer to decisions made by the Executive 
Branch in relation to Section 5 enforcement. 
 19. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 923–27 (1995). 
 This Article fills a vacuum in the discussion by proposing a framework 
for analyzing discriminatory purpose in the redistricting context.
20
  While it 
is impossible to account for every possible scenario involving 
discriminatory purpose that might arise, the proposed framework pinpoints 
four instances where federal officials should intervene to deny preclearance 
on discriminatory purpose grounds when a redistricting plan fails to 
provide additional representation for minority voters:
21
  when direct 
evidence of discriminatory animus in the redistricting process has come to 
light; when the redistricting plan does not provide minority voters with any 
representation; when “minority” voters comprise a majority of the 
jurisdiction, but the redistricting plan prevents them from electing a 
majority of the seats on the governing body; and when the redistricting map 
clearly shows on its face that district lines have been grossly 
gerrymandered to preclude the ability of minority voters to elect a 
candidate of their choice.  However, the proposed framework notably does 
not mandate federal intervention on discriminatory purpose grounds to 
compel the creation of additional districts that provide minority voters with 
an ability to elect candidates of their choice whenever such districts can be 
drawn—a type of federal enforcement of Section 5 that brought severe 
criticism from the Supreme Court during the 1990s redistricting cycle. 
The framework for discriminatory purpose developed here has roots in 
both doctrine and theory.  On one level, the framework proposed in this 
Article represents a pragmatic exercise that first briefly recounts the history 
of discriminatory purpose and redistricting (Part I) and then engages in the 
typical tools of legal analysis, such as precedent and legislative history, to 
develop a workable framework that can be administered by the federal 
government, particularly the Attorney General (Part II).  On a second level, 
though, the framework proposed in this Article aims to stretch beyond the 
standard doctrinal tools and draw upon the theoretical “politics as markets” 
framework developed by New York University’s Sam Issacharoff and Rick 
Pildes.
22
  The politics as markets approach they have championed seems to 
                                                 
 20. This Article will primarily focus on discriminatory purpose and redistricting in 
relation to Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.  However, in those areas of the United States 
not subject to Section 5 preclearance, discriminatory purpose can also be an independent 
claim under both the United States Constitution and Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  See 
supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.  That said, in areas not covered by Section 5, 
discriminatory purpose analysis under the Constitution or Section 2 is unlikely to play a 
central role because the Section 2 “results” standard will be the primary tool used to 
challenge discriminatory redistricting plans.  See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 21. Another situation where discriminatory purpose could be found occurs when a 
redistricting plan retrogresses minority voting strength.  However, for reasons explained 
infra notes 125–129 and accompanying text, this Article will leave to one side detailed 
discussion of the discriminatory purpose standard and retrogression. 
 22. See generally Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics As Markets:  
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643, 646 (1998) [hereinafter 
Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics As Markets](calling for an analytical perspective analogizing 
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be most definitively  and comprehensively developed in the context of 
partisan gerrymandering.
23
  Yet Professors Issacharoff and Pildes have also 
sought to re-think voting rights
24
 in light of their approach that focuses on 
competition and accountability.
25
  In this vein, their analyses have been 
most specific when it comes to the continued need for Section 5
26
 and, 
more particularly, when it comes to application of the discriminatory 
effects standard by the Attorney General in the context of Georgia’s post-
2000 redistricting.
27
  Their analyses, however, in other areas of voting 
rights, such as discriminatory purpose in the adoption of electoral 
structures, have been somewhat more tepid and less detailed.
28
  The 
                                                 
democratic politics with robustly competitive business markets, formed with clear rules of 
engagement and competition). 
 23. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 593 (2002) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Gerrymandering]; Richard H. Pildes, 
Foreword:  The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 29, 55–83 
(2004) [hereinafter Pildes, Foreword] (extensively discussing a Supreme Court decision in 
the partisan gerrymandering context); Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political 
Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253 (2006) [hereinafter Pildes, Political Competition]. 
 24. See Richard H. Pildes, The Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REV. 1605, 
1619–21 (1999) [hereinafter Pildes, Theory] (discussing the application of politics as 
markets to minority voting rights); see also Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics As Markets, supra 
note 22, at 700–07 (analyzing vote dilution and minority voting rights through the politics as 
markets theory); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 83–101 (discussing politics as markets 
in relation to a Supreme Court decision involving minority voting rights). 
 25. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics As Markets, supra note 22, at 646 (“Only through 
an appropriately competitive partisan environment can one of the central goals of 
democratic politics be realized:  that the policy outcomes of the political process be 
responsive to the interests and views of citizens.”) (emphasis added); Pildes, Political 
Competition, supra note 23, at 256 (describing the “basic mechanism of representative self-
government” as the “electoral accountability of officeholders to voters”); see also 
Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 600 (“[A] core tenet of democratic 
legitimacy [is] accountability to shifting voter preferences.”); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 
23, at 43 (“All theories of representative democracy require, at a minimum, that those who 
exercise power be regularly accountable through elections to those they represent; 
accountability is a necessary, even if not sufficient, condition of democracy.  And just as 
meaningful personal autonomy requires a range of options from which to choose, electoral 
accountability can exist only when effective political competition generates genuine 
political choices.”). 
 26. See generally Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 A Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 
COLUM. L. REV. 1710 (2004) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Own Success] (questioning the 
necessity of extending Section 5). 
 27. See Issacharoff, Own Success, supra note 26, at 1716–17 (analyzing Georgia’s 
redistricting process); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 83–101 (discussing Georgia v. 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 (2003)).  See generally Richard H. Pildes, Political Competition and 
the Modern VRA, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 1 (David L. Epstein et. al. 
eds., 2006) [hereinafter Pildes, Modern VRA] (analyzing what politics as markets may mean 
for the Voting Rights Act primarily through the lens of Section 5’s retrogression standard).  
 28. See Pildes, Modern VRA, supra note 27, at 10 (“This [politics as markets] 
perspective is not meant to endorse specific solutions for future applications of the VRA.  
Instead, it is meant to offer a general framework for organizing analysis of the way legal 
ideas of rights and equality must be modified to account for the larger structural 
environment within which politics takes place.”); see also Issacharoff, Own Success, supra 
note 26, at 1731 (suggesting, but not definitively concluding, that Section 5 may no longer 
be necessary because of the “strengthened world of partisan competition”); Pildes, Theory, 
supra note 24, at 1620 (“Whether the changing dynamics of partisan competition in the 
newly emergent two-party South should affect judicial doctrine or statutory policy with 
 framework advanced here attempts to harmonize, to the extent possible, 
politics as markets theory with the discriminatory purpose standard. 
In the end, criticisms may well be levied at the discriminatory purpose 
framework proposed here.  Some may think it does too little to improve the 
substantive position of minority voters while others may think it goes too 
far in the extent to which it allows for federal intervention in the functions 
of state and local governments.  Criticism, though, would be welcome 
because that would entail a wider dialogue about enforcement of the 
discriminatory purpose standard—a wider dialogue that needs to occur.  
Unless something unexpected happens, a conservative majority of the 
Supreme Court seems likely to hold the keys to Section 5’s fate for the next 
several years, and the AMUDO Court has already telegraphed its 
constitutional discomfort with Section 5.
29
  The question then becomes 
what might push the Court’s conservative majority, particularly the key 
“swing” vote of Justice Anthony Kennedy, to completely dismantle Section 
5.  It would seem that the greatest threat to Section 5’s continued viability 
would be haphazard enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard.  
Therefore, beyond the specific framework proposed here lies a call to at 
least have a debate over the meaning of the discriminatory purpose 
standard in the redistricting context before it is too late (Part III). 
I. THE DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE STANDARD:  A BRIEF HISTORY 
The broad historical outlines of the discriminatory purpose standard are 
relatively straightforward.  For approximately a decade following initial 
passage of Section 5 in the mid-1960s, the discriminatory purpose standard 
had little independent value in preventing the implementation of 
redistricting plans.  But this initial dormancy gave way when the federal 
government started to use the discriminatory purpose standard to compel 
state and local governments to adopt redistricting plans that increased 
minority voting strength.  However, in the early 1990s, the Supreme Court 
expressed deep concern about the Attorney General’s implementation of 
the discriminatory purpose standard and, by 2000, the Court completely 
closed off the federal government’s ability to use the standard as a tool for 
improving the position of minority voters.  In 2006, though, Congress 
legislatively overruled the Court through an amendment to Section 5 that 
re-established the federal government’s power under the discriminatory 
                                                 
respect to vote dilution would depend on many considerations—some theoretical, some 
empirical.”). 
 29. Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act Through the Justices’ Eyes:  
NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 4 (2009), 
http://www.texaslrev.com/sites/ default/files/seealso/vol88/pdf/88TexasLRevSeeAlso1.pdf 
(“The [NAMUDNO] Court, however, did not simply ignore the constitutional issue.  
Instead, it spent several pages speculating as to why Section 5 might be unconstitutional . . 
.”). 
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purpose standard.  Even so, what the congressional amendment means for 
future enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard remains very 
much up for grabs. 
A. The Constitutional Purpose Standard:  ow You See It, ow You 
Don’t 
Congress enacted Section 5 in the mid-1960s as part of a comprehensive 
response to the Deep South’s massive resistance to the enfranchisement of 
African Americans.
30
  In the years preceding passage of the Voting Rights 
Act, the United States Department of Justice attempted to enfranchise 
African Americans through case-by-case litigation.
31
  But experience 
demonstrated that even when litigation against one type of disfranchising 
tactic—such as the discriminatory application of a literacy test for voter 
registration—succeeded, state and local officials would then switch to new 
tactics of discrimination that had not been the subject of the litigation.
32
  To 
combat such recalcitrance to the basic participatory rights of African 
Americans, Section 5 required certain jurisdictions to secure pre-approval 
from the federal government (the Attorney General or the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia) for any changes to election 
laws.
33
  To obtain federal approval of a voting change, a jurisdiction had to 
prove that the change “[did] not have the purpose and [would] not have the 
effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or 
color.”
34
 
Section 5 activity was relatively quiet in the years immediately following 
passage of the Voting Rights Act because the federal government primarily 
focused its attention on enforcing the provisions of the Act most directly 
related to voter registration.
35
  However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Section 5 activity rapidly increased—in part because of the Supreme 
                                                 
 30. See Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of Maintenance, 59 ALA. L. 
REV. 903, 911–12 (2008) [hereinafter Pitts, Era of Maintenance] (describing the legislative 
birth of the Voting Rights Act as a result of intolerable Southern political resistance). 
 31. See generally BRIAN K. LANDSBERG, FREE AT LAST TO VOTE (2007) (detailing the 
Department of Justice’s pre-VRA voting rights litigation in three Alabama counties). 
 32. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 314 (1966) (“Even when favorable 
decisions [for African American voters] have finally been obtained, some of the States 
affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees 
or have enacted difficult new tests designed to prolong the existing disparity between white 
and [African American] registration.”). 
 33. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Extension of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965:  The Continued eed for Preclearance, 51 TENN. L. REV. 1, 63 (1983) (noting that the 
“major emphasis in the Department of Justice under the Johnson Administration (1965–68) 
was on voter registration”); see also Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right 
to Vote, 26 VAND. L. REV. 523, 578 n.244 (1973) (“For the first few years of the Voting 
Rights Act, there were few submissions [of voting changes to the Attorney General] and 
there was no set procedure for dealing with them.”). 
 Court’s watershed decision in Allen v. State Board of Elections
36
 that 
applied Section 5 to a broad swath of democratic activity, including 
electoral structures, and in part because the federal government became 
more interested in enforcement, as evidenced by the Attorney General’s 
1971 publication of guidelines for the Executive Branch’s administration of 
Section 5.
37
  Importantly, since these watershed events in the early years of 
the Act, the vast majority of Section 5 preclearance work has involved 
administrative review by the Attorney General rather than litigation in the 
D.C. District Court because state and local governments view 
administrative review as faster and cheaper.
38
 
While the 1965 Act authorized the rejection of voting changes that had 
either the “purpose” or “the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote 
on account of race or color,”
39
 the distinction between the purpose and the 
effect standards was not of tremendous import during the first decade of 
Section 5 enforcement.
40
  That changed in the mid-1970s when the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Beer v. United States
41
 made the distinction 
between the two standards much more salient.  In Beer, the City of New 
Orleans sought federal approval of a redistricting plan for its five single-
member council districts.
42
  On its face, the city’s redistricting plan 
represented an apparent increase in African American voting strength.
43
  
However, a three-judge panel of the D.C. District Court denied approval to 
New Orleans’ redistricting plan, finding the plan to be discriminatory in 
effect because it failed to provide enough representation for African 
American voters.
44
  Yet the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the effect 
standard of Section 5 only served to block the implementation of voting 
changes that retrogressed minority voting strength.
45
  Put differently, the 
                                                 
 36. 393 U.S. 544 (1969). 
 37. Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 36 
Fed. Reg. 18, 186 (Sept. 10, 1971) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 51). 
 38. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 39. Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437, 439 (1965) (emphasis added). 
 40. Peyton McCrary et. al., The End of Preclearance As We Knew It:  How the Supreme 
Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275, 292–99 
(2006) (describing how most objections in the 1970s were based on “effect” and not 
“intent”). 
 41. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). 
 42. Id. at 135–36. 
 43. The existing redistricting plan had one single-member district with an African 
American total population majority and no single-member district with an African American 
voter majority; the proposed redistricting plan had two single-member districts with an 
African American total population majority and one single-member district with an African 
American voter majority.  Id. at 136–37. 
 44. Beer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 363, 402 (D.D.C. 1974), rev’d, 425 U.S. 130 
(1976). 
 45. See Beer, 425 U.S. at 141 (holding that the effects prong only served to block 
voting changes that “would lead to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with 
respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise”). 
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effect standard only served to prevent voting changes that would make 
minority voters worse off. 
By confining the effect standard to retrogressive voting changes, the 
Supreme Court closed the door on using the effect standard as a vehicle to 
compel state and local governments to enhance minority voting strength.  
Yet the Court seemingly left the door ajar to compel enhancement using the 
purpose standard.  The Beer Court closed the door to the effect standard by 
noting that “a legislative reapportionment that enhances the position of 
racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral 
franchise can hardly have the ‘effect’ of diluting or abridging the right to 
vote on account of race within the meaning of [Section] 5.”
46
  However, in 
the next breath, the Beer Court said that “an ameliorative new legislative 
apportionment” could violate Section 5 if “the new apportionment itself so 
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution.”
47
  
With this language the Court opened up the use of Section 5’s purpose 
standard to enhance minority voting strength because constitutional 
doctrine at the time allowed minority plaintiffs to use the discriminatory 
purpose standard to achieve additional representation.
48
 
The language from Beer, along with some other substantial hints from 
the Supreme Court,
49
 cleared the way for nearly a quarter century of 
Section 5 enforcement where federal officials used the purpose standard to 
                                                 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. (emphasis added). 
 48. See, e.g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (finding constitutional violation in 
the use of multi-member electoral districts).  As mentioned previously, the focus of this 
discussion is Section 5.  See supra note 20.  There were, however, several important 
decisions from the Supreme Court during the 1970s and early 1980s that did not involve 
Section 5 and were related to electoral structures and the constitutional purpose standard.  
See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980); White, 
412 U.S. at 755; Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971).  The impact of these decisions 
on the discriminatory purpose standard going forward will be discussed later.  See infra Part 
II.   
 49. See Busbee v. Smith, 459 U.S. 1166, 1166 (1983) (affirming the decision of the 
district court); Jurisdictional Statement of Petitioner at i, Busbee, 459 U.S. 1166 (No. 82-
857) (requesting review as to whether a redistricting plan that did not “have the purpose of 
diminishing the existing level of black voting strength can be deemed to have the purpose of 
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race within the meaning of Section 5 of 
the Voting Rights Act”); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 912, 912–13 (1996) (reiterating 
that an ameliorative plan “cannot violate § 5 unless the new apportionment itself so 
discriminates on the basis of race or color as to violate the Constitution” and engaging in an 
analysis of the Attorney General’s interpretation of the purpose standard); City of Pleasant 
Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 471 n.11 (1987) (noting that a voting change 
motivated by a discriminatory purpose had “no legitimacy at all under our Constitution or 
under the statute.” (quoting City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 378–79 
(1975))) (emphasis added); Pleasant Grove, 479 U.S. at 474 (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(confirming the role of unconstitutional discriminatory purpose as part of the Section 5 
analysis by asserting that previous Court decisions have made it “explicitly clear that for a 
city to have a discriminatory purpose within the meaning of the Voting Rights Act, it must 
intend its action to have a retrogressive effect on the voting rights of blacks”). 
 compel state and local officials to increase minority voting strength.
50
  For 
example, even if a proposed redistricting plan retained the status quo (i.e., 
did not retrogress) in terms of minority voting strength, federal officials 
could (and would) demand the drawing of an additional district that 
provided minority voters an ability to elect a candidate of choice.
51
  Indeed, 
even if a proposed redistricting plan had already enhanced minority voting 
strength by creating an additional district for minority voters, federal 
officials would use Section 5 to compel the creation of even more such 
districts.  And this enhancement of minority voting strength was primarily 
accomplished on a theory that even changes that retained the status quo or 
enhanced the position of minority voters could be found to violate the 
discriminatory purpose standard.
52
 
But in the early to mid-1990s, the Supreme Court expressed deep 
concern with the direction the Attorney General’s enforcement of the 
purpose standard had taken.  In the racial gerrymandering line of cases, the 
Court chastised the Attorney General for compelling state and local 
governments to create additional districts that provided minority voters an 
ability to elect candidates of choice.
53
  While the import of these racial 
gerrymandering decisions for the future interpretation of the purpose 
standard will be discussed in greater detail in the next part of this Article, 
what is important for understanding the history of the purpose standard is 
how these cases served as an indictment of the Attorney General’s 
enforcement.  Put simply, the racial gerrymandering cases were a message 
from the Court warning the Attorney General to be much more judicious 
when using the purpose standard as a tool for expanding the electoral 
strength of minority voters.
 54
 
                                                 
 50. DAVID LUBLIN, THE PARADOX OF REPRESENTATION 28 (1997) (“[T]he Justice 
Department used its power under Section 5 to deny preclearance to force states to draw new 
majority-minority districts.”). 
 51. See Pitts, End of Section 5, supra note 14, at 276 (describing the Attorney General’s 
enforcement of Section 5).  
 52. In addition to using the purpose standard, the Attorney General also compelled the 
creation of additional districts for minority voters by folding the “results” standard from 
Section 2 into the Section 5 analysis.  28 C.F.R. § 51.55(b) (1996).  However, when it came 
to the creation of additional minority voting strength, the Section 2 results standard played a 
secondary role to the purpose standard.  McCrary et. al., supra note 40, at 297 (providing 
statistics on the number of denials of preclearance by the Attorney General based on 
discriminatory purpose and Section 2).  Eventually, in the mid-1990s, the Supreme Court 
held that the Attorney General could not fold the Section 2 results standard into the Section 
5 analysis.  Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd. (Bossier Parish I), 520 U.S. 471, 485 (1997). 
 53. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995) (“[I]nstead of grounding its 
objections on evidence of a discriminatory purpose, it would appear the Government was 
driven by its policy of maximizing majority-black districts.”). 
 54. Indeed, the Attorney General seemed to understand the Court’s message.  
Following the racial gerrymandering cases, the Attorney General eased up on enforcement 
of the purpose standard.  Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 
5, in THE FUTURE OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT 38, 50 (David L. Epstein et. al. eds., 2006). 
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By the onset of the first post-millennia redistricting cycle, though, the 
Court’s message to the Attorney General to be more judicious in 
compelling the creation of additional districts for minority voters morphed 
into an outright prohibition on the Attorney General’s authority.  In Reno v. 
Bossier Parish School Board (Bossier Parish II),
55
 the Court dismissed as 
“pure dictum” its language from more than two decades earlier in Beer that 
provided the foundation for using Section 5 to prevent the implementation 
of redistricting plans that had an unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.
56
  
Instead, the Court held that Section 5’s statutory language merely allowed 
federal officials to prevent the implementation of redistricting plans that 
were adopted with a retrogressive purpose.
57
  Thus, unlike previous 
redistricting cycles when the federal government could use the purpose 
standard to increase minority voting strength, during the post-2000 
redistricting cycle, the purpose standard only served to prevent the 
implementation of redistricting plans adopted with an intent to retrogress. 
The predicted consequence of the Bossier Parish II decision was that the 
“new” purpose standard of an intent to retrogress would not add much to 
the effect standard.  The intent to retrogress standard would likely only 
reach the so-called “incompetent retrogressor”—the state or local 
government that embarked on a redistricting plan with an intent to 
retrogress, but was too inept to actually accomplish the dirty deed.
58
  
Indeed, that is exactly what happened during the years immediately 
following Bossier Parish II.  As one empirical study of Section 5 
administrative enforcement has demonstrated, the purpose standard served 
as the sole reason for denying preclearance in fifty eight percent of the 
instances in which the Attorney General rejected a voting change during 
the 1990s.
59
  In the 2000s, the purpose standard arguably served as the sole 
reason for denying preclearance to a redistricting plan in only a single 
instance.
60
  While the purpose standard was used in conjunction with the 
                                                 
 55. 528 U.S. 320 (2000).  This version of the case is commonly known as Bossier 
Parish II because it was the second iteration of this litigation in front of the Supreme Court. 
 56. Id. at 338. 
 57. Id. at 341 (“[W]e hold that § 5 does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan 
enacted with a discriminatory but nonretrogessive purpose.”). 
 58. Id. at 332. 
 59. McCrary et. al, supra note 40, at 298. 
 60. Id. at 314–15.  I use the term “arguably” because the sole denial of preclearance to a 
redistricting plan identified by the authors of this empirical study as “based entirely on the 
elusive concept of retrogressive intent” appears to me to also have a component of actual 
retrogressive effect.  Id. at 314 (emphasis added).  The preclearance denial in question 
involved a redistricting plan for Cumberland County, Virginia, where one of the single-
member districts had its African American population reduced from 55.7% to 55.2%.  Letter 
from Ralph F. Boyd, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Darvin Satterwhite, 
Esq., Cnty. Att’y (July 9, 2002), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/pdfs/l_070902.pdf.  The letter denying preclearance 
described how the county “has not carried its burden of proving a lack of retrogressive 
intent.”  Id.  However, in addition to the finding of retrogressive intent, the letter also 
 effect standard some of the time, the purpose standard had essentially no 
independent value when it came to preventing the implementation of 
redistricting plans.  In short, when the 2000 redistricting cycle occurred, the 
Section 5 purpose standard had essentially been reduced to a nullity. 
B. Restoring the Constitutional Purpose Standard, But in What Form? 
Recently, the House and Senate engaged in a legislative process that 
culminated with President George W. Bush signing into law an extension 
and amendment of Section 5.
61
  During deliberation over the extension and 
amendment, the House and Senate held substantial hearings—receiving 
testimony from numerous witnesses and collecting thousands of pages of 
documents.
62
  What we know from the statutory language and legislative 
history surrounding the extension and amendment is that Congress wished 
to restore the ability of the Attorney General to prevent the implementation 
of redistricting plans adopted with an unconstitutional discriminatory 
purpose.  What the language of the Act, the House and Senate Reports, and 
the numerous hearings do not tell us with any great specificity is how to 
differentiate between those redistricting plans that pass muster under the 
discriminatory purpose standard and those that do not. 
The statutory text provides the obvious starting point for any discussion 
about interpretation of the purpose standard.  The Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa 
Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and 
Amendments Act of 2006 (VRARA) commences with a statement of 
congressional purpose and findings, most of which are unsurprising.  From 
this statement, we learn the VRARA was designed to “ensure that the right 
of all citizens to vote, including the right to register to vote and cast 
meaningful votes, is preserved and protected as guaranteed by the 
                                                 
included two statements that indicate a finding of retrogression.  The first statement 
explained that “[W]e sought to determine whether there were illustrative plans that meet the 
county’s redistricting criteria, but which did not result in the retrogression evidenced by the 
proposed plan.” Id. (emphasis added).  Similarly, the second statement explained, “[a]nd in 
each [alternative] plan, the black total and voting age populations is maintained and 
increased in District 3 and the retrogression is eliminated.” Id. (emphasis added).  Thus, I 
would categorize this denial of preclearance as based both on an intent to retrogress and 
actual retrogression.  To be fair, the authors of the empirical study recognize that, at the 
margins, room for debate can exist as to what constituted the legal grounds for preclearance 
denials by the Attorney General.  McCrary et. al., supra note 40, at 292 n.84 (“Our coding 
decisions were, inevitably, based on textual interpretation.  We believe that although 
knowledgeable observers might disagree occasionally with our coding of individual 
objections, the patterns we identify are beyond reasonable dispute.”). 
 61. Section 5 includes a sunset provision and every so often Congress must examine the 
statute and decide whether to extend it.  Section 5 was scheduled to expire in August 2007.  
42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(8) (2006).  The extension and amendment was signed into law in 
2006.  VRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). 
 62. Kristen Clarke, The Congressional Record Underlying the 2006 Voting Rights Act:  
How Much Discrimination Can the Constitution Tolerate?, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 
385, 402–03 (2008) (describing the volume of the Congressional record). 
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Constitution.”
63
  We also learn Congress found that “[s]ignificant progress 
has been made in eliminating” some of the barriers to electoral 
participation and representation faced by minority voters.
64
  However, 
“vestiges of discrimination in voting continue to exist,” with these 
continuing vestiges most notably demonstrated by the continued 
persistence of racially polarized voting and the vast amount of Voting 
Rights Act enforcement since 1982.
65
 
Most importantly for purposes of the current discussion, the 
Congressional findings also reflect the view that previous Supreme Court 
decisions incorrectly interpreted Section 5.  Congress noted that “[t]he 
effectiveness of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 had been significantly 
weakened by the United States Supreme Court decisions in Reno v. Bossier 
Parish II and Georgia v. Ashcroft.”
66
  Indeed, these decisions from the 
Court represented a misconstruing of congressional intent that improperly 
“narrowed the protections afforded by section 5.”
67
  Accordingly, we learn 
that the Court’s statutory interpretation in Bossier Parish II was incorrect 
and that Congress set its sights on fixing the Court’s misapprehension of 
the statutory situation. 
Beyond the prefatory statement of purpose and findings lies the actual 
language used to accomplish the task of legislatively overruling Bossier 
Parish II.  In the VRARA, Congress undertakes the statutory heavy lifting 
by creating a new subsection (b) for Section 5 that reads: 
Any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, 
or procedure with respect to voting that has the purpose of or will have 
the effect of diminishing the ability of any citizens of the United States 
on account of race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set 
forth in section 4(f)(2), to elect their preferred candidates of choice 
denies or abridges the right to vote within the meaning of subsection (a) 
of this section.
68
 
The crux of the matter, though, comes in newly developed subsection (c), 
where Congress defines the term “purpose” as used in Section 5 to “include 
any discriminatory purpose.”
69
  The key here is the use of the word “any”:  
Bossier Parish II confined discriminatory purpose under Section 5 to an 
                                                 
 63. VRARA, § 2(a). 
 64. Id. § 2(b)(1)–(4).  The enforcement mentioned in the findings references, among 
other things, the hundreds of denials of preclearance as well as other Section 5 enforcement, 
the “continued filing of section 2 cases,” and litigation related to the electoral participation 
of language minority voters.  Id. § 2(b)(4).  The significance of the year 1982 is that, prior to 
the extension and amendment in 2006, the most recent extension and amendment of Section 
5 had taken place in 1982.  See Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
205, 96 Stat. 131. 
 65. VRARA, § 2(b)(2)–(4). 
 66. Id.  § 2(b)(6). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. § 5(b). 
 69. Id. § 5(c) (emphasis added). 
 intent to retrogress;
70
 the VRARA allows for a broader-based Section 5 
inquiry into the existence of “any” discriminatory purpose—including any 
discriminatory purpose that would violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth 
Amendments.
71
 
While the statutory language restores the constitutional discriminatory 
purpose standard to Section 5, that is about all the statutory language tells 
us.  In particular, the statutory language fails to provide insight about how 
to determine whether a voting change passes muster under the 
discriminatory purpose standard.  And most importantly for present 
purposes, the statutory language provides absolutely no guidance related to 
the biggest-ticket question:  which redistricting plans should be rejected 
using the purpose standard? 
Of course, the lack of congressional statutory guidance might be moot if 
an extensive cache of federal judicial opinions existed that clearly develop 
a framework for deciding questions of discriminatory purpose in the 
redistricting context.  Unfortunately, there has been little recent guidance 
from the Supreme Court (or the lower federal courts) on this subject.
72
  
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Co.
73
 is 
the Court precedent that creates the basic matrix for deciding whether state 
action involves discriminatory purpose.
74
  However, that case involved 
housing, not voting-related discrimination.
75
  Moreover, the last time the 
                                                 
 70. See 528 U.S. 320, 341 (2000) (explaining the limits of Section 5). 
 71. VRARA, § 5(c).  
 72. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 13 (2006) (“Since 1982, six published cases have ended in a 
court ruling or a consent decree finding that one of the 880 covered jurisdictions had 
committed unconstitutional discrimination . . . . During that same time period, six cases 
have found that a non-covered jurisdiction committed unconstitutional discrimination 
against minority voters.”)  Importantly, few, if any of these twelve cases identified in the 
Senate Report involved a redistricting plan.  Id. at 65–70. 
 73. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
 74. The other major case that sets out the framework for assessing discriminatory 
purpose is Mt. Healthy Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).  In a nutshell, 
Mt. Healthy provides a defense against allegations of discriminatory purpose in “mixed-
motive” cases where an invalid purpose played a substantial role in a governmental decision 
but where other valid purposes may also have played a role in the decision.  See id. at 287 
(“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his 
conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial factor’—or, 
to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in the Board’s decision not to rehire 
him.  Respondent having carried that burden, however, the District Court should have gone 
on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it 
would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s employment status even in the 
absence of the protected conduct.”).  However, Mt. Healthy has not had much of an impact 
on voting rights cases, as the Supreme Court has only cited it once in a majority opinion that 
involved felon disfranchisement, and twice in dissents that involved litigation related to 
electoral structures.  See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1058 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citing Mt. Healthy in dissent in a racial gerrymandering case); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 
U.S. 222, 225 (1985) (citing Mt. Healthy in a felon disfranchisement case); City of Mobile 
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 138 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Mt. Healthy in dissent 
in a challenge to at-large elections).  In contrast, Arlington Heights has been cited in more 
than a dozen voting rights decisions.  
 75. Even though Arlington Heights did not involve voting discrimination, the Court has 
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Court issued a direct holding
76
 as to the presence or absence of 
discriminatory purpose in an electoral structure was 1982’s Rogers v. 
Lodge
77
—a decision that involved an at-large, not single-member district, 
election system.
78
  Perhaps the most significant recent judicial guidance can 
be found in the racial gerrymandering cases from the early 1990s, in which 
the Court rebuked the Attorney General’s interpretation of the 
discriminatory purpose standard.
79
  At the end of the day, though, few 
would likely describe judicial guidance on discriminatory purpose in the 
redistricting context as anything other than opaque.
80
 
                                                 
held the case to be useful in making determinations related to purposeful discrimination in 
the voting context. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227 (noting, in a challenge to a felon 
disfranchisement law, that “[p]resented with a neutral state law that produces 
disproportionate effects along racial lines, the Court of Appeals was correct in applying the 
approach of Arlington Heights to determine whether the law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
 76. The Court also discussed discriminatory purpose in two other cases involving 
voting rights, but neither case involved electoral structures such as at-large elections or 
redistricting plans.  Hunter v. Underwood involved Alabama’s racially motivated adoption 
of a felon disfranchisement statute.  471 U.S. 222, 227–34 (1985).  Pleasant Grove v. 
United States, involved an Alabama city employing an annexation policy that, essentially, 
denied annexation by African American persons but allowed annexation by white persons.  
479 U.S. 462, 465–67 (1987). 
 77. 458 U.S. 613 (1982). 
 78. Id. at 614; cf. Samuel Issacharoff & Pamela S. Karlan, Standing and 
Misunderstanding in Voting Rights Law, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2276, 2282 (1998) (“[P]rior to 
the 1990s round of redistricting, the Supreme Court defined the concept of vote dilution 
claims exclusively in connection with challenges to at-large or multi-member district 
elections.”).  True, there is an important decision from the D.C. District Court involving 
discriminatory purpose in redistricting that was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
but that case was decided in the early 1980s.  Busbee v. Smith, 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 
1982), aff’d, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983). 
 79. See Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74, 85–90 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 
912–13 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995).  Two other major Court 
decisions have involved the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and redistricting.  See 
United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (plurality 
opinion); Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964).  However, the challenges brought in 
those cases did not allege a failure to provide additional districts for minority voters but 
were more akin to racial gerrymandering challenges.  See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 
119 (1986) (classifying Wright and United Jewish Orgs. as general equal protection claims, 
rather than claims involving diminishing the effectiveness of ballots cast by members of 
racial minority groups). 
A bit of implicit guidance also appears in a recent statutory Section 2 case, League of 
United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006).  It is true that 
decision may be of some use and will be referenced in the later discussion developing a 
framework for making determinations about discriminatory purpose.  See infra Part II.  
However, the decision primarily involved retrogression of minority voting strength, rather 
than the failure to provide an additional ability for minority voters to elect candidates of 
choice. 
 80. Some might contend that the Arlington Heights decision provides adequate 
guidance for decision-making related to discriminatory purpose in any context.  Under 
Arlington Heights, an analysis of discriminatory purpose is “a sensitive inquiry into such 
circumstantial and direct evidence of intent as may be available.”  429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).  
Factors to be considered in this “sensitive inquiry” include:  (1) whether the impact of the 
official action bears more heavily on one race than another; (2) the “historical background 
of the decision, particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious 
purposes”; (3) an inquiry into the “specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged 
 Beyond statutory language and judicial opinions, the other obvious place 
to seek instruction about how to enforce the purpose standard would be 
Executive Branch interpretations; but, here again, little concrete guidance 
exists.  The Attorney General’s Procedures for the Administration of 
Section 5
81
 have three important provisions presenting the framework used 
to evaluate whether a redistricting plan merits preclearance. 
The first important provision applies to all voting changes, not just 
redistricting plans.  Here, the considerations of the Attorney General are:  
the extent to which a reasonable and legitimate justification for the change 
exists; the extent to which the jurisdiction followed objective guidelines 
and conventional procedures in adopting the change; the extent to which 
the jurisdiction afforded members of minority groups an opportunity to 
participate in the decision-making process; and the extent to which the 
jurisdiction took into account the concerns of the minority group.
82
 
The second important provision provides a list of “background” factors 
to be considered when reviewing certain types of voting changes, including 
redistricting plans.
83
  These “background” factors are:  the extent to which 
minority residents have been denied an equal opportunity to participate 
meaningfully in the jurisdiction’s political process; the extent to which 
minority residents have been denied an equal opportunity to influence 
elections and the decision-making of elected officials in the jurisdiction; 
the extent to which voting is racially polarized and political activities are 
racially segregated; and the extent to which voter registration and election 
participation by minority residents have been adversely affected by current 
or historic discrimination.
84
 
The third important provision in the Attorney General’s guidance applies 
solely to review of redistricting plans.  Here, the guidance states that the 
following will be considered: 
(a) The extent to which malapportioned districts deny or abridge the right to vote of 
minority citizens. 
                                                 
decision” including whether “[d]epartures from the normal procedural sequence” occurred 
and whether “[s]ubstantive departures” occurred; and (4) the “legislative or administrative 
history . . . especially where there are contemporary statements by members of the 
decisionmaking body.”  Id. at 266–68.  Of course, this summary of factors from the Court 
did not “purport[ ] to be exhaustive.”  Id. at 268. 
I do not think Arlington Heights does much to clarify the decision to be made in relation 
to redistricting.  This multi-factored “test” (that is not even an exhaustive listing of factors) 
seems easily subject to manipulation and inconsistent results.  Moreover, redistricting has 
been recognized by the Court as a unique form of government decision-making.  See Shaw 
v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (recognizing that “redistricting differs from other kinds 
of state decisionmaking”).  Finally, to anyone who thinks Arlington Heights alone provides 
a clear framework for analyzing discriminatory purpose in the redistricting context, I would 
ask how Arlington Heights clearly resolves the numerous hypothetical situations set forth in 
Part II of this Article. 
 81. 28 C.F.R. § 51 (2009). 
 82. See id. § 51.57. 
 83. See id. § 51.58(a)–(b). 
 84. Id. § 51.58(b)(1)–(4). 
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(b) The extent to which minority voting strength is reduced by the proposed 
redistricting. 
(c) The extent to which minority concentrations are fragmented among different 
districts. 
(d) The extent to which minorities are overconcentrated in one or more districts. 
(e) The extent to which available alternative plans satisfying the jurisdiction’s 
legitimate governmental interests were considered. 
(f) The extent to which the plan departs from objective redistricting criteria set by 
the submitting jurisdiction, ignores other relevant factors such as compactness and 
contiguity, or displays a configuration that inexplicably disregards available natural 
or artificial boundaries. 
(g) The extent to which the plan is inconsistent with the jurisdiction’s stated 
redistricting standards.
85
 
In theory, the multiple factors in these three provisions (at least fifteen 
factors total) can all be relevant to deciding whether the discriminatory 
purpose standard has been met—which makes it a duck soup in the 
abstract.  At least one of the factors—”the extent to which minorities have 
been denied an equal opportunity to participate meaningfully in the 
political process”—is essentially a restatement of the Supreme Court’s 
standard for discriminatory purpose in the context of electoral structures.
86
  
Two of the factors—the extent to which a legitimate reason for the voting 
change exists and “the extent to which malapportioned districts deny or 
abridge the rights of minority” voters—are mostly meaningless in the 
redistricting context.
87
  Four of the factors basically describe the same 
thing:  the impact of the plan on minority voters.
88
  More fundamentally, no 
apparent hierarchy of factors exists.  Is past discrimination more or less 
important than, say, the extent of racially polarized voting?  Most 
fundamentally, how many of these factors does one need to find to 
conclude the discriminatory purpose standard has been violated:  One?  
Two?  Five?  A majority?  Without launching into a Chief Justice John 
Roberts-like game of forty questions,
89
 these abstract concepts do not 
                                                 
 85. Id. § 51.59. 
 86. Id. § 51.58(b)(1) (2009).  Compare with Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 624 (1982) 
(noting that the lack of any black candidate having ever been elected is “insufficient . . . to 
prove purposeful discrimination absent other evidence such as proof that blacks have less 
opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice”) 
(internal citations omitted).  
 87. These factors are mostly meaningless because nearly all redistricting is undertaken 
for the entirely legitimate purpose of complying with the equal protection mandate of one 
person, one vote, and even fewer redistricting plans that are developed fail to cure the 
malapportionment prohibited by the one person, one vote rule.  See Black Political Task 
Force v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 (D. Mass. 2004) (describing redistricting 
designed to comply with one person, one vote after new population data becomes available 
as “standard operating procedure”). 
 88. Those four factors are: the extent to which malapportioned districts deny or abridge 
the right to vote of minority citizens; the extent to which minority voting strength is reduced 
by the proposed redistricting; the extent to which concentrations of minority residents are 
fragmented among different districts; and the extent to which minority residents are 
overconcentrated in one or more districts. 
 89. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2269–72 (2009) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting).   
 provide much that point to a standardization of discriminatory purpose 
review of redistricting plans. 
These abstract factors, though, were implemented in specific contexts by 
the Attorney General for many years.  For roughly two-and-a-half decades 
the Attorney General denied preclearance to redistricting plans that had 
failed to meet the discriminatory purpose standard.  These denials of 
preclearance are embodied in letters the Attorney General wrote to state 
and local officials that set forth the legal rationales for the denials.
90
  Here, 
then, one can look to see how these abstract concepts have led to on-the-
ground decisions and, presumably, formulate a viable framework of what 
constitutes discriminatory purpose from the Attorney General’s 
perspective. 
However, the manner in which the Attorney General implemented the 
discriminatory purpose standard earned stinging Supreme Court criticism 
in the early 1990s.
91
  Accordingly, one cannot necessarily look at the 
Attorney General’s decisions with regard to the purpose standard and say 
that these decisions provide a viable framework for future decisions.  The 
Attorney General’s administrative review is designed to mimic the 
decisions that the federal courts would make, as the Attorney General’s 
own guidelines state that in conducting administrative review it sits as a 
“surrogate” for the federal courts.
92
  But it is obvious from the Supreme 
Court’s racial gerrymandering decisions in the 1990s that the Court thought 
the Attorney General was not exactly doing a swell job as a “surrogate” 
when it came to making decisions related to the discriminatory purpose 
standard and redistricting.  Unfortunately, though, other than saying the 
Attorney General got it horribly wrong, the Court provided little 
affirmative guidance about how to enforce the purpose standard. 
In short, judicial guidance on the discriminatory purpose standard in the 
redistricting context is fairly limited, the Attorney General’s guidelines for 
decision-making seem quite malleable, and the Attorney General’s most 
recent concrete decisions under those guidelines were severely criticized by 
the Supreme Court. 
                                                 
 90. See, e.g., Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to 
John E. Pilcher, Esq. (May 1, 1992), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, 
Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 388–90 (2005).  
 91. See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text.  Other advocates have also criticized 
the Attorney General’s enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard.  See Renewing 
the Temporary Provisions of the Voting Rights Act:  Legislative Options After LULAC v. 
Perry:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Prop. Rights of 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 142 (2006) (testimony of Michael A. Carvin) 
(“It is well documented, however, that the Justice Department routinely finds discriminatory 
purpose every time the submitting authority fails to create the maximum number of minority 
opportunity districts.”). 
 92. 28 C.F.R. § 51.52 (2009). 
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This brings us back to Congress in 2006.  One might think that when 
considering restoration of the discriminatory purpose standard, Congress 
might have realized there was very little clear guidance on enforcement of 
the discriminatory purpose standard.  Upon making this realization, 
Congress might have decided to provide detailed direction to the Attorney 
General about enforcement.  Such direction might not have been added to 
the statutory language itself, but at least such direction might have been 
provided through substantial discussion in the House and Senate Reports, 
and during floor debates and hearings.  Nevertheless, the legislative history 
is sparse.
93
 
The House Report spends about two-and-a-half pages—six total 
paragraphs—discussing the statutory reversal of Bossier Parish II.
94
  The 
first paragraph merely explains the Bossier Parish II decision.
95
  The 
second, third, and fourth paragraphs discuss the history of judicial and 
executive branch enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard.
96
  
The fifth paragraph explains how Bossier Parish II reduced the purpose 
standard of Section 5 to a nullity and how continuing to follow Bossier 
Parish II would continue this trend.
97
  Finally, in the sixth and final 
paragraph, the House Report recognizes that “[i]n amending the purpose 
prong to bar ‘any discriminatory purpose,’ the Committee is aware of the 
concerns by some that such a prohibition is ‘standardless’ and 
unadministrable.”
98
  The House Report, though, addresses this concern with 
a single sentence: 
[T]he Committee concludes that the factors set out in Village of 
Arlington Heights et. al. v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. et. 
al. provide an adequate framework for determining whether voting 
changes submitted for preclearance were motivated by a discriminatory 
                                                 
 93. Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the ew Voting Rights Act, 117 YALE 
L.J. 174, 192 (2007) (“The differing views of policymakers and advocates as to what the 
law actually meant remained pushed to the background of the legislative debate . . . .”); cf. J. 
Morgan Kousser, The Strange, Ironic Career of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 1965–
2007, 86 TEX. L. REV. 667, 669 (2008) (“Never have there been so many proposals for 
comprehensive changes when the temporary parts of the Act have come up for renewal, and 
never has there been less serious debate about the Act in committees and on the floor of 
Congress.”).  There is a bit of an incongruity in the fact that so little guidance was provided 
on how to interpret the purpose standard when the legislative record surrounding extension 
and amendment of Section 5 was described by Representative James Sensenbrenner as “one 
of the most extensive considerations of any piece of legislation that the United States 
Congress has dealt with in the 27½ years that I have been honored to serve as a Member of 
this body.”  152 CONG. REC. H5143 (daily ed. July 13, 2006) (statement of Rep. 
Sensenbrenner). 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 66–68 (2006). 
 95. Id. at 66. 
 96. Id. at 66–67. 
 97. Id. at 67–68. To be sure, one can try to tease out, by implication, some guidance 
from these passages.  To the extent possible, the framework presented in Part II will try to 
read between the lines. 
 98. Id. at 68. 
 purpose, including determining whether a disproportionate impact exists; 
examining the historical background of the challenged decision; looking 
at the specific antecedent events; determining whether such change 
departs from the normal procedures; and examining contemporary 
statements of the decision-maker, if any.
99
 
After providing this list of factors, the House Report concludes:  “In 
weighing each of these factors, the Committee believes that a proper and 
fair determination may be made as to whether a voting change was 
motivated by discriminatory intent.”
100
  In short, these six paragraphs in the 
House Report that contain little more than a single sentence of direct 
substantive guidance do not provide a lot with which to work. 
Turning to the Senate Report, one finds a bit more direction.  The Senate 
Report’s overarching goal seems to be to cabin the application of the 
discriminatory purpose standard as much as possible.  In a three-page 
discussion, the Senate Report spends about half of its verbiage emphasizing 
that the amendment “merely reiterate[s] the constitutional standard” 
embodied in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
101
  The Senate 
Report then provides some guidance as to situations where the 
discriminatory purpose standard has or has not been met.  The Senate 
Report states that “[o]ne traditional and important standard for identifying 
unconstitutional racial discrimination is  . . . [when] the challenged action 
departs from normal rules of decision,” such as when “the State went out of 
its way to avoid creating such a majority-minority [district]—one that 
would be created under ordinary rules.”
102
  The Senate Report also notes a 
number of areas where a finding of discriminatory purpose should not 
occur: 
•When the finding is based on a failure to create “so-called influence or 
coalition districts;” 
•When the finding is based “in whole or part, on a failure to adopt the 
optimal or maximum number of majority-minority districts or 
compact minority opportunity districts;” and 
•When the finding is “based on a determination that the plan seeks 
partisan advantage or protects incumbents.”
103
 
Thus, the Senate Report more substantially addresses the standard for 
discriminatory purpose, primarily by describing situations in which 
discriminatory purpose should not be found. 
However, the Senate Report’s usefulness as an interpretive tool may be 
minimal, at best, because of its lack of support and odd timing.  The main 
                                                 
 99. Id.  As previously noted, these factors do not seem to provide much analytical 
clarity.  See supra note 80. 
 100. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 68. 
 101. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 17 (2006). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 17–18. 
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body of the Senate Report did not garner the endorsement of a majority of 
the Judiciary Committee,
104
 and it contains a truly unique dissent penned by 
eight supporters of extension and amendment of Section 5.
105
  In that 
dissent, these eight members noted that the Senate Report did not reflect 
their views “or those of scores of other co-sponsors.”
106
  Moreover, the 
dissenters noted that the Senate Report was filed nearly a week after the 
Senate passed the extension and amendment of Section 5 and that “[a]t the 
time of the floor debate and consideration [of the legislation] . . . no draft 
Senate Committee Report was available to Senators.”
107
  In closing, the 
dissenters noted that “after-the-fact attempts to re-characterize the 
legislation’s language and effects should not be credited.”
108
  For these 
reasons, the Senate Report seems to have limited value.
109
 
Granted, maybe Congress did not see it as its place to define the contours 
of unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.  The purpose standard might be 
something properly left in the hands of the federal judiciary.  After all, the 
Supreme Court has opined in the City of Boerne v. Flores
110
 line of cases 
that while Congress possesses the power to pass legislation that enforces 
the promises of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, the substance of 
constitutional rights lies within the ambit of the nine justices.
111
  Indeed, the 
Senate Report recognized the danger of overstepping congressional 
authority by noting that “it would raise serious constitutional questions if 
we were to adopt a free-flowing definition of purpose.”
112
  Moreover, in 
light of the fact that Congress was perhaps pushing the boundary of 
constitutionality by extending Section 5 in the first place,
113
 politically it 
may have made sense not to push the boundary even further by providing a 
                                                 
 104. See James Thomas Tucker, The Politics of Persuasion:  Passage of the Voting 
Rights Act Reauthorization Act of 2006, 33 J. LEGIS. 205, 265–66 (2007) (detailing the 
genesis of the Senate Report). 
 105. See S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54–55; Persily, supra note 93, at 178 (“Never before in 
American history, however, has a Senate committee that unanimously voted in favor of a 
law later published a postenactment committee report that was supported only by members 
of one party.”). 
 106. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 54. 
 107. Id. at 54–55. 
 108. Id. at 55. 
 109. Additionally, several judges, including, most prominently, Justice Antonin Scalia, 
refuse to put any stock in legislative history.  ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997) (“I think it is time to call an 
end to a brief and failed experiment, if not for reasons of principle then for reasons of 
practicality.  I have not used legislative history to decide a case for, I believe, the past nine 
terms.”). 
 110. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 111. Id. at 519 (“The design of the [Fourteenth] Amendment . . . [is] inconsistent with 
the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s restrictions on the States . . . [Congress] has been given the power ‘to 
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”). 
 112. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 18. 
 113. See discussion infra Part III. 
 detailed explanation of what Congress thought the contours of the 
discriminatory purpose inquiry should be. 
At the end of the day, though, the main point here is not that Congress 
should have provided more guidance about enforcement of the 
discriminatory purpose standard.  Rather, the point is that no sufficiently 
detailed framework has been developed for making determinations about 
discriminatory purpose in the crucial context of redistricting.  Part III of 
this Article will lay out several reasons why it is important to develop a 
framework for making determinations about discriminatory purpose prior 
to the onset of the next redistricting cycle.  But for now what is necessary 
to understand is that no one has tried to synthesize what is out there—in 
terms of doctrine and theory—to establish a workable structure for 
decision-making.  In some sense, what needs to occur before the next 
redistricting cycle is a restatement of the law of discriminatory purpose and 
redistricting.  A restatement provides a synthesis of where the law is while 
simultaneously attempting to push the law to where it should be.  The next 
Part proposes such a synthesis. 
II.  A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR DISCRIMINATORY PURPOSE AND 
REDISTRICTING 
While the three main actors—Congress, the Supreme Court, and the 
Attorney General—in the drama involving the discriminatory purpose 
standard have yet to put forward an affirmative, operable framework for 
decision-making in the crucial context of redistricting, it is important to 
recognize that creating such a framework presents no simple task.  As the 
Court has previously noted, “[d]etermining whether invidious 
discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry 
into such circumstantial and direct evidence as may be available.”
114
  
Indeed, in the specific context of electoral structures, Justice Stevens’ 
dissent in Rogers v. Lodge noted that the Court’s majority had failed to 
create “an acceptable, judicially manageable standard” for adjudicating 
discriminatory purpose.
115
  In short, discriminatory purpose can be difficult 
to pinpoint and it is probably impossible to create a framework that 
accounts for every possible situation.   
Although it is likely impossible to create an absolutely all-encompassing 
framework for making decisions related to the discriminatory purpose 
standard, some paradigmatic redistricting scenarios arise that may lend 
themselves to the creation of clearer decision-making rules.  Certainly one 
                                                 
 114. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977).  
In many respects, deciding when state action has been imbued with a discriminatory purpose 
has an “I know it when I see it” quality.  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) 
(Stewart, J., concurring).   
 115. 458 U.S. 613, 633 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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cannot turn discriminatory purpose analysis in the redistricting context into 
a mathematical formula, but one can make some decisions about how to 
proceed in some of the recurring situations that the Attorney General and 
the federal courts seem likely to confront in the coming years.  While a 
comprehensive framework cannot be developed that defines the full range 
of permissible and impermissible redistricting behavior, “incomplete 
theorization” can still serve a quite useful purpose.
116
 
Going forward, this Article presents some of the paradigmatic situations 
involving decisions that will likely need to be made under the 
discriminatory purpose standard.  In developing each of these various 
scenarios, concrete examples will most often be used.  While some of these 
examples will be hypothetical, many examples will come directly from 
actual determinations regarding discriminatory purpose made by the 
Attorney General during the 1990s redistricting cycle or, in the alternative, 
from prior federal judicial opinions. 
However, before delving into specific scenarios, one needs to first 
recognize that discriminatory purpose in the context of electoral structures 
represents a combined focus on process concerns and on substantive 
electoral outcomes.  On the one hand, discriminatory purpose is sometimes 
about what lies in the hearts of government actors in that they are targeting 
a group for disfavored treatment because of animosity toward that group.
117
  
On the other hand, discriminatory purpose also contains a strong focus on 
substantive representational outcomes where there does not appear to be 
any obvious intentional racial or ethnic animosity on the part of 
government actors in the design of a plan.
118
  Put differently, sometimes 
discriminatory purpose is mostly about a deliberative process during which 
decision-makers harbored some sort of racial animus.  At other times, 
discriminatory purpose is primarily about a pattern of electoral outcomes in 
which the votes of a minority group are consistently degraded.
119
  
Admittedly, some might wish the Supreme Court to wholly select one 
perspective or the other,
120
 but it seems likely that both perspectives will 
                                                 
 116. See Pildes, Theory, supra note 24, at 1612 (“In theory and in doctrine, we can often 
identify what is troublingly unfair, unequal, or wrong without a precise standard of what is 
optimally fair, equal, or right.”) (emphasis added). 
 117. See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (plurality opinion) 
(implying that discriminatory purpose represents a search for direct evidence of racial 
animus on the part of government actors). 
 118. See generally Rogers, 458 U.S. 613 (finding discriminatory purpose in the 
maintenance of an at-large election system from a panoply of factors of which few, if any, 
were directly related to the motivations of government officials); White v. Regester, 412 
U.S. 755 (1973) (same). 
 119. Of course, sometimes discriminatory purpose combines elements of both 
discriminatory animus and a pattern of negative electoral outcomes for minority voters. 
 120. See, e.g., Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 601 (suggesting that when 
it comes to the law of democracy, the court should “jettison the elusive search for improper 
motives altogether”); Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limits on Racial and Partisan 
 continue to inform discriminatory purpose doctrine for several years to 
come. 
Another thing that needs to be recognized is that a few assumptions are 
at work in all of the scenarios described below.  First, except where 
otherwise noted, the presence of racially (or ethnically) polarized voting is 
assumed.  In other words, one should assume that when offered a choice 
between, for example, a white candidate and an African American 
candidate, white voters overwhelmingly support the white candidate and 
African American voters overwhelmingly support the African American 
candidate.
121
  Indeed, the presence of polarized voting might legitimately 
be described as the key evidentiary precondition for any legal claim 
involving minority voting rights and electoral structures.
122
  Second, in all 
of the scenarios below it is assumed that the jurisdiction in question has 
some history of discrimination.  In the overwhelming majority of instances 
that history of discrimination will be related to the electoral process; after 
all, jurisdictions covered by Section 5 were subjected to the preclearance 
requirement in the first place because prima facie evidence of voting-
                                                 
Redistricting, 106 YALE L.J. 2505, 2506 (1997) [hereinafter Pildes, Principled Limits] 
(“Whatever the merits of motive-based approaches to mediating group conflicts in other 
constitutional contexts, in the redistricting arena that approach will not be capable of 
sustaining constitutional doctrine in coherent, administrable, or useful form.”). 
 121. To be sure, voting can be polarized even if the candidates in a specific contest are 
from the same racial or ethnic group. See generally Lewis v. Alamance County, 99 F.3d 
600, 605–11 (4th Cir. 1996) (describing how voters of different racial groups can have 
sharply different preferences in electoral contests that pit a white candidate versus another 
white candidate).  However, courts consistently note that the most compelling evidence of 
racially polarized voting comes from inter-racial and inter-ethnic contests.  See Uno v. City 
of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 988 n.8 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[E]lections in which minority candidates 
run are often especially probative on the issue of racial bloc voting.”); Jenkins v. Red Clay 
Consol. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4 F.3d 1103, 1128 (3d Cir. 1993) (“As a general matter, we 
believe that elections involving white candidates only are much less probative of racially 
polarized voting than elections involving both black and white candidates.”); Westwego 
Citizens for Better Gov’t v. City of Westwego, 946 F.2d 1109, 1119 n.15 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(“[T]he evidence most probative of racially polarized voting must be drawn from elections 
including both black and white candidates.” (quoting Westwego Citizens for Better Gov’t v. 
City of Westwego, 872 F.2d 1201, 1208 n.7 (5th Cir. 1989))); McNeil v. City of Springfield, 
658 F. Supp. 1015, 1028 (C.D. Ill. 1987) (“[A]nalysis of voting . . . demonstrates that in 
races where there is a black candidate, most blacks vote for the black.  White voters 
overwhelmingly prefer white candidates in the same circumstances.  This is racially 
polarized voting.”) (emphasis added); see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al., Race, Region, 
and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election:  Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 
123 HARV. L. REV. 1385, 1394 (2010) (“One way courts attempt to . . . resolve the . . . issue 
of who is the minority community’s ‘candidate of choice’ [ ] is to focus on elections in 
which minority candidates oppose white candidates.”); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights 
Law ow at War with Itself?  Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 N.C. L. 
REV. 1517, 1526 n.22 (2002) (noting that in analyzing racially polarized voting “[m]ost 
courts include all contests, but conclude that black versus white candidate races have greater 
‘probative value’”).  
 122. See Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process:  The 
Transformation of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833, 1837 (1992) 
[hereinafter Issacharoff, Polarized Voting] (describing how racially polarized voting is a 
major focus in voting rights litigation). 
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related discrimination existed.
123
  In addition, a history of discrimination 
will likely be found outside of the voting context, such as in education and 
the provision of other government services, and this discrimination can 
often be linked to present-day continuing effects (e.g., in health, education, 
etc.) that can impact political participation.
124
 
Yet another thing that needs to be recognized is that the presence of 
discriminatory purpose when there is an actual retrogression of minority 
voting strength or an intent to retrogress will not be discussed for several 
reasons.
125
  For starters, when actual retrogression occurs, there is already a 
basis for denying preclearance under the Section 5 effects standard.
126
  In 
other words, discriminatory purpose analysis adds little to the mix when 
actual retrogression has occurred.
127
  As for an intent to retrogress, such a 
situation is an outlier because it is rare that those who have an intent to 
retrogress fail to achieve the goal.
128
  Thus, the concern to which the 
following pages are devoted is when the discriminatory purpose standard 
should be found to have been violated because a redistricting plan fails to 
improve the position of minority voters.
129
 
                                                 
 123. See United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 156–57 
(1977) (plurality opinion) (describing how jurisdictions got covered by the preclearance 
provision “whenever it was administratively determined that certain conditions which 
experience had proved were indicative of racial discrimination in voting had existed in the 
area”). 
 124. See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 439–40 (2006) (finding a violation of Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act while implying discriminatory purpose existed and noting the importance 
to the Court’s analysis of a history of voting-related discrimination and “the political, social, 
and economic legacy of past discrimination”). 
 125. One could possibly make an argument that the plain language of Section 5 confines 
the purpose standard to redistricting plans that have “a purpose of diminishing the ability of 
. . . [minority voters] to elect their preferred candidates of choice.”  42 U.S.C. § 1973c(b).  
However, confining the interpretation of Section 5 in this manner would reduce to a nullity 
the textual congressional statement of purpose that expresses an intention to statutorily 
overrule Bossier Parish II.  VRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. 577 (2006).  
Moreover, such a plain language argument would be unavailing to anyone willing to take 
even a cursory peek at the legislative history.  See H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 66–68 (2006). 
 126. Supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text (discussing the “effects” standard). 
 127. Moreover, relatively few redistricting plans will involve retrogression. McCrary et. 
al., supra note 40, at 314 (showing that in the post-2000 Census redistricting cycle, the 
Attorney General denied approval to only fifteen districting plans using the retrogression 
standard).  This is because Section 5 has a “strong deterrent effect” on redistricting actors.  
See MARK A. POSNER, Post-1990 Redistrictings and the Preclearance Requirement of 
Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in RACE AND REDISTRICTING IN THE 1990S 80, 94–96 
(Bernard Grofman ed., 1998) (describing Section 5’s deterrent effect). 
 128. Supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text (discussing the rarity of the 
“incompetent retrogressor”). 
 129. Supreme Court doctrine and the legislative history surrounding VRARA allow for a 
finding of discriminatory purpose when an electoral structure fails to create an additional 
opportunity for minority voters.  See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982); White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973); H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 67 (favorably mentioning 
Busbee—a case where discriminatory purpose was found when the redistricting plan failed 
to provide additional minority voting strength); S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 17 (“Courts and the 
Justice Department should ask whether the decision not to create a black-majority district 
departed from ordinary districting rules . . . . If the State went out of its way to avoid 
creating such a majority-minority [district]—one that would be created under ordinary 
 Finally, a word of caution with regard to the effort to use politics as 
markets as a theoretical framework to aid in decision-making related to the 
discriminatory purpose standard.  Politics as markets would certainly like 
to entertain a wholesale doctrinal shift in many areas.  For instance, politics 
as markets would lead to the Court taking a more aggressive stance against 
partisan gerrymanders and a less aggressive approach to racial 
gerrymandering.
130
  Moreover, politics as markets might even like to see 
the total elimination of Section 5.
131
  I proceed, however, from the position 
that wholesale revolution will not arrive anytime soon.  Indeed, even 
Supreme Court justices whom one might think inclined to embrace politics 
as markets seem cautious about the approach.
132
  In my view, what politics 
as markets might be able to do is influence the edges of voting rights 
enforcement rather than completely overhaul it.  In some sense, the goal 
here is to combine some of the theory of politics as markets with the reality 
of the doctrinal and statutory landscape.  This means there may be 
instances where the framework presented here diverges from a strict 
politics as markets view. 
What is attempted in the pages that follow is the creation of a macro-
level framework that can bring some measure of order to discriminatory 
purpose analysis in the redistricting context.  The goal is to strip away all of 
the multi-factored tests to find the core fundamentals that should lead to a 
finding that the discriminatory purpose hurdle has or has not been cleared.  
In essence, the individual scenarios for redistricting always present unique 
independent facts and can involve multiple arguments for and against 
finding a violation of the discriminatory purpose standard.  Nevertheless, at 
the end of the day, there seem to be four instances where a redistricting 
plan should be found to violate the discriminatory purpose standard 
because it fails to increase minority voting strength:  when direct evidence 
of discriminatory animus in the redistricting process has come to light; 
when the redistricting plan does not provide minority voters with any 
representation; when “minority” voters comprise a majority of the 
jurisdiction, but the redistricting plan prevents them from electing a 
majority of the seats on the governing body; and when the redistricting map 
clearly shows on its face that district lines have been grossly 
gerrymandered to preclude the ability of minority voters to elect a 
                                                 
rules—that is unconstitutional racial discrimination.”) (emphasis added).  
 130. See generally Pildes, Political Competition, supra note 23 (arguing the Court 
should engage in more policing of partisan gerrymanders); Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, 
supra note 23 (arguing the Court should disengage from the racial gerrymandering inquiry).   
 131. See generally Issacharoff, Own Success, supra note 26; Pildes, Modern VRA, supra 
note 27.   
 132. See, e.g., Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 351 n.5 (2004) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(describing the politics as markets analogy to antitrust as “an intriguing one that may prove 
fruitful, though I do not embrace it at this point out of caution about a wholesale conceptual 
transfer from economics to politics”).   
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candidate of their choice.  However, notably, the proposed framework does 
not mandate federal intervention on discriminatory purpose grounds to 
create additional districts that provide minority voters with an ability to 
elect candidates of their choice whenever such districts can be drawn—a 
type of federal enforcement of Section 5 that brought severe criticism from 
the Supreme Court during the 1990s redistricting cycle.
133
 
A. Direct Evidence of Racial Animus 
In some instances, a state or local government will fail to provide an 
additional ability for minority voters to elect
134
 a candidate of choice and 
direct evidence of racial animus will have been developed.  In this 
situation, the failure to increase minority voting strength can be attributed 
to direct evidence of an intent to harm minority voters harbored by those 
who designed the redistricting plan.  In such a scenario, the redistricting 
plan should be found to violate the discriminatory purpose standard. 
The paradigmatic example of this scenario was Georgia’s congressional 
redistricting in the early 1980s.  In Busbee v. Smith,
135
 a three-judge panel 
of the D.C. District Court rejected Georgia’s plan even though it did not 
diminish minority voting strength and on its face appeared to slightly 
                                                 
 133.  See infra notes 220–23 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
criticism). 
 134. At this point, it may be useful to explain some of the redistricting terminology being 
employed in this Article.  The Supreme Court has variously referred to at least five types of 
electoral districts: “safe,” “majority-minority,” “coalition,” “cross-over,” and “influence.”  
See generally Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S. Ct. 1231 (2009); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 
461 (2003).  For purposes of Section 5 and this Article, it makes the most sense to 
distinguish between two types of districts: “ability to elect” and “influence.”  An “ability to 
elect” district is what the Court might term a “safe,” “majority-minority,” “coalition,” or 
“cross over” district.  Cf. Pildes, Modern VRA, supra note 27, at 7 (noting that the Court has 
equated “safe” and “coalitional” districts when “coalitional districts offer the same 
likelihood of black electoral success”).  In these “ability to elect” districts, minority voters 
control electoral outcomes either by being able to control the outcome (by forming a 
majority of the electorate) of both the primary and general election or by being able to 
control the outcome of the primary election and then having the candidate they selected in 
the primary go on to victory at the general election because of a predictable number of 
crossover votes from white voters.  In ability to elect districts, minority voters almost always 
secure “descriptive” representation in that the winning candidate in the district will typically 
be of the same race or ethnicity as the minority voters who control electoral outcomes. See 
Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 480–81 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing how “safe” districts 
operate); see also LUBLIN, supra note 50, at 46, 48 (providing statistics for United States 
House districts demonstrating that African American candidates usually win in African 
American majority districts and that Latino candidates usually win in Latino majority 
districts).  In contrast, an “influence” district is one where minority voters do not have the 
ability to control the outcome (i.e., form a majority of the electorate) of either the primary or 
general election, but have a significant enough amount of the population that they might 
theoretically play a role in swinging an election one way or another.  Issacharoff, Own 
Success, supra note 26, at 1716 (describing an “influence” district as one “where black 
voters [will] be able to exert a significant—if not decisive—force in the election process.”).  
In these “influence” districts, what theoretically will happen is that a white Democrat wins 
in the primary and defeats a white Republican in the general election. 
 135. 549 F. Supp. 494 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983). 
 increase minority voting strength.
136
  The court held the plan to be 
purposefully discriminatory due to overt racial animus on the part of 
legislators who played a key role in shaping the plan.
137
  In so holding, the 
court described one of the most influential leaders of the redistricting 
process as a “racist”
138
 for using a racial epithet to describe his opposition 
to drawing a congressional district that would provide minority voters with 
the ability to elect a candidate of their choice.
139
  The court also detailed 
how another leader in the process explicitly described his opposition to the 
creation of an ability-to-elect district in racial terms.
140
  And it described 
how a third leader of the redistricting process, Georgia’s Speaker of the 
House, held a negative racial attitude toward African Americans.
141
  In 
short, the Busbee decision involved a situation where evidence of racial 
animus by decision-makers was plain. 
Admittedly, overt evidence of racial hostility was not the only factor 
mentioned by the Busbee court that led to a finding of discriminatory 
purpose.  In Busbee, the court also relied on the negative impact of the 
redistricting plan (in that it failed to create a district that provided minority 
voters with an ability to elect a candidate of choice), the history of 
discrimination, and the absence of a legitimate reason for failing to draw a 
district for minority voters.
142
  The Busbee court also detailed how 
legislators who supported creating a district for minority voters were 
marginalized during the redistricting process.
143
  Moreover, Busbee 
involved a scenario where minority voters in Georgia did not have any 
ability to elect a candidate of choice to Congress—a potentially significant 
aspect of discriminatory purpose analysis that will be discussed in just a 
moment.  For these reasons, one could read Busbee as a finding of 
discriminatory purpose based on something more than direct evidence of 
discriminatory animus by government officials. 
Nevertheless, direct evidence of racial hostility seemed to do the 
majority of the heavy-lifting in the Busbee court’s discriminatory purpose 
analysis and Congress itself appears to have so interpreted the decision.  
The court itself mentioned that the “overt racial statements” provided “only 
                                                 
 136. Id. at 516 (“[The District in the proposed plan] has a higher black population 
percentage than under the existing plan, there is no retrogression.”). 
 137. Id. at 517 (“Overt racial statements . . . mandates the conclusion that . . . [the 
redistricting plan] has a discriminatory purpose in violation of Section 5.”). 
 138. Id. at 500 (“Representative Joe Mack Wilson is a racist.”). 
 139. Id. at 501 (noting that Rep. Wilson said, “I don’t want to draw nigger districts”). 
 140. Id. at 507 (describing Sen. Hudson’s floor statement). 
 141. Id. at 509–10. 
 142. Id. at 516. 
 143. See id. at 509 (describing the makeup of the reapportionment conference committee 
as including only white members who overtly opposed any plan that would strengthen 
African American voting power, despite there being black members who qualified to serve). 
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one basis for a finding of discriminatory intent,”
144
 hinting that the racial 
statements alone would have supported the court’s holding.  Moreover, the 
2006 House Report related to extension and amendment of Section 5 notes 
that when Congress initially enacted Section 5 it wanted to prevent voting 
changes made with “clear racial animus.”
145
  It then goes on to describe 
how omitting the discriminatory purpose standard from Section 5 would 
have required preclearance of the redistricting plan in Busbee where “Joe 
Mack Wilson, the chief architect of redistricting in the house told his 
colleagues on numerous occasions, ‘I don’t want to draw nigger 
districts.’”
146
  For Congress, too, Busbee seems to be a decision primarily 
grounded in clear, direct evidence of animus against minority voters by 
government actors. 
Moreover, direct evidence of racial hostility likely will be accompanied 
by other evidence of discrimination.  Where direct evidence of racial or 
ethnic animus exists, one is likely to find many of the other factors 
mentioned by the Busbee court—a racial impact to the decision in that 
minority voting strength could be increased, a history of discrimination, the 
absence of legitimate reasons for adopting the plan, and flaws in the 
redistricting process.  In short, while direct evidence of racial hostility may 
not technically be the entire ballgame, it has previously been recognized as 
doing the lion’s share of the work and, regardless, where there is 
discriminatory smoke, there is likely to be discriminatory fire.
147
 
                                                 
 144. Id. at 516 (emphasis added). 
 145. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 66 (2006). 
 146. Id. at 67 (quoting Busbee, 549 F. Supp. at 501). 
 147. An interesting situation could arise if there is direct evidence of discriminatory 
animus but absolutely no possibility for the redistricting plan to provide an improved 
position for minority voters.  In other words, racial discrimination could be at work but no 
real remedy is available for minority voters other than passing a new plan absent the overt 
racial animus. 
Under such a circumstance, it may not make much sense from a functional perspective to 
reject such a redistricting plan.  On this score, some courts have taken the position that to 
succeed on a claim of intentional discrimination, plaintiffs need to show some impact on the 
minority group’s ability to elect a candidate of its choice.  See, e.g., Garza v. County of Los 
Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Even where there has been a showing of 
intentional discrimination, plaintiffs must show that they have been injured as a result.  
Although the showing of injury in cases involving discriminatory intent need not be as 
rigorous as in effects cases, some showing of injury must be made to assure that the district 
court can impose a meaningful remedy.”).  Indeed, Justice Stevens’ dissent in Rogers v. 
Lodge recognized that one flaw of discriminatory purpose analysis generally is that it can be 
used to strike down rules that otherwise do not seem to cause concrete injury.  458 U.S. 613, 
641–42 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s [discriminatory purpose] 
analysis, however, the characteristics of the particular form of government under attack are 
virtually irrelevant.  Not only would the Court’s approach uphold an arbitrary—but not 
invidious—system that lacked independent justification, it would invalidate—if a 
discriminatory intent were proved—a local rule that would be perfectly acceptable absent a 
showing of invidious intent.”); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 418 (2006) (expressing 
skepticism, in the context of partisan gerrymandering analysis, “of a claim that seeks to 
invalidate a statute based on a legislature’s unlawful motive but does so without reference to 
the content of the legislation enacted”). 
 There are also solid theoretical reasons for rejecting a redistricting plan 
where direct evidence of discriminatory animus existed because approving 
such a redistricting plan sends the wrong message.  In light of the United 
States’ long history of discrimination related to voting and other matters,
148
 
upholding a redistricting plan produced under a penumbra of racial or 
ethnic animus would further the idea that discriminatory motive is 
acceptable conduct for public officials.  Indeed, in the context of the racial 
gerrymandering decisions, the Supreme Court has recognized the 
“pernicious” message that overtly racialized redistricting can send to voters 
and elected officials alike.
149
 
In sum, there is adequate foundation for denying preclearance to 
redistricting plans that fail to improve the position of minority voters due to 
racial animus on the part of redistricting actors.  First, such enforcement 
conforms to a key precedent in the area.  Second, such enforcement 
conforms with the legislative history of the 2006 amendment to Section 5.  
Third, such plans should be rejected because of the pernicious message 
they send.
150
  Thus, redistricting plans that are the product of direct racial 
animus should be found to violate the discriminatory purpose standard.
151
 
                                                 
There might, however, be symbolic value to disapproving a plan adopted with racial 
animus but that did not negatively impact minority voters’ ability to elect a candidate of 
choice.  In some respects, this symbolic injury would be similar to the type of injury 
recognized in the racial gerrymandering context.  See infra note 149 and accompanying text.  
Moreover, other language in Supreme Court opinions implies that the presence of a 
discriminatory purpose alone should result in a denial of Section 5 preclearance.  See, e.g., 
City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 469 (1987) (“Congress plainly 
intended that a voting practice not be precleared unless both discriminatory purpose and 
effect are absent.” (quoting City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172 (1980))); see 
also Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 122, at 1836 (describing Pleasant Grove as 
allowing for Section 5 to reach “ill-motivated municipal annexation decisions even in the 
absence of any discriminatory impact”).  In addition, the House Report accompanying the 
2006 extension and amendment of Section 5 implies that a plan adopted with a clear racial 
animus is not entitled to federal approval, regardless of the effect.  H.R. Rep. No. 109-478, 
at 66 (“Through the ‘purpose’ requirement, Congress sought to prevent covered jurisdictions 
from enacting and enforcing voting changes made with a clear racial animus, regardless of 
the measurable impact of such discriminatory changes.”). 
Undoubtedly, this debate might be one of great academic interest.  However, a scenario 
where clear racial animus exists but no racial effect can be found seems more likely to exist 
in the world of Supreme Court Justice and law professor hypotheticals than in the real 
world.  This is because persons who harbor an intent to harm minority voters are unlikely to 
give effect to that intent without affecting some substantive harm.  As such, this Article 
won’t pretend to definitively resolve what seems likely to be an outlier scenario. 
 148. See generally C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 
 149. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647–49 (1993) (recognizing stereotyping 
and sending a “pernicious message” to elected officials as harms that stem from redistricting 
plans that “rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segregate 
voters into different districts on the basis of race . . . [without sufficient justification.]”); see 
also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 984 (1996) (plurality opinion) (recognizing that the 
problem with racial gerrymandering is an “expressive harm”). 
 150.  Application of politics as markets theory likely would not result in denials of 
preclearance because of evidence of racial animus as politics as markets seems to eschew a 
focus on the motives of redistricting actors.  See supra note 120.  However, as previously 
mentioned, my primary aim here is to create a relatively pragmatic framework that can be 
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B. Failure to Provide Any Minority Representation 
The Busbee decision involved direct evidence of racial animus on the 
part of redistricting actors, but it also involved another key fact.  In Busbee, 
there was not a single Georgia congressional district that provided minority 
voters with an ability to elect a candidate of choice.
152
  Put simply, minority 
voters lacked any representation.  And in these types of situations—where 
it is possible to provide minority representation and yet the redistricting 
plan perpetuates a lack of representation
153
—a denial of preclearance can 
be justified on doctrinal, statutory, and theoretical grounds.
154
 
                                                 
implemented in the upcoming redistricting cycle and, as such, it does not seem feasible to 
reject an approach that denies preclearance to those redistricting plans where racial animus 
is plain. 
 151. To be sure, clear, direct evidence of animus likely will be absent in the vast 
majority of future redistricting processes.  See Hayden v. Patterson, 594 F.3d 150, 163 (2d 
Cir. 2010) (“[D]iscriminatory intent is rarely susceptible to direct proof . . .”); Uno v. City 
of Holyoke, 72 F.3d 973, 984 (1st Cir. 1995) (“In this enlightened day and age, bigots rarely 
advertise an intention to engage in race-conscious politics.”).  There are at least three 
reasons for this.  First, members of our society are less likely to harbor “old school” racist 
sentiments than they were several decades ago.  Antony Page & Michael J. Pitts, Poll 
Workers, Election Administration, and the Problem of Implicit Bias, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
1, 22–23 (2009) (describing changing social mores in relation to racial discrimination). 
Second, government actors have become more sophisticated in the sense that even if they 
harbor racial animus, they are unlikely to express these sentiments in a manner that will end 
up as evidence in a judicial proceeding or administrative investigation.  Third, and relatedly, 
the redistricting process itself is often incredibly secretive—redistricting perhaps more than 
anything in our current political culture evokes the image of hardball politics conducted in 
smoke-filled backrooms.  Cf. Michael S. Kang, De-Rigging Elections:  Direct Democracy 
and the Future of Redistricting Reform, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 667, 668 (2006) (describing 
redistricting as “insufficiently ‘political’ in the sense that it occurs too isolated from public 
engagements, too distant from public scrutiny, and too insulated from popular 
accountability”).  Nevertheless, such direct evidence of animus still occasionally comes to 
light and might be found in the future.  See Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and 
Reapportionment:  When Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting? 4 U. PA. 
J. CONST. L. 735, 750 (2002) (describing the 1990s redistricting process in Pennsylvania 
when a state legislator reacted to learning the minority percentage in his district would 
increase by saying: “Look, I’m a white mother-f--er from Philadelphia.  And I don’t want no 
more blacks or Spics in my district.”); see also Clarke, supra note 62, at 406 (flagging 
litigation from 2002 challenging a redistricting plan where direct evidence of racial animus 
was presented).  
 152. See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text (describing Busbee). 
 153. There are, of course, those who would argue that as long as minority voters can 
formally participate (i.e., register and vote), then any redistricting plan provides minority 
voters with representation.  However, such a crabbed view of constitutional voting rights 
has never been endorsed by a majority of the Supreme Court.  See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 
377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (“[T]he right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or 
dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free 
exercise of the franchise.”).  Thus, as should be plain by this point, by a lack of “any 
minority representation,” I mean a situation where minority voters do not have the ability to 
elect a candidate of their choice.  See supra note 134 (describing terminology used in this 
Article).  
 154. An example of such a discriminatory purpose analysis comes from the Attorney 
General’s 1992 denial of preclearance to the redistricting plan for the West Carroll Parish 
(Louisiana) school board.  The parish was almost seventeen percent African American and 
voting was racially polarized.  Letter from James P. Turner, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., 
Civil Rights Div., to David A. Creed (March 30, 1993), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of 
the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of 
 Enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard in this manner 
comports with the most recent Supreme Court precedent related to 
discriminatory purpose in the context of electoral structures.  Although 
Rogers v. Lodge did not directly involve a redistricting plan, it is the 
clearest example of the Court being willing to find discriminatory purpose 
from an amalgamation of circumstances, the most important of which 
would seem to be a total lack of minority representation.  In Rogers, the 
Court considered a challenge to at-large elections for the five-member 
board of commissioners in Burke County, Georgia, which at the time had a 
slight majority African American population.
155
  Elections were marked by 
racially polarized voting, and in the history of Burke County, no African 
American candidate had ever been elected.
156
  Under these circumstances, 
the Supreme Court upheld a lower court finding of discriminatory 
purpose.
157
 
To be sure, a lack of any representation in the context of racially 
polarized voting cannot be the sole factor related to a finding of 
discriminatory purpose.
158
  For example, the Rogers Court carefully 
acknowledged other ingredients contributing to the decision:  a history of 
discrimination in voting and other areas, such as education; the lingering 
effects of past discrimination on present-day political participation; an 
unresponsiveness to the concerns of African American citizens on the part 
of the white members of the board; and African Americans’ depressed 
socio-economic status.
159
  Admittedly, there was a bit more to the 
discriminatory purpose story in Rogers. 
                                                 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1044–46 (2005).  Despite requests from 
members of the African American community for a district that would provide minority 
voters with an ability to elect a candidate of choice, and despite the fact that an alternative 
redistricting plan had been developed that provided for such a district, the proposed 
redistricting plan perpetuated the lack of minority representation.  Id.  Thus, the Attorney 
General refused to preclear the school board’s redistricting plan.  Id. 
 155. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 615–16 (1982). 
 156. Id. at 615, 623 (noting that while no African American candidate had ever been 
elected, African American candidates had been on the ballot). 
 157. Id. at 616. 
 158. Id. at 624 (“Under our cases, however, such facts [as racially polarized voting and a 
lack of minority candidates elected] are insufficient in themselves to prove purposeful 
discrimination absent other evidence such as proof that blacks have less opportunity to 
participate in the political processes and to elect candidates of their choice.”).  There is, of 
course, another working assumption in this particular analysis in that there has to be an 
ability to create a single-member district in which minority voters can control their own 
electoral destiny.  If it is impossible to create such a district, there is no remedy for the harm 
except possibly through the adoption of an “alternative” election system such as cumulative 
voting.  To date, though, courts have been extremely reluctant to order the adoption of 
alternative election systems to remedy violations of minority voting rights unless the 
alternative election system has been proposed by a defendant as a remedy following a 
finding of vote dilution.  See United States v. Vill. of Port Chester, No. 06 Civ. 15173, 2010 
WL 1326267, at *32–33 (S.D.N.Y. April 1, 2010). 
 159. Rogers, 458 U.S. at 624–26.  The Court also noted that Burke County’s system of 
at-large elections had several facets that enhanced its discriminatory impact, including:  the 
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But it would seem that the lack of any representation in the context of 
racially polarized voting is what did the majority of the analytical work in 
Rogers.  Indeed, the Court implied as much when it wrote that the lack of 
elected African Americans and the overwhelming evidence of racially 
polarized voting “[bore] heavily on the issue of purposeful racial 
discrimination.”
160
  Moreover, when racially polarized voting exists and 
minority voters lack any representation in the governing body, one would 
expect to find a history of discrimination, lingering effects of that 
discrimination on political participation and socioeconomic status, and 
some evidence of a lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials.  
Put differently, where minority voters comprise enough of the population to 
elect a candidate of their choice in a single-member district, voting is 
racially polarized, and minority representation is nonexistent, it will be 
relatively easy to discover an amalgamation of other circumstantial factors 
to support a finding of discriminatory purpose.
161
 
Apart from judicial doctrine, the legislative history surrounding the 2006 
extension and amendment of Section 5 provides implicit support for using 
the discriminatory purpose standard to reject a redistricting plan that fails to 
provide any representation to a cohesive and sufficiently numerous 
minority population.  The House Report, although not a paradigm of 
clarity, quotes with approval testimony from a witness concerned about the 
absence of a purpose standard leading to the inability of federal decision-
makers to employ Section 5 as a tool to address situations where no 
minority representation existed.
162
  The Senate Report, to the extent it has 
                                                 
fact that Burke County was unusually large (about two-thirds the size of Rhode Island), thus 
making it difficult for African American voters to reach polling places and African 
American candidates to campaign; and the use of numbered posts and a majority vote 
requirement.  Id. at 627.  These factors, though, would not likely play much of a role in the 
context of single-member districts because single-member districts substantially cut down 
on geographic sprawl and single-shot voting is not often a viable electoral strategy for 
minority voters in single-member districts. 
 160. Id. at 623 (emphasis added).  In the context of a decision rendered under Section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act, the Court seems to have similarly placed a lot of emphasis on a 
total lack of minority representation as one of the main foundations for finding a Section 2 
violation.  See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1012–13 (1994) (noting that finding a 
violation of Section 2 is much harder when the facts involve “not the chance for some 
electoral success in place of none, but the chance for more success in place of some”). 
 161. See generally Rogers, 458 U.S. at 623–25 (discussing factors such as historical 
discrimination, educational opportunity, and socio-economic status as evidence of 
discriminatory purpose).  When describing a lack of any representation in a redistricting 
plan, it is implied that one is looking at a continuum of elections at which minority voters 
have been unable to obtain representation in the same way that one examines a continuum 
of elections to determine the presence or absence of racially polarized voting. 
 162. H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 67 (2006) (“[T]he Committee heard testimony that if the 
Bossier II standard is left unaddressed ‘all of the places where [we] did not have Black 
representation where the number of seats, members on the commission or county school 
board or city council were increased, we would stand to lose representation, all of those 
governing bodies, if the Bossier II standard is applied.’” (quoting Voting Rights Act:  
Section 5—Preclearance Standards Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. 
 any value as legislative history,
163
 also implies that the discriminatory 
purpose standard should serve to prevent redistricting plans that “lock out 
racial and language minorities from political power.”
164
 
A strong theoretical basis also supports finding a violation of the 
discriminatory purpose standard when a redistricting plan does not provide 
any representation to minority voters. 
For starters, having a minority member
165
 of the governing body can 
change the debate within the governing body, and changing the debate can 
lead to substantive, positive legislative outcomes for minority voters.  For 
example, Professor Kerry Haynie notes that legislators introduce bills to set 
the playing field for debate, and that African American state legislators are 
more likely to introduce legislation in the interests of African American 
constituents.
166
  A simpler, more concrete example comes from United 
States Senator Carole Moseley Braun, an African American from Illinois, 
whose presence in that body led to the defeat of legislation that would have 
renewed a patent on the Confederate flag insignia held by the Daughters of 
the Confederacy.
167
  Indeed, even Abigail Thernstrom—a fierce critic of 
drawing district lines to allow minority voters to elect candidates of 
                                                 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement of Jerome A. Gray, State Field 
Director, Alabama Democratic Conference))). 
 163. See supra notes 104–09  and accompanying text (describing facts that point to the 
Senate Report as being of limited value as legislative history). 
 164. S.R. REP. NO. 109-295, at 16 (2006) (quoting Anita Earls).  The Senate Report cites 
witness testimony that the discriminatory purpose standard covers redistricting choices that 
are “purposefully taken . . . to lock out racial and language minorities from political power.”  
Id.  Of course, the words “purposefully taken” could be interpreted to suggest that direct 
evidence of racial animus on the part of key redistricting actors is necessary to reject a plan 
that fails to provide any representation to minority voters.  Indeed, this interpretation 
receives added support from the Senate Report’s later reference to City of Mobile v. Bolden, 
446 U.S. 55 (1980), a case that seemed to require direct evidence of racial animus as a 
condition of proving discriminatory purpose. S.R. REP. NO. 109-295, at 16 (citing City of 
Mobile).  However, the Senate Report states that the goal of amending Section 5 to restore 
the constitutional purpose standard was to allow for rejection of plans that violate the 
Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment.  Id.  And judicial interpretation of the Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendments has not required direct evidence of racial animus when minority 
voters are locked out from any representation.  See supra notes 155–61. 
 165. Recall that a district that provides minority voters with the ability to elect a 
candidate of choice will nearly always lead to a situation where a member of that minority 
group achieves election to the governing body.  See supra note 134.  
 166. See KERRY L. HAYNIE, AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGISLATORS IN THE AMERICAN STATES 
29–31 (2001) (finding that African American legislators are more likely than white 
legislators to introduce legislation that is in the interests of African American constituents 
even after controlling for factors such as gender, party affiliation, legislative seniority, and 
racial composition of the district that elected the legislator).  In addition to substantive 
legislation, such as spending bills, minority governing officials also play a significant role in 
the introduction and passage of “symbolic” legislation, such as the naming of a post office 
for a civil rights icon.  See KATHERINE TATE, BLACK FACES IN THE MIRROR 103–04 (2003) 
(“[W]ithout Black members in Congress, it is doubtful that Blacks would obtain their fare 
share of symbolic legislation.”). 
 167. DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION 37 (1999). 
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choice—seems to admit that having some (as opposed to zero) minority 
representation at the table changes the nature of legislative debate.
168
 
Having some minority representation can also change the dynamic in 
terms of access to power for minority voters.  For example, having a 
minority representative may mean that minority citizens get better results in 
terms of constituent services.
169
  As one staffer of a newly elected minority 
member of Congress told Wisconsin’s David Canon in the 1990s, “We 
have a very passive constituency.  They very seldom write to us with their 
problems; they are not even aware of the basic resources offered by the 
federal government in many cases.  So we have town meetings and radio 
call-in shows every week to try and get out the word.”
170
  Moreover, while 
minority elected officials will be more likely to reach out to minority 
constituents, minority constituents may be more likely to reach out to 
minority elected officials because they perceive minority officials to be 
responsive.
171
 
There is also a symbolic aspect to having minority representation in 
terms of the message it can send both to minority and white citizens.  On 
the one hand, minority representation sends the message to minority 
residents that they are not second-class citizens,
172
 it may inspire minority 
                                                 
 168. See ABIGAIL THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES COUNT? 238–39 (1987).  As Thernstrom 
has written: 
There is no doubt that where “racial politics . . . dominates the electoral process” 
and public office is largely reserved for whites, the method of voting should be 
restructured to promote minority officeholding. . . . Whether on a city council, on a 
county commission, or in the state legislature, blacks inhibit the expression of 
prejudice, act as spokesmen for black interests, dispense patronage, and often 
facilitate the discussion of topics (such as black crime) that whites are reluctant to 
raise.  That is, governing bodies function differently when they are racially mixed, 
particularly where blacks are new to politics and where racially insensitive 
language and discrimination in the provision of services are long-established 
political habits. 
Id. 
 169. See LUBLIN, supra note 50, at 99–100 (“African-American voters often feel more 
comfortable approaching a black representative for constituent service or about a public 
policy concern.”). 
 170. Canon, supra note 167, at 58. 
 171. See TATE, supra note 166, at 120 (“When asked if they had a problem that their 
representative could do something about, how helpful would that representative be, the vast 
majority (88.5 percent) of [African American survey respondents] represented by Black 
Democrats felt that their legislator would be somewhat helpful. . . . . At the same time, 76.5 
to 71% of those respondents believed that their White legislator, either Republican or 
Democrat, would be very or somewhat helpful.”); Claudine Gay, Spirals of Trust?  The 
Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Relationship Between Citizens and Their 
Government, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 717, 718 (2002) (noting that “black constituents . . . are 
more likely to contact black representatives”). 
 172. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, Editors’ Introduction to QUIET 
REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH 3, 16 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994) 
(“Tom McCain was one of the first blacks elected to office since Reconstruction in 
Edgefield County, South Carolina—home of racist firebrand Benjamin ‘Pitchfork Ben’ 
Tillman and of long-time opponent of desegregation J. Strom Thurmond.  Speaking in 1981, 
McCain said, ‘There’s an inherent value in officeholding that goes far beyond picking up 
the garbage.  A race of people who are excluded from public office will always be second 
 residents to have greater confidence in government,
173
 and it may increase 
civic participation among minority residents.
174
  On the other hand, having 
some minority representation also tells whites that minority residents are 
not second-class citizens,
175
 and to the extent that whites have irrational 
views of minority competence in electoral office, having minority 
representation may help diminish the prevalence of such views.
176
 
                                                 
class.’”); TATE, supra note 166, at 15 (“Descriptive representation remains potently 
symbolic to Blacks today.  It represents their inclusion in the polity, the progress achieved in 
America’s race relations, and their political power in the U.S. system.”); Pildes, Modern 
VRA, supra note 27, at 2 (“Particularly for groups long excluded from political power, 
guaranteed representation is an expressively important sign of equal political standing and 
citizenship, as well as a functional means of securing participation in power.”). 
 173. See LUBLIN, supra note 50, at 37 (“The election of African Americans and Latinos 
to Congress legitimates the political process for members of these previously powerless and 
excluded groups.”); TATE, supra note 166, at 151 (“Being descriptively represented in 
Congress had no bearing on whether Congress was doing a good job or not. . . . Still, Blacks 
who believed Blacks to be numerically strong in Congress had more positive views of 
Congress and greater trust than those Blacks who felt Blacks were numerically weak.”); 
THERNSTROM, supra note 168, at 239 (“Few would disagree that, in a heavily black southern 
city with a long history of police brutality, black confidence in the police force demands that 
it be integrated.  The point applies in politics as well:  where blacks have long been 
disfranchised and remain excluded from office, black confidence in government is in the 
public interest.”); KENNY J. WHITBY, THE COLOR OF REPRESENTATION 81 (1997) (“The 
social composition of a representative body is important from a symbolic perspective 
because it demonstrates to groups in society that they are taken seriously by the government.  
Sociological similarity (descriptive representation) helps to promote good representation 
and political stability by increasing members of the group’s faith and trust in government 
(symbolic representation).”); Lawrence Bobo & Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., Race, 
Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment, 84 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 377, 383 
(1990) (“Blacks in high-empowerment areas trust local officials more and expect to have 
greater influence with them than do blacks in low-empowerment areas.”). 
 174. See Bobo & Gilliam, supra note 173, at 387 (“Our results show, first, that where 
blacks hold positions of political power, they are more active and participate at higher rates 
than whites of comparable socioeconomic status.”); see also Michael S. Kang, Race and 
Democratic Contestation, 117 YALE L.J. 734, 785 (2008) (“Although empirical research on 
majority-minority districts for African-Americans is more mixed [than that for Latinos], the 
social science literature generally finds higher levels of political participation by African 
Americans in jurisdictions of minority empowerment.”); cf. TATE, supra note 166, at 141 
(concluding that “political knowledge” increases among African Americans when they are 
represented by a person of their own race in the U.S. House of Representatives, but not 
finding an increase in other measures of voter participation). 
 175. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 54 (1994) (reporting that one 
African American state legislator worked to ensure the election of other African Americans 
to help dispel “the myth that some white kids might have that blacks can’t serve or shouldn’t 
be serving at the courthouse”); LUBLIN, supra note 50, at 100 (“The election of white ethnic 
representatives visibly symbolized their clout and status as well as their assimilation into the 
American polity.  African-American efforts to elect blacks to public office are both utterly 
understandable and American.”). 
 176. HAYNIE, supra note 166, at 63 (“[T]he increased presence of African Americans in 
public policy-making institutions challenges the notion that African Americans cannot or 
should not be trusted in positions of authority and power.”); THERNSTROM, supra note 168, 
at 239 (“And where whites—and often blacks—regard skin color as a qualification for 
office (in part because no experience suggests otherwise), the election of blacks helps to 
break both white and black patterns of behavior.  In the documentary film ‘Hands That 
Picked Cotton,’ a white store owner in a county supervisor race in Mississippi explains that 
he chose to run because he didn’t want the job to get in the hands of the ‘wrong person,’ 
someone who couldn’t manage money.  In such a setting, the lesson that blacks are not 
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While there are solid doctrinal and theoretical reasons for federal 
intervention to provide some representation to minority voters when the 
redistricting plan provides no representation, one theoretical angle that has 
yet to be developed in detail is how politics as markets should treat such a 
scenario.  Does this scenario amount to a situation where incumbent 
politicians have the system “locked up” in such a way that the political 
market does not function properly?  In the view of New York University’s 
Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes, judicial intervention into the political 
process
177
 becomes especially appropriate in the absence of robust partisan 
competition.
178
  There are two forms of political lockups identified by 
Professors Issacharoff and Pildes.  The first is “a precommitment pact 
among existing elites that frustrates easy penetration by outsiders.”
179
  Here 
they provide The White Primary Cases
180
 as an example, which they view 
as a “partisan tool to deter any internal party factions from seeking to forge 
destabilizing coalitions with black allies.”
181
  The second form is when 
incumbent parties “deploy state authority to raise entry barriers against 
potential third-party challengers.”
182
 
When it comes to the application of this theory in the voting rights 
context, particularly in the context of representation, Professors Issacharoff 
and Pildes suggest the absence or presence of competition between the two 
major parties may be the touchstone as to whether judicial intervention is 
necessary on behalf of racial minority groups.
183
  They seem to view 
judicial intervention on behalf of minority voters in the 1970s and, perhaps, 
                                                 
necessarily the wrong people, that money can be safe in black hands, is one that only 
experience can teach.”). 
 177. Presumably, the Attorney General’s intervention into state and local political 
processes amounts to the functional equivalent of judicial intervention. 
 178. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 648 (“Where there 
is an appropriately robust market in partisan competition, there is less justification for 
judicial intervention.  Where courts can discern that existing partisan forces have 
manipulated these background rules, courts should strike down those manipulations in order 
to ensure an appropriately competitive partisan environment.”); Pildes, Foreword, supra 
note 23, at 98 (“If partisan competition is an effective means of realizing representational 
equality and if first-order mandates of equality can undermine competition and hence 
effective equality itself, courts would best ensure equality by policing the background 
conditions of competition.”); see also Pildes, Modern VRA, supra note 27, at 9 (“All this 
might suggest that the judicial role, in a mature regime of intense partisan competition, 
should shift from the first-order imposition of representational equality to the second-order 
task of securing the conditions of effective partisan competition itself.”). 
 179. Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 651. 
 180. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF ET. AL., THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY:  LEGAL STRUCTURE OF 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS 208–26 (3d. ed. 2007) (describing The White Primary Cases as a 
series of decisions by the Supreme Court involving the State of Texas and the Texas 
Democratic Party’s attempt to exclude African American voters from participating in the 
electoral process). 
 181. Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 651. 
 182. Id.  
 183. See id. at 702 (“When there is a partisan lockup, courts should intervene both to 
enhance competition and to remedy vote dilution claims.”). 
 the 1980s as necessary
184
 and justified because of the one-party 
stranglehold the Democratic Party had on the South.
185
  However, by the 
1990s, as the Republican Party grew in strength, they argue the South 
became much more “normal” in its politics and, therefore, that intervention 
on behalf of minority voters became less justified.
186
  What they seem to 
think is that partisan competition forces racial considerations to take a back 
seat to partisan motivation and that, as a result, political actors will engage 
minority voters as a means of maximizing overall partisan gain.
187
  
However, it seems likely that in the context of a total lack of any 
representation for minority voters, the presence or absence of partisan 
competition will make little difference as to whether the political market 
becomes locked up by whites who seek to prevent competition from 
minority interests.
188
  Perhaps the best way to engage in such an analysis is 
                                                 
 184. See Pildes, Theory, supra note 24, at 1620 (concluding that the goal of political 
equality was “appropriately enforced in the 1970s through constitutional doctrine”); see also 
Richard H. Pildes, Diffusion of Political Power and the Voting Rights Act, 24 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 119, 131–34 (2000) [hereinafter Pildes, Diffusion] (describing favorably judicial 
intervention on behalf of minority voters in Mobile, Alabama); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 
23, at 87 (“By 1982, the VRA served as a rough but effective tool to destabilize this system 
of [racial] polarization and political monopoly.”). 
 185. See Issacharoff, Own Success, supra note 26, at 1713 (noting that one of the 
preconditions for the success of Section 5 was that “blacks in the historic Jim Crow South 
had no avenue of political redress” and “even if able to vote, they could never aspire to be 
influential swing voters in a one-party political environment”); see also Pildes, Foreword, 
supra note 23, at 87 (“Because the Democratic Party at that time faced no external 
competition from a strong alternative party, it had little incentive to respond to claims 
pressed by recently enfranchised black voters.”). 
 186. See Pildes, Modern VRA, supra note 27, at 4 (“In contrast to its days as a lazy 
monopolist, the Democratic Party [in the South] is now engaged in an intensely competitive 
partisan struggle for every inch of political terrain.”). 
 187. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 702 (“But where 
there is intense partisan competition, disputes over the relative distribution of political 
power could be left to democratic politics itself . . . .”); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 
97 (“Put in other terms, competition itself creates the incentives and provides the checks that 
most effectively realize representational equality.”); Pildes, Theory, supra note 24, at 1619 
(“[When] two major parties, however, are contesting every electoral seat—especially where 
‘the black vote is the bedrock upon which the Statewide Democratic [Party power] is 
anchored’—success in this struggle might discipline parties (or that party in which black 
voters are concentrated, if one exists) so that they cannot afford to draw election districts in 
ways that dilute black voting power.  If competition forces partisan gain to be the overriding 
motivation, black voters will be distributed in ways that maximize that overall partisan 
goal.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 188. Cf. FRANCES FOX PIVEN ET. AL., KEEPING DOWN THE BLACK VOTE 16 (2009) (“In 
fact, the historical evidence shows that the argument that attributes the democratizing 
function of voter mobilization to competitive parties is sometimes right, but also often 
wrong.  While party competition has on occasion led the parties to mobilize new voters, 
much of the time it has not, and it has certainly not led them to mobilize marginalized 
groups of nonvoters.”). 
  In an early article that pre-dated publication of Politics As Markets, Professor 
Issacharoff implied (in the context of describing federal jurisprudence related to at-large 
elections) that coalitions between white and minority voters would not necessarily occur just 
because minority voters could participate in the electoral process. Issacharoff, Polarized 
Voting, supra note 122, at 1875–76 (criticizing the idea that white voters will coalesce with 
minority voters when minority voters become a powerful “swing” vote).  Professor 
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to review a couple of concrete hypothetical situations.  In these situations, 
consider a city with the following basic political dynamic:  five single-
member districts, each with a twenty percent African American population, 
racially polarized voting, residence patterns that make it possible to draw a 
compact district that would provide African American voters with the 
ability to elect a candidate of their choice, and a lack of any district to 
provide African American voters with representation. 
For starters, let us take a situation where no partisan competition 
exists—either because nonpartisan elections are the norm or because one 
political party, most likely the Democratic Party, represents the only game 
in town.  Let us say that the current districts are all eighty percent white 
and twenty percent African American.
189
  In such a situation, what can be 
done to break up such an entrenched white monopoly?  Seemingly, very 
little.  In the context of nonpartisan elections, there are no partisan cues to 
trump racial politics.  In the context of one-party rule by Democrats, 
African Americans could try to form a separate political party, but the costs 
of creating a separate party are extraordinary.  Moreover, formation of a 
separate party likely will be ineffective because the separate party, which 
presumably represents only about twenty percent of the population in each 
district, will be consistently defeated at the polls. 
Instead of creating a separate party, though, African American residents 
could try to establish a coalition with a disaffected (read “losing”) white 
faction, but there are several barriers to such a coalition.  First, white 
political leaders may view any attempt to coalesce with African American 
voters as political suicide.
190
  In other words, even if it might seem rational 
to do so, the disaffected white faction might not be willing to coalesce with 
African Americans because the white faction does not want to risk 
antagonizing their base of support.
191
  Second, assume the disaffected 
                                                 
Issacharoff explained that “[i]t is striking that theories purporting to promote more effective 
minority electoral participation proffer no empirical support for the claim that white voters 
will indeed be more likely to coalesce with minority voters in the absence of judicial 
intervention”). Id.  Professor Issacharoff also briefly recognized that judicial intervention to 
eliminate at-large election systems in situations where voting was racially polarized and 
minorities lacked representation exemplified the judiciary attempting to police “[p]olitical 
market failure.”  Id. at 1870.  In some sense, my aim here is to extend the analysis from at-
large elections where coalitions are not forming to redistricting plans where such coalitions 
are not forming. 
 189. Admittedly, in the real world not all of the districts would be eighty percent white 
and twenty percent African American in terms of the demographic split.  However, it is not 
likely that having districts with African American populations of, say, between ten percent 
and forty percent would substantially change the analysis presented here. 
 190. Cf. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE 236 (2000) (describing the one-party 
Democratic South between 1920 and WWII and how “no white faction that dared to support 
black enfranchisement could hope to survive long enough to build a coalition with 
prospective African-American voters”). 
 191. Cf. FOX PIVEN ET. AL., supra note 188, at 16 (“Politicians . . . are reluctant to 
undertake the mobilization of new voters, even when the ‘logic’ of electoral competition 
suggests a new course.  This is especially the case when the new voters are drawn from 
 whites and African Americans decide to join forces and run a slate of 
candidates (one in each district)—say, four whites and one African 
American.  The problem here, though, is racially polarized voting.  It is 
unlikely the disaffected whites will be able to convince their white 
supporters to support an African American candidate and unless they do 
convince a substantial number of white voters to cross over, the African 
American candidate will lose.  Third, the disaffected whites could run an 
all-white slate with the promise to African American voters that, upon 
election to office, they will draw a single-member district to provide 
African American voters with representation.  However, it is less likely 
African American voters will turn out strongly for an all-white slate.  
Moreover, even if elected, the new white incumbents will likely have to 
destabilize the districts under which they were elected and choose which of 
the white incumbents to “throw under the bus.”  And, if racial polarization 
is the norm, those white incumbents will also have to take the blame at the 
next election for placing a racial minority in a seat of power.  In short, 
when elections are nonpartisan or one political party rules, it is unlikely 
African American voters will win representation through the political 
process alone. 
Now let us switch the hypothetical.  Instead of one-party dominance or 
nonpartisan elections, let us assume partisan competition exists.  In 
addition, assume African American residents vote overwhelmingly for the 
Democratic candidates—a likely event in this day and age.  Moreover, 
assume white Democrats form a three to two majority of the council with 
districts that have minority populations of thirty percent, thirty percent, 
thirty percent, five percent and five percent.  (To be clear, the white 
Democrats control the outcomes and achieve election in the thirty percent 
districts while the Republicans do likewise in the five percent districts.) 
In this scenario, African American voters once again seem unlikely to 
gain representation.  For starters, Democrats do not have much incentive to 
run an African American candidate in one of the existing districts because 
in the context of racially polarized voting, that is a sure loss.  Democrats 
also do not have much incentive to draw a district to provide African 
American voters an ability to elect a candidate of their choice because 
drawing such a district would likely lead to a majority-Republican city 
council because of the loss of solid Democratic voters in the other districts.   
Of course, Democrats do have an incentive to not lose their strong 
electoral base and Republicans do have an incentive to try and chip away at 
that strong electoral base (either through attracting votes or depressing 
African American turnout).  However, unless African Americans switch 
                                                 
marginalized groups that risk antagonizing others in the party’s electoral coalition.”) 
(emphasis added). 
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their allegiance substantially to Republicans (an unlikely event), 
Republicans are not going to provide representation for minority voters.  In 
addition, Democrats have an incentive to provide some substantive 
representation to keep their base of support in the fold, but the benefits 
previously described above that flow from direct African American 
representation will never be achieved.
192
  In sum, where robust political 
competition exists, Democrats have a hold on power, and minority voters 
have no representation, it seems unlikely that the political dynamic will 
shift in such a way as to create representation for minority voters. 
Now, again, let us switch the hypothetical but change the partisan 
dynamics.  Again, let us assume partisan competition exists and again let us 
make the reasonable assumption that African American voters 
overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates.  This time, however, let us 
assume Republicans form a 3-2 majority on the council with districts that 
have minority populations of ten percent, ten percent, ten percent, thirty-
five percent, and thirty-five percent. 
Again, African American voters seem unlikely to obtain representation.  
Presumably Republicans have some interest in expanding their one person 
majority on the council by, perhaps, drawing a safe African American 
district that bleaches one of the other Democratic districts in such a way to 
make it perform for a Republican.  But there are likely to be strong 
disincentives to do so.  For instance, drawing such a district may 
necessitate major revisions in the district lines, and the three incumbent 
Republicans are likely to opt for the safety of their own existing districts 
rather than make wholesale changes.
193
  Moreover, drawing a safe district 
that leads to the election of an African American candidate may incur the 
wrath of the majority populace that votes along racial lines.  Put simply, 
why would incumbent Republicans take the risk of destabilizing this 
system that has led them to success?  In addition, it is quite possible that in 
a place where no representation for African American voters exists, there is 
a tacit understanding among whites of all political stripes that African 
American representation will not be allowed. 
Indeed, a concrete example in which political competition existed 
between Democrats and Republicans but yet minority voters were denied 
any ability to elect their candidates of choice was seen in litigation 
involving the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors.  During the 1980 
redistricting, a majority of the Board of Supervisors’ seats were held by 
Republicans whereas a minority of the seats was held by Democrats—
                                                 
 192. See supra notes 166–76 and accompanying text (describing benefits of minority 
representation). 
 193. See FOX PIVEN ET. AL., supra note 188, at 16 (“Politicians seek the stability that 
makes electoral outcomes predictable and manageable, and manageable with limited 
effort.”). 
 seemingly a situation where a two-party, rather than one-party, system 
prevailed.
194
  However, all sides (Democrat and Republican) worked 
together during the 1980 redistricting to fragment the Latino population.
195
  
So, while in theory partisan competition might change the political 
dynamic, at least in the context of Los Angeles County, it did not. 
At the end of the day, in the context of a redistricting where racially 
polarized voting prevails and minority voters remain totally unrepresented, 
it seems unlikely that the presence or absence of partisan political 
competition will make a substantial difference.  Each major political party 
likely has an interest in maintaining the racial status quo:  a white lock-up 
on political power. 
To be fair, Professors Issacharoff and Pildes may well agree with this 
analysis.  In their explications of their theory of competition, they have 
often been tentative in their application of the theory to the question of 
racial and ethnic representation.
196
  In addition, they have recognized that 
electoral competition may be only one of many competing values in 
formulating the framework of the law of democracy and that other 
justifications for providing minority representation exist.
197
  Moreover, to 
the extent that they have advocated for a new view of minority voting 
rights based on partisan competition, the concrete examples they have 
provided have almost always been in reference to state legislative 
redistricting, rather than local government structures, and have also been in 
contexts where minority voters have some representation.
198
  Nonetheless, 
                                                 
 194. See Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 195. Id. (finding that Democratic board members agreed to transfer population 
distributions to maintain the elected status quo).  Interestingly, bipartisan cooperation was 
needed to pass Los Angeles County’s redistricting plan.  The board was split three-to-two 
with a Republican majority, but a supermajority of four votes was needed to pass a 
redistricting plan.  Id.  It is possible that the super-majority rules for redistricting provided 
strong incentives for retaining the status quo and that without the super-majority 
requirement, Republican members of the county board would have been more able to draw a 
Latino district at the expense of an incumbent Democrat. 
 196. See Issacharoff & Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 706 (“These 
perspectives on the VRA are offered in a speculative vein.”); Pildes, Foreword, supra note 
23, at 98 (“This [politics as markets] perspective is not meant to endorse specific solutions 
for future applications of the VRA.”); Pildes, Theory, supra note 24, at 1620 (“Whether the 
changing dynamics of partisan competition in the newly emergent two-party South should 
affect judicial doctrine or statutory policy with respect to vote dilution would depend on 
many considerations—some theoretical, some empirical.”). 
 197. See Pildes, Theory, supra note 24, at 1620 (“Theoretically, the discussion would 
have to consider the precise values that underlie current vote dilution policy; there are 
different ways of understanding the reasons that vote dilution is banned, and some of these 
reasons might not be affected at all by whether partisan competition is robust or absent.”); 
see also Samuel Issacharoff, Why Elections?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 684, 688 (2002) (“It is 
important to note, however, that the competition model is not intended to explain 
democratic governance or democratic legitimacy fully.”). 
 198. See Issacharoff, Own Success, supra note 26, at 1714 (describing how African 
Americans are no longer “political outsiders” in the Section 5 covered jurisdictions and how 
Southern legislatures are responsive to minority claims for representation); Issacharoff & 
Pildes, Politics as Markets, supra note 22, at 702–03 (focusing on state legislative 
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it is important to explicitly recognize that in the absence of existing 
minority representation, partisan competition alone will not inexorably lead 
to minority representation and that federal intervention can serve to bust up 
racial monopolies in the context of a functioning two-party structure, as 
well as when only a one-party structure exists. 
In sum, a denial of preclearance on discriminatory purpose grounds 
when a redistricting plan fails to provide any representation to minority 
voters can be justified on a number of levels.  First, as a matter of doctrine, 
the most recent Supreme Court case related to discriminatory purpose and 
electoral structures implies almost definitive emphasis on the total 
exclusion of minority voters from representation.  And historically, total 
exclusion has led to judicial findings of purposeful discrimination.
199
  
Second, legislative history seems to endorse this interpretation.  Third, as a 
matter of theory, numerous and substantial benefits inure to providing some 
minority representation where none exists.  Fourth, with regard to politics 
as markets, situations where minority voters have no representation seem 
likely to result in the functional equivalent of a pre-commitment pack on 
the part of elites to exclude minority voters regardless of whether vibrant 
partisan competition between the major political parties exists.  Put 
somewhat differently, in these situations, a racial, rather than partisan 
lockup of the market exists and intervention is justified to dismantle the 
lockup. 
C. Failure to Provide Additional Minority Representation 
Another common redistricting situation occurs when minority voters 
already enjoy some representation but it is possible to provide more 
representation.  Here, several key points need to be made.  First, the 
Attorney General commonly would deny preclearance in such instances 
during the 1990s redistricting cycle.  Second, this sort of Section 5 
enforcement by the Attorney General received  
severe criticism from the Supreme Court.  Third, going forward, 
preclearance should not be denied using the discriminatory purpose 
standard when a redistricting plan fails to create additional minority 
representation when minority voters already enjoy representation absent 
other factors, such as direct evidence of racial animus. 
                                                 
redistricting in the South); see also Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 88 (“Several changes 
in the larger structural context of democratic politics test whether principles of political 
equality and fair representation should be understood as general ideals or contingent 
functions of certain background structural conditions.  First, due in part to the VRA itself, a 
substantial contingent of black elected officials, particularly in the South, now has a seat at 
the legislative table.”). 
 199. Issacharoff, Polarized Voting, supra note 122, at 1844 (noting that many of the 
1970s vote dilution cases addressed a pattern of “complete exclusion” of African Americans 
from elected office). 
 An example of this type of Section 5 enforcement—demanding 
additional minority representation when some minority representation 
already exists—occurred during the 1991 redistricting of the nine-
member
200
 Catahoula Parish (Louisiana) Police Jury.
201
  The Attorney 
General’s letter denying preclearance noted that the parish was twenty six 
percent African American, yet the proposed redistricting plan provided for 
only a single majority-minority district.
202
  The letter also noted that it was 
possible to create an additional African American majority district by 
curing the overconcentration of African American population in one area of 
the parish as well as the fragmentation of African American population in 
another separate area.
203
  Finally, the letter noted that parish officials knew 
                                                 
 200. See About Counties:  Catahoula Parish, LA, National Association of Counties, 
http://www.naco.org/Template.cfm?Section=Find_a_County&Template=/cffiles/counties/co
unty.cfm&id=22025 (last visited May 23, 2010). 
 201. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to H. C. 
Peck, Jr., President, Catahoula Parish Police Jury (Oct. 25, 1991), in Voting Rights Act:  
Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 972–73 (2005).  The letter to 
Catahoula Parish is, perhaps, emblematic of one of the problems with the Attorney 
General’s enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard during the 1990s redistricting 
cycle:  the letters sometimes lacked a detailed, persuasive analysis as to why a redistricting 
plan did not merit preclearance.  See id. (denying preclearance on discriminatory purpose 
grounds in a two-page, six-paragraph letter to Catahoula Parish that really contains only a 
single paragraph of three sentences setting forth the reasons why the plan was 
discriminatory in purpose).  Indeed, such a letter stands in sharp contrast to, say, the federal 
district court’s findings in the paradigmatic discriminatory purpose case of Busbee v. Smith. 
549 F. Supp. 494 (1982) aff’d, 459 U.S. 1166 (1983); see supra notes 135–44 and 
accompanying text (describing Busbee). 
To be fair, the general nature of the administrative preclearance process—operating on 
short, sixty-day deadlines with limited resources—means that letters from the Attorney 
General cannot be as comprehensive as a federal district court opinion.  Moreover, the 
problem of tight deadlines and lack of resources that apply to the administrative 
preclearance process at all times become particularly acute problems in the years 
immediately following the release of decennial census data when redistricting activity 
reaches its zenith.  See infra notes 325–330 (discussing the nature of preclearance review).  
In addition, sometimes the Attorney General has evidence explaining the rationale for the 
denial of preclearance that does not make it into the letter.  Nevertheless, at least going 
forward, the Attorney General should endeavor to explain the rationale for denials of 
preclearance based on discriminatory purpose better than the explanation provided in the 
1991 letter to Catahoula Parish. 
 202. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to H. C. 
Peck, Jr., President, Catahoula Parish Police Jury, supra note 202, at 972 (“We note at the 
outset that according to the 1990 Census, 26 percent of the population of Catahoula Parish is 
black, yet the parish’s proposed plan provides for only one black majority district.”). 
 203. Id. (“The parish’s black population is situated in such a way that readily available or 
discernible alternatives would include at least one additional black majority district, but this 
result seems to have been avoided through the overconcentration of black population into 
one district in the Jonesville area and fragmentation of black population concentrations in 
the Sicily Island area.”).  It is unclear whether the letter contemplated creation of a district 
that linked populations from the Sicily Island area to the Jonesville area.  Jonesville lies in 
the center of the parish and Sicily Island is a little more than 20 miles away in the parish’s 
northeast corner.  In cases decided after this letter was written, the Supreme Court criticized 
linking African American populations that were not geographically and culturally compact.  
See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 908 (1995) (“The Eleventh District lost the black 
population of Macon, but picked up Savannah, thereby connecting the black neighborhoods 
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African American residents desired “to have their voting potential better 
recognized” and that parish officials “failed to offer any persuasive 
explanation for its failure to cure the overconcentration and fragmentation 
of [the African American] population evident in the proposed plan.”
204
  For 
these reasons, the Attorney General denied preclearance on discriminatory 
purpose grounds.
205
 
The Catahoula Parish example is fairly typical of the type of analysis in 
which the Attorney General engaged in the 1990s.  A fair number of 
denials of preclearance on discriminatory purpose grounds by the Attorney 
General during this time period involved the following basic scenario:  an 
increase in the proportion of minority population in the state or local 
jurisdiction; the ability to draw an additional district that would provide 
minority voters with an ability to elect a candidate of choice; a minority 
community request for an additional district, often including the 
presentation of at least one alternative redistricting plan creating such a 
district that was rejected by the state or local government; and the lack of a 
legitimate, non-racial explanation for the failure to adopt the alternative 
plan that would have provided additional minority representation. 
There was, however, one additional, key wrinkle in some of these 
scenarios:  incumbency protection.  Redistricting actors sometimes 
confessed to having rejected a redistricting plan that increased minority 
representation because of a desire to keep incumbents in office.  In this 
way, incumbency protection was offered as a legitimate, non-racial reason 
                                                 
of metropolitan Atlanta and the poor black populace of coastal Chatham County, though 260 
miles apart in distance and worlds apart in culture.”). 
 204. See Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to H. C. 
Peck, Jr., President, Catahoula Parish Police Jury, supra note 202, at 972–73. 
 205.  Another example of this type of analysis is the Attorney General’s denial of 
preclearance to the City of Griffin’s (Georgia) 1992 redistricting plan.  Griffin, which had a 
1990 Census population of 47.8% African American—a 5.3 percentage point increase since 
1980—was governed by a seven member board of commissioners, with one member elected 
at-large and six members elected from single-member districts.  See Letter from John R. 
Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Andrew J. Whalen III, Esq. (Nov. 30, 
1992), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
615–17 (2005).  The existing redistricting plan allowed African American voters the 
opportunity to elect candidates of their choice in only two seats; the proposed plan preserved 
these opportunities but did not, as the city claimed, create an additional opportunity for 
African American voters to elect their candidate of choice in a third district—District 6.  Id.  
The Attorney General noted: 
[D]emographic analysis of the proposed plan reveals a significant area of minority 
population concentration has been fragmented by the line dividing proposed 
Districts 4 and 6.  It appears that it would have been possible to reduce this 
fragmentation, and in the process create a third district in which black voters would 
have a clear opportunity to elect candidates of their choice.  Indeed, one such 
alternative plan was presented to the board of commissioners for its consideration 
during the redistricting process.  Although we have invited the city to address with 
more specificity claims that the city’s redistricting choices were motivated by the 
desire to limit minority electoral opportunity unfairly, the city has failed to do so. 
Id. 
 for rejecting a plan that expanded minority voting strength.  However, the 
Attorney General would reject incumbency protection as a legitimate 
reason for failing to create additional representation for minority voters and 
deny preclearance to the redistricting plan on discriminatory purpose 
grounds. 
Indeed, many of the Attorney General’s denials of preclearance to 
statewide redistricting plans that so exorcized the Supreme Court in the 
context of racial gerrymandering fell squarely into this  
analytical framework.
206
  Take, for example, North Carolina’s 1991 
congressional redistricting plan.  The proposed plan contained one 
majority-minority district in the northeast region of the state.
207
  However, 
the Attorney General noted that the boundary lines in the south-central to 
southeastern part of the State “appear[ed] to minimize minority voting 
strength given the significant minority population in this area of the 
state.”
208
  After noting that there was “significant interest on the part of the 
minority community in creating a second majority-minority district in 
North Carolina” and that alternative plans existed that would accomplish 
this result, the Attorney General wrote: 
These alternatives, and other variations identified in our analysis, appear 
to provide the minority community with an opportunity to elect a second 
member of congress of their choice to office, but, despite this fact, such 
configuration for a second majority-minority district was dismissed for 
what appears to be pretextual reasons.  Indeed, some commenters have 
alleged that the state’s decision to place the concentrations of minority 
voters in the southern part of the state into white majority districts 
attempts to ensure the election of white incumbents while minimizing 
minority electoral strength.  Such submergence will have the expected 
result of “minimiz[ing] or cancel[ling] out the voting strength [of black 
and Native American voters].”  Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 
(1965).  Although invited to do so, the state has yet to provide 
convincing evidence to the contrary.
209
 
                                                 
 206. Supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 207. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Tiare B. 
Smiley, Spec. Deputy Att’y Gen. for N.C. (Dec. 18, 1991) (on file with author). 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. (emphasis added).  The Attorney General’s 1991 denial of preclearance to the 
redistricting plan for the police jury and board of education in St. Landry Parish (Louisiana) 
provides another example of this type of analysis involving incumbency protection.  The 
1990 Census showed that the parish was forty percent African American and that African 
American voters had three “safe” districts (out of thirteen), and a fourth district with “a bare 
black majority in population” that  
also “offered black voters some electoral potential.”  See Letter from John R. Dunne, 
Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to E. Kenneth Selle, President, Tri-S Assocs., Inc. 
(Dec. 16, 1991), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 884–86 (2005).  The Attorney General, however, found that “the choices made by the 
parish in these redistricting plans were calculated to minimize black voting strength” 
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Importantly, while not a part of the letter to North Carolina quoted 
above, the doctrinal citation provided by the Attorney General for these 
types of denials of preclearance where incumbency protection seemed to be 
the driving force behind adoption of the plan were two circuit court cases—
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Ketchum v. Byrne
210
 and the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision in Garza v. County of Los Angeles.
211
 
However, there are a number of reasons—doctrinal, pragmatic, and 
theoretical—why this type of discriminatory purpose enforcement should 
be a dead-letter going forward.  For starters, the primary doctrinal 
foundation on which the Attorney General relied was weak.  The two cases 
cited in the Attorney General’s correspondence during these years were 
from the Seventh Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, not the United States 
Supreme Court.  Moreover, even discounting the lower court nature of the 
decisions, the underlying facts of these circuit court decisions were quite 
distinct from the contexts in which the Attorney General often employed 
these precedents. 
The Seventh Circuit decision, Ketchum v. Byrne, was inapposite 
primarily because the decision involved incumbency protection in the 
context of a retrogression of minority voting strength.
212
  The analysis in 
                                                 
because the parish had rejected a “suggestion” to “provide a greater electoral opportunity for 
blacks” by creating one or two additional districts with a majority of African American 
population.  Id.  According to the Attorney General, the rejection of the “approach” that 
provided additional majority-minority districts “[had] not been satisfactorily explained on 
non-racial grounds,” noting: 
Of particular significance in this regard is our understanding that the incumbents in 
[the potential majority-minority districts] were especially concerned that an 
increase in the black percentages in their districts might threaten their re-election 
chances.  Although incumbency protection is not in and of itself an inappropriate 
consideration, it may not be accomplished at the expense of minority voting 
potential.  Garza v. County of Los Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, [sic] (9th Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 681 (1991); Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398, 1408–09 (7th Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985). 
Id.  Notably, the letter contains an obvious typographical error by failing to provide a pin 
cite for the Garza decision.  In other letters that reject incumbency protection as an adequate 
explanation for state and local redistricting choices, the citation provided for Garza is “918 
F.2d 763, 771.”  See, e.g., Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights 
Div., to Neta J. Bowman, Clerk/Cnty. Manager, La Paz Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (July 17, 
1992), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
1293–95 (2005) (emphasis added).  
 210. 740 F.2d 1398, 1408–09 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 211. 918 F.2d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 212. The use of Ketchum as support for the Attorney General’s discriminatory purpose 
analysis was also suspect for a couple of other reasons.  First, the case involved a holding 
under the “results” test of Section 2 of the Act, not the constitutional prohibition on 
discriminatory purpose.  740 F.2d at 1406 (“We approve [the trial court’s] finding of a 
section 2 violation based on retrogression and on the manipulation of racial voting 
populations to achieve retrogression.”).  Second, the best language supporting the 
proposition that non-minority incumbents cannot protect themselves by declining to draw 
districts that increase minority voting strength is dicta that approvingly quotes from a 
district court opinion.  Id. at 1408 (“[U]nder the peculiar circumstances of this case, the 
requirements of incumbency [protection] are so closely intertwined with the need for racial 
 Ketchum hinged upon the fact that incumbency protection was used as an 
excuse to retrogress minority voting strength, not  
as an excuse for failing to enhance minority voting strength.
213
  
Importantly, unlike the facts in Ketchum, when the Attorney General 
declined to preclear redistricting plans solely on discriminatory purpose 
grounds, the Attorney General was not attacking plans that protected non-
minority incumbents through retrogression; rather the Attorney General 
was declining to preclear redistricting plans that protected white 
incumbents by failing to improve the position of minority voters.  The harm 
to minority voters was much greater
214
 in Ketchum because it involved 
retrogression of existing voting strength rather than a failure to increase 
                                                 
dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarily white, district . . . is virtually 
coterminous with a purpose to practice racial discrimination.” (quoting Rybicki v. State Bd. 
of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1109 (N.D. Ill. 1982))). 
 213. Ketchum, 740 F.2d at 1407.  The Court noted that there were several factors that 
provided “strong evidence of intentional discrimination”.  Id.  First, there was retrogression.  
Id.  Second, there was manipulation of boundary lines to accomplish this retrogression.  Id.  
That manipulation took the form of removing more African American voters from certain 
districts than was necessary to comply with the equal protection mandate of one person, one 
vote.  Id.  (“For example, before the 1981 redistricting, four wards . . . had population in 
excess of the [population] required under the redistricting plan.  Population therefore, had to 
be moved out of those wards in order to accomplish the redistricting mandate.  Three of the 
four wards had strong, but not overwhelming, black majorities.  The fourth ward . . . had a 
strong black plurality.  In order to accomplish the required redistribution of population, 
however, blacks were moved out of these wards in much greater numbers than their 
proportion of the population and in greater numbers than required to accomplish the 
necessary reduction.”). 
Interestingly, it is worth noting that a judicial decision similar to Ketchum emanated from 
the post-2000 redistricting of the Massachusetts State House involving a judicial finding of 
a statutory violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  See Black Political Task Force 
v. Galvin, 300 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 (D. Mass. 2004).  In finding the statutory violation, the 
Court attached “great importance” to the fact that minority voters were removed from a 
majority-minority district to protect a white incumbent.  Id. at 313–15. 
 214. One might argue that theoretically there is no greater discrimination when a 
minority group has its voting strength targeted for purposes of incumbency protection by 
retrogression than when a minority group has its voting strength targeted for purposes of 
incumbency protection by a failure to create an additional opportunity for minority voters to 
elect a candidate of choice.  The harm, however, to minority voters from the former scenario 
seems to be far greater than the latter scenario for several reasons.  First, when minority 
voters lose an existing (or burgeoning) ability to elect a candidate of choice, a very visible 
harm will have occurred because it is highly likely that a minority candidate will be replaced 
by a white candidate.  See supra note 134 (explaining the types of candidates who win 
office in ability to elect districts).  Second, beyond visibility, there can also be a substantive 
harm to minority voters stemming from the elimination of an ability to elect district because 
minority candidates tend to substantively represent minority voters better than white 
candidates.  LUBLIN, supra note 50, at 97 (“African-American representatives, who 
represent all of the voting-age majority black [House] districts but few non-majority-
minority districts, provide the highest level of substantive representation in addition to 
descriptive representation.”).  Third, from a psychological perspective, there is evidence 
demonstrating that most persons think losing something is worse than failing to gain 
something.  RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 33 (2009) (“Roughly 
speaking, losing something makes you twice as miserable as gaining the same thing makes 
you happy.”).   
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minority voting strength where some minority voting strength already 
existed.
215
 
The Ninth Circuit decision in Garza v. County of Los Angeles
216
 was 
inapposite because it involved a situation where minority voters did not 
have any representation.  To be sure, Garza did involve a situation where 
discriminatory purpose was found because incumbent politicians attempted 
to protect themselves by ensuring that no additional district for minority 
voters would be created.
217
  However, a key aspect of Garza that 
distinguishes it from many of the Attorney General’s denials of 
preclearance during the 1990s is that there was not a single district in the 
existing plan that provided Latino voters with the ability to elect a 
candidate of their choice.
218
  In other words, the non-minority 
representatives had a complete lock-up on every seat on the Los Angeles 
County Board.  In contrast, many of the denials of preclearance on 
discriminatory purpose grounds during the 1990s redistricting cycle were to 
redistricting plans that provided minority voters some ability to elect a 
candidate of choice.  In short, the primary precedents behind a number of 
the Attorney General’s decisions involving redistricting and the 
discriminatory purpose standard did not strongly support the Attorney 
General’s Section 5 enforcement during the 1990s.
219
 
                                                 
 215. While not explicitly involving a decision under the Constitution, the Court’s recent 
decision in LULAC implies that retrogression of minority voting strength in order to protect 
incumbents will lead to a finding of discriminatory purpose.  548 U.S. 399 (2006).  In 
LULAC, the Latino share of the citizen voting age population in a Texas congressional 
district was reduced from 57.5% to 46%.  Id. at 423–24.  The reduction occurred while 
Latinos were “poised to elect their candidate of choice” and served to “undermine[] the 
progress of a racial group that ha[d] been subject to significant voting-related discrimination 
and that was becoming increasingly politically active and cohesive.”  Id. at 438–39.  In this 
context, Justice Kennedy remarked that reducing the voting strength of Latinos in this 
district bore “the mark of intentional discrimination that could give rise to an equal 
protection violation.”  Id. at 440; see also Richard H. Pildes, The Decline of Legally 
Mandated Minority Representation, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139, 1153 (2007) (“Justice Kennedy 
signals, in addition, that in the particular circumstances of the Texas case, he believes 
District 23 essentially involved a case of intentional racial discrimination. . . . LULAC 
indicates only that the Court is prepared to find the VRA violated when a State intentionally 
manipulates election lines to deprive minority voters of the power they would otherwise 
have had the State simply left the lines intact.”).  
 216. 918 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 217. Id. at 771 (“[T]he [district] court noted that the Supervisors appear to have acted 
primarily on the political instinct of self-preservation, the [district] court also found that they 
chose fragmentation of the Hispanic voting population as the avenue by which to achieve 
this self-preservation.  The supervisors intended to create the very discriminatory result that 
occurred.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 218. Id. at 765 (“[Plaintiffs] sought redistricting in order to create a district with a 
Hispanic majority . . .”) (emphasis added); see also id. at 766–68 n.1 (detailing findings of 
fact by the district court related to the history of redistricting of the Los Angeles County 
Board of Supervisors). 
 219. Moreover, even apart from the shaky use of circuit court precedent, incumbency 
protection has long been recognized as a legitimate redistricting criterion by the Supreme 
Court.  In the one person, one vote context, the Court recognized incumbency protection as 
a legitimate redistricting value at least as far back as the 1980s.  See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 
 Moreover, the doctrinal foundations have only become weaker since the 
decisions the Supreme Court handed down in the racial gerrymandering 
cases.  In Miller v. Johnson,
220
 the State of Georgia attempted to justify the 
creation of an additional majority-minority congressional district because 
of the need to secure preclearance from the Attorney General.
221
  The 
                                                 
U.S. 725, 740 (1983) (recognizing “[preservation of] the cores of prior districts, and [the 
avoidance of] contests between incumbent Representatives” as state legislative policies that 
would be “consistent with constitutional norms”); cf. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 
751–54 (1973) (declining to find an equal protection violation when the redistricting plan 
was drawn with the purpose of providing “political fairness” between the two major 
political parties).  In the racial gerrymandering context, the Court has recognized 
incumbency protection as “a legitimate political goal.”  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 
248 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 964 (1996) (“[W]e have recognized incumbency 
protection, at least in the limited form of avoiding contests between incumbents, as a 
legitimate state goal.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted); see also Nathaniel 
Persily, In Defense of Foxes Guarding Henhouses:  The Case for Judicial Acquiesence to 
Incumbent-Protecting Gerrymanders, 116 HARV. L. REV. 649, 653 (2002) (“[W]hen 
confronted with the charge that race motivated the creation of a district, a jurisdiction can 
defend itself by saying that zealous attention to partisanship and incumbent protection, 
rather than race, was the real cause of the district’s shape.”); cf. Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 
541, 549–51 (1999) (noting that the creation of a safe Democratic district was a legitimate 
political objective).  In a recent decision involving application of Section 2 of the Voting 
Rights Act, the Court recognized that incumbency protection could serve as a legitimate 
redistricting purpose so long as voters do not get removed from a district because they are 
likely to vote against the incumbent.  LULAC, 548 U.S. at 441 (plurality opinion) (“If the 
justification for incumbency protection is to keep the community intact so the officeholder 
is accountable for promises made or broken, then the protection seems to accord with 
concern for the voters.  If, on the other hand, incumbency protection means excluding some 
voters from the district simply because they are likely to vote against the officeholder, the 
change is to benefit the officeholder, not the voters.”).  Finally, in the partisan 
gerrymandering context, the Court has recognized that “there always is a neutral explanation 
[for redistricting choices]—if only the time-honored criterion of incumbent protection.”  
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 300 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 220. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 221. The factual background of Miller is complicated by the back-and-forth nature of the 
Section 5 process in relation to the development of Georgia’s post-1990 congressional 
redistricting plan.  The plan in place during the 1980s had ten congressional districts, one of 
which was majority African American.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 906.  The 1990 Census showed 
that Georgia was entitled to an additional (eleventh) congressional district, and the State 
subsequently developed a congressional redistricting plan that had two majority-minority 
districts and a third district with a little over thirty-five percent African American voting age 
population.  Id.  The Attorney General refused to approve the proposed plan, citing the need 
to create a third majority-minority district.  Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y 
Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Mark H. Cohen, Senior Assistant Att’y Gen. for Ga. (Jan. 21, 
1992), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 
703–08 (2005) (“A concern was raised with regard to the principle underlying the 
Congressional redistricting, namely that the Georgia legislative leadership was predisposed 
to limit black voting potential to two black majority districts.”).  The State then drew 
another congressional districting plan that increased the African American population in all 
three of the districts in question.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 907.  Again, though, the Attorney 
General denied preclearance, citing the need for the State to develop a third majority-
minority congressional district.  Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil 
Rights Div., to Mark H. Cohen, Senior Assistant Att’y Gen. for Ga. (March 20, 1992), in 
Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 716–19 
(2005) (“As you know, the state’s first proposed plan was rejected amid general concerns 
that the Georgia legislative leadership had been predisposed to limit black voting potential 
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Court, however, severely criticized the Attorney General’s interpretation of 
Section 5’s discriminatory purpose standard.  The Court described the 
Attorney General’s theory of discriminatory purpose as one in which 
preclearance would be denied if the State did not prove that there was a 
nondiscriminatory purpose for its refusal to create a third  
majority-minority district.
222
  The Court dismissed this position as 
“insupportable,” accusing the Attorney General of supporting a “policy of 
maximizing majority-black districts.”
223
  In essence, the Miller Court 
seemed to reject the position that discriminatory purpose can be found 
when the state or local government does not put forward a legitimate 
reason for failing to provide minority voters with an additional ability to 
elect a candidate of choice. 
Indeed, one might view the racial gerrymandering decisions as the flip 
side of the coin of the strain of discriminatory purpose analysis focused on 
the motivations of redistricting actors.
224
  What the Court has noted in the 
racial gerrymandering context is that those who claim the existence of 
racial gerrymandering must meet “a demanding” burden.
225
  Moreover, 
“those who claim that a legislature has improperly used race as a 
criterion . . . must show at a minimum that the ‘legislature subordinated 
traditional race-neutral districting principles . . . to racial 
considerations.’”
226
  Indeed, “[r]ace must not simply have been “a 
motivation for the drawing of a majority-minority district, but the 
predominant factor motivating the legislature’s districting decision.”
227
  As 
                                                 
to two black majority voting age population districts.  This concern continues with respect 
to the state’s present redistricting plan.”).  This led the State to adopt yet another version of 
its congressional plan, this time with three majority-minority districts, which finally 
received the Attorney General’s imprimatur.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 909 (“Georgia’s plan 
included three majority-black districts, though, and received Justice Department 
preclearance on April 2, 1992.”). 
 222. Miller, 515 U.S. at 924 (“The key to the Government’s position, which is plain from 
its objection letters if not from its briefs to this Court, . . . is and always has been that 
Georgia failed to proffer a nondiscriminatory purpose for its refusal in the first two 
submissions to take the steps necessary to create a third majority-minority district.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 223. Id.; see also id. at 926 (describing “[t]he Justice Department’s maximization 
policy”).  The Court rendered a similar decision in Shaw v. Hunt. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).  In 
that case, the Court noted how the Attorney General alleged that “North Carolina, for 
pretextual reasons, did not create a second majority-minority district.”  Id. at 912.  The 
Court, however, found the Attorney General’s position “insupportable,” noted that the 
Attorney General seemed to be “pursuing in North Carolina the same policy of maximizing 
the number of majority-black districts that it pursued in Georgia,” and “again reject[ed] the 
Department’s expansive interpretation of § 5.”  Id. at 912–13; see also Abrams v. Johnson, 
521 U.S. 74, 85–90 (1997) (criticizing the Attorney General’s enforcement of Section 5). 
 224. Recall, here, the discussion of the two strains of discriminatory purpose analysis 
discussed supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 225. Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241 (2001). 
 226. Id. at 241 (internal citations omitted). 
 227. Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotations omitted); cf. United Jewish Orgs. v. 
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 161 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[N]either the Fourteenth nor the 
Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in districting and 
 the Court has noted, “consciousness of race” by redistricting actors and 
“intentional creation of majority-minority districts” does not suffice to 
support a successful claim  
of racial gerrymandering.
228
  What must be proved is that “other, legitimate 
districting principles were subordinated to race.”
229
 
If the racial gerrymandering cases are the functional equivalent of what 
one might term the “invidious motivation” strain of discriminatory purpose 
analysis, then the line of analysis should be the same.
230
  The burden to 
prove discriminatory purpose in this context should similarly be a 
demanding one.  And it should not be enough to show that redistricting 
actors were aware of race or that they consciously chose to create a district 
with a certain demographic skew.  Instead, what should have to be shown is 
that race predominated over the redistricting process to the exclusion of 
other general redistricting principles. 
Moreover, the overall message at the conclusion of the racial 
gerrymandering cases from the 1990s redistricting cycle was that the Court 
was looking for a way out of policing every redistricting choice of state and 
local actors.
231
  After all, no racial gerrymandering claim was successful in 
the Supreme Court in the 2000s, and the success rate in the lower courts 
was equally poor.
232
  It would be odd, then, for the Court to endorse the 
type of discriminatory purpose analysis employed by the Attorney General 
in the 1990s because that could further enmesh the federal judiciary in a 
“political thicket”
233
 that the Justices seem to be trying to escape.
234
 
                                                 
apportionment.”).  As Justice William Brennan once observed, “[i]t would be naïve to 
suppose that racial considerations do not enter into apportionment decisions.”  Id. at 176 n.4 
(Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
 228. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958 (1996) (plurality opinion). 
 229. Id. at 959. 
 230. The most recent extensive discussion of racial gerrymandering doctrine implied that 
its analysis extended beyond just the creation of majority-minority districts.  See Easley, 532 
U.S. at 241 (“The Court has specified that those who claim that a legislature has improperly 
used race as a criterion, in order, for example, to create a majority-minority district . . . .”) 
(emphasis added).  In other words, the implication might be that the racial gerrymandering 
analysis not only applies to attacks on the creation of districts for minority voters but also 
applies on attacks to redistricting plans that fail to create additional districts for minority 
voters. 
 231. Cf. id. at 242 (noting that “courts must exercise extraordinary caution in 
adjudicating claims that a State has drawn district lines on the basis of race”) (citations 
omitted) (internal quotations omitted). 
 232. See generally Jocelyn Benson, A Shared Existence:  The Current Compatibility 
Between the Equal Protection Clause and Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 88 NEB. L. 
REV. 124 (2009) (noting how there were very few successful claims of racial 
gerrymandering in the post-2000 redistricting cycle); cf. Persily, supra note 219, at 652 n.9 
(noting that “not a single Shaw claim [was] currently on its way to the Supreme Court”). 
 233. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). 
 234. There is very little in terms of compelling legislative history to help with this thorny 
problem.  The House Report says nothing explicit about situations where minority voters 
have some representation but could be provided with additional representation and says 
nothing directly about incumbency protection.  However, one could argue that the House 
Report implies a favorable view of the Attorney General’s prior enforcement of the purpose 
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Aside from doctrine, there may also be legitimate theoretical reasons for 
not creating additional minority representation when minority voters 
already enjoy some representation.  Here, one starts with the premise that 
there are substantial representational benefits to creating some minority 
representation where none previously existed, but that there are 
diminishing returns from increasing minority representation.  How much of 
a gain—from the perspective of civic participation—is there to be garnered 
from, say, having one minority member of a city council out of seven as 
opposed to two minority members out of seven?  Will the conversation 
among councilmembers change that much more?  Will minority members 
of the community feel that much more connected to the polis?  In theory, 
adding representation where some representation already exists seems less 
likely to make a substantial difference. 
There may also be diminishing returns on the level of substantive 
government outcomes.
235
  Here, one wanders into the debate between 
maximizing descriptive representation of minority voters on the one hand 
and maximizing the ability of minority voters to achieve substantive 
legislative outcomes.
236
  On one side are scholars who think that drawing 
districts that provide minority voters with the ability to control outcomes 
has the perverse effect of decreasing the ability of minority voters to get the 
substantive governing outcomes (i.e., legislation) they desire.
237
  The 
argument is that by assigning minority voters to districts where they control 
electoral outcomes, other “influence” districts in the plan are “bleached” 
and become more likely to elect white representatives hostile to the 
legislative interests of minority voters.
238
  On the other side are scholars 
                                                 
standard.  H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 67 (2006) (“The effectiveness of the ‘discriminatory’ 
purpose requirement in barring discriminatory voting changes is reflected in the 83 
objections that were imposed during the 1980s and in the 151 objections interposed in the 
1990s solely on the basis of discriminatory purpose.”).  On the other hand, the Senate 
Report clearly joins forces with the Supreme Court against the Attorney General’s 
“maximiz[ing] majority-minority districts at any cost” and notes that a finding of 
discriminatory purpose cannot be “based, in whole or part, on a failure to adopt the optimal 
or maximum number of majority-minority districts . . . . Nor does it permit a finding of 
discriminatory purpose based on a determination that the plan seeks partisan advantage or 
protects incumbents.”  S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 17–18 (2006).  Again, though, the Senate 
Report is likely of little interpretive utility.  See supra notes 104–09 and accompanying text. 
 235. See WHITBY, supra note 173, at 133 (“The creation of majority-minority districts 
clearly suggests that there are representational trade-offs to increasing black descriptive 
representation.  On the one hand, blacks do reap substantive benefits from having black 
membership in Congress because the race of the member matters on many important issues 
that run along racial lines. . . . On the other hand, if district lines are drawn in a way that 
would result in new conservative Republican districts and a Republican majority in the 
House, then blacks may well undermine their own substantive political interests.”). 
 236. See Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 91 (briefly describing debate among social 
scientists and political actors). 
 237. See, e.g., Charles Cameron et. al., Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize 
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 794, 795 (1996). 
 238. See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Measuring the Electoral and Policy 
Impact of Majority-Minority Voting Districts, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 367, 369 (1999) (“A 
 who remain skeptical of the substantive benefits of trading “ability to elect” 
districts for influence districts.
239
 
Without definitively choosing sides in this unsettled debate among 
political scientists,
240
 the fact that this debate exists cuts against federal 
intervention to increase minority representation where some representation 
already exists.  The question, it would seem, is not entirely settled as to 
which type of representation better suits the interests of minority voters:  
more officials whose electoral accountability is solely controlled by 
minority voters or more officials whose electoral destiny is only partially 
controlled by minority voters.  If this debate is unsettled, then it is not clear 
that federal intervention in the political market should resolve this debate.  
When no minority representation exists, a relatively clear market failure 
exists; when some minority representation is in place, the market failure 
seems much less apparent. 
Finally, because politics as markets theory is being used to inform the 
discriminatory purpose framework presented here, it’s appropriate to 
mention how it might play a role.  In the first instance, the type of 
enforcement engaged in by the Attorney General in the 1990s seems to be 
of the discriminatory motive variety.  And politics as markets likely would 
                                                 
number of observers have claimed that these [majority-minority] districts may actually harm 
the overall representation of minorities by concentrating these populations too heavily, 
thereby marginalizing their policy concerns in surrounding districts.  If this is true, then 
heavily gerrymandered districts may actually be counterproductive from a policy standpoint, 
allowing greater numbers of minorities to gain office but minimizing their influence in the 
political decision making process once they arrive.”). 
 239. See David T. Canon, Renewing the Voting Rights Act:  Retrogression, Influence, 
and the “Georgia v. Ashcroft Fix”, 7 ELECTION L.J. 3, 8–9 (2008)  (“[I]f an analysis of the 
more easily measured aspects of substantive representation shows that two white Democrats 
in influence districts provide the same level of substantive representation as one African 
American legislator in an ability-to-elect district, one could conclude that trading one 
ability-to-elect district for two influence districts is non-retrogressive only if descriptive 
representation is seen as having no additional value . . . . But nearly everyone who has 
examined the issue agrees that descriptive representation has some intrinsic value and some 
tangible but difficult to measure aspects.”); Bernard Grofman, Operationalizing the Section 
5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act in the Light of Georgia v. Ashcroft:  
Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity and Control, 5 ELECTION 
L.J. 250, 275–81 (2006) (criticizing the ideas and methodology of social scientists who 
support trading districts that provide descriptive representation for influence districts). 
 240. The Supreme Court has also recognized the potential trade-off in several decisions.  
See, e.g., Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 480 (2003) (“In order to maximize the electoral 
success of a minority group, a State may choose to create a certain number of ‘safe’ 
districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of 
their choice.  Alternatively, a State may choose to create a greater number of districts in 
which it is likely—although perhaps not quite as likely as under the benchmark plan—that 
minority voters will be able to elect candidates of their choice.”) (internal citations omitted); 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 154 (1993) (“The practice challenged here, the creation 
of majority minority districts, does not invariably minimize or maximize minority voting 
strength.  Instead, it can have either effect or neither.  On the one hand, creating majority-
black districts necessarily leaves fewer black voters and therefore diminishes black-voter 
influence in predominantly white districts.  On the other hand, the creation of majority-black 
districts can enhance the influence of black voters.”). 
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eschew any attempt to determine the validity of a redistricting plan with a 
motive-based approach.  However, as previously mentioned, the motive-
based approach does not appear likely to entirely vanish anytime soon. 
If the apparent first-order preference of politics as markets is not 
available, does politics as markets have anything to say in this area?  
Perhaps, but it’s not entirely clear. 
Politics as markets generally advocates the creation of competitive 
districts in order to hold incumbents accountable.  In essence, politics as 
markets eschews redistricting plans “that favor only one party or all 
incumbents in a ‘sweetheart gerrymander.’”
241
  For this reason, politics as 
markets would prefer the establishment of “a prophylactic per se rule that 
redistricting conducted by incumbent powers is constitutionally 
intolerable.”
242
  Indeed, in part for this reason, Professor Issacharoff has 
been critical of racial gerrymandering jurisprudence because the racial 
gerrymandering cases allow incumbency protection to serve as a legitimate 
justification to stave off a charge that racial considerations predominated in 
the construction of a redistricting plan.
243
  Thus, it would seem that any 
approach that advocates the acceptance of incumbency protection as a 
legitimate redistricting goal could run afoul of politics as markets.
244
 
On the other hand, other concerns also animate politics as markets.  For 
starters, Professor Pildes has been among the most vociferous persons in 
the legal literature objecting to the creation of additional districts that 
provide minority voters with the ability to elect candidates of choice 
because of the deleterious impact it may have on substantive minority 
representation.
245
  Moreover, Professor Issacharoff criticizes the racial 
                                                 
 241. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 645 (emphasis added); cf. Samuel 
Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes:  Political Parties, Associational 
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274, 280–81 (2001) (“The core 
of that [politics as markets] analysis was that there should be legal intervention when self-
serving incumbent behavior threatens the competitiveness of that [political] process.”). 
 242. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23 at 601, 645–48; cf. Pildes, Foreword, 
supra note 23, at 98 (“[I]f courts (and other institutions) minimize partisan gerrymandering 
and other anticompetitive practices, judicial deference to the outcomes of that competition . . 
. might not only be justified, but might also be more effective at ensuring equality itself.”). 
 243. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 637 (“[T]he Court’s constitutional 
priorities in the Shaw cases appear to be backwards.  The Shaw cases placed the Court in the 
awkward position of putting the Constitution on the side of protecting vested incumbent 
power, while prohibiting the redistribution of electoral opportunity to those out of power.”). 
 244. Of course, from the perspective of statutory interpretation, it would be unlikely that 
Congress decided to endorse a reading of discriminatory purpose that did not allow for 
protection of incumbents to provide some legitimating role for redistricting choices.  Indeed, 
the Senate Report, flawed as it may be, seems to want to provide the ability of incumbency 
protection to serve as a rebuttal to allegations of discriminatory purpose.  See supra note 
234. 
 245.  See Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 92 (“Here was a large contingent of black 
legislators who, now that they had entered the halls of legislative power, determined that 
they and their constituents would have more effective power as part of a Democratic senate; 
yet the Act would have required them to become the minority in the senate for the sake of a 
marginal potential gain in formal black representation.”).  See generally Pildes, Modern 
 gerrymandering cases for creating incentives for political actors to racialize 
their political disputes.
246
  In other words, in a world that more easily 
entertains claims of racial discrimination rather than political 
discrimination, political actors have incentives to bring claims of racial 
discrimination. 
In light of these other concerns, one might then conclude that politics as 
markets supports the proposed framework on this point.  Adopting a regime 
that rejected incumbency protection as a legitimate redistricting motive 
would lead to more opportunities to “over-racialize” redistricting—a move 
that would seem contrary to Professor Issacharoff’s desires.  In addition, 
intervention to create an additional district for minority voters on 
discriminatory purpose grounds would not seem to resolve any 
accountability problems and might make the situation worse, as such 
intervention would seemingly necessitate the adoption of a “safe” district 
for minority voters.  Put differently, federal intervention here would either 
shift the problem of accountability from safe white districts to safe minority 
districts or, perhaps worse, shift from competitive white districts to safe 
minority districts.
247
 
                                                 
VRA, supra note 27. 
 246. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 637–41, 645–46 (“[T]he 
combination of the recognition that something can go wrong in redistricting with the 
absence of doctrinal tools to address that recognition leads to great pressure on 
antidiscrimination doctrine to fill the void.  This in turn leads to the overracialization of 
redistricting law through the Shaw [racial gerrymandering] line of cases.”). 
 247. Section 5 poses a bit of a dilemma for the politics as markets approach in another 
way.  Professor Pildes criticized federal intervention in Georgia’s post-2000 redistricting on 
behalf of minorities, specifically pointing to the forced retention of “safe” seats for African 
American incumbents.  See generally Pildes, Modern VRA, supra note 27.  Ironically, 
though, federal acquiescence would have been to what was well-recognized on a macro 
level as a Democratic political gerrymander.  Cf. Pildes, Foreword, supra note 23, at 90 
(“Because redistricting is generally still in the hands of existing officeholders largely free to 
pursue their own partisan ends, the Democrats sought to design districts that increased the 
likelihood of retaining their majority in the senate”).  See generally Larios v. Cox, 300 F. 
Supp. 2d 1320 (N.D. Ga. 2004) (recognizing that the Georgia state legislative redistricting 
plan was designed to help the Democratic Party). 
  Presumably, though, this tension could be resolved in a couple of ways.  First, one 
could say that federal authorities should not intervene on behalf of racial and ethnic 
minorities in the Section 5 context, but should intervene at a later date to prevent political 
gerrymandering on behalf of Democrats.  Cf. Pildes, Diffusion, supra note 184, at 138 
(“Any doctrine that seeks to single out racial gerrymandering without simultaneously 
addressing partisan gerrymandering is destined to be highly artificial, at best, and perhaps 
altogether unintelligible.”).  Second, one could say that the core problem of partisan 
gerrymandering is not a lack of competition at the macro legislative level but at the 
individual district level.   
  On this second point, though, a few additional issues are raised.  For starters, it is 
unclear whether politics as markets only aims at making elections competitive at the 
individual district level, institutional level, or both.  It seems to me (and others) that politics 
as markets tends to focus on the individual level; however the approach also seems to be 
concerned with competition at the institutional level.  See Persily, supra note 219, at 657 
(describing “the aggregate partisan effects of gerrymanders” as “not Issacharoff’s principle 
concern”) (emphasis added); see also Samuel Issacharoff & Jonathan Nagler, Protected 
from Politics:  Diminishing Margins of Electoral Competition in U.S. Congressional 
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In the end, the politics as markets approach does not provide a definitive 
answer but likely leans toward a hands-off approach in this context.  
Moreover, when combined with the doctrinal reasons for caution in this 
area, a discriminatory purpose should generally not be found when 
minority voters already enjoy some representation but the redistricting plan 
fails to provide them with additional representation.  The Attorney General 
should accept incumbency protection as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
reason if presented with it. 
Before moving on, though, it must be emphasized that the approach 
endorsed here does not mean that additional districts for minority voters 
should never be drawn on the theory of discriminatory purpose whenever 
minority voters already enjoy representation.  In some situations, there 
might be direct evidence of racial hostility.  In other instances (which will 
be discussed below), incumbent legislators might adopt lines that go out of 
the way to prevent the creation of additional districts for minority voters.
248
  
                                                 
Election, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1121, 1135 (2007) [hereinafter Issacharoff and Nagler Protected 
from Politics] (“[O]ur claim is only that gerrymandering has contributed to making this 
[shift in control of Congress] more difficult as more traditional swings in voter preference 
would likely have little or no effect on the partisan composition of the House.”); Samuel 
Issacharoff, Oversight of Regulated Political Markets, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 91, 95 
(2000) [hereinafter Issacharoff, Oversight] (“There is little normative justification for 
permitting the sinecure of an entrenched unaccountable minority that cannot be dislodged 
[by the majority of voters] through the normal operation of the political process.”); cf. 
Pildes, Political Competition, supra note 23, at 260–61 (describing how the House is the 
“least responsive institution” and how partisan gerrymandering “frustrates change”) 
(internal citations omitted).  In addition, even if the sole focus of concern is at the individual 
district level, there may be a disconnect in politics as markets because a plan such as 
Georgia’s trades some incumbent protection in order to increase other incumbents’ 
protection.  Put more concretely, if the core issue is making individual districts less safe for 
African American incumbents in order to elect Democrats elsewhere, then presumably 
districts for white Democratic incumbents have been made safer.  There is, then, a bit of a 
tension in endorsing a plan that attempts to reduce the safety of some incumbents to increase 
the safety of others, all with the goal of entrenching what would appear to be a minority 
faction in power. 
 248. In addition, when it comes to state legislative redistricting plans, there might need 
to be a slightly different approach to the determination of whether minority voters enjoy 
existing representation.  In virtually all of the Section 5 covered states, minority voters enjoy 
existing representation in the state legislature.  Absent other facts pointing toward a 
violation of the discriminatory purpose standard, the framework employed here would seem 
to ensure that preclearance would almost never be denied in the context of a statewide 
redistricting.  However, it may be more appropriate to look at representation for minority 
voters in state legislatures from a regional perspective, rather than looking at the plan as a 
whole.  In other words, even if minority voters enjoy some representation in a state 
legislature, if minority voters in a particular region of the State completely lack descriptive 
representation, a finding of discriminatory purpose might be appropriate.  That said, when it 
comes to statewide redistricting, it would seem judicial doctrine is moving in the opposite 
direction of a regional approach.  Compare LULAC, 548 U.S. 399, 437 (2006) (“We 
conclude the answer in these [statewide redistricting] cases is to look at proportionality 
statewide.”), with Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1021–22 (1994) (leaving undecided 
whether proportionality in a statewide redistricting plan was to be referenced in relation to 
the statewide plan as a whole or in relation to specific regions of the State), and Rural W. 
Tenn. African-American Affairs Council v. McWherter, 877 F. Supp. 1096, 1109–10 (W.D. 
Tenn. 1995) (engaging in an analysis of proportionality for a state legislative redistricting 
 Put simply, it’s still possible in some circumstances to deny preclearance to 
a redistricting plan on discriminatory purpose grounds even if minority 
voters already enjoy some representation. 
Further, Section 5 does not represent the only tool in the Voting Rights 
Act that can be used to increase representation for minority voters.  Even if 
a jurisdiction covered by Section 5 obtains preclearance for its redistricting 
plan, that plan can still be challenged using the “results” test of Section 
2.
249
  Section 2, while somewhat similar in terms of evidentiary application 
to the discriminatory purpose standard,
250
 presumably provides a slightly 
easier standard with which minority voters can stake their claim  
for additional representation.  In short, rejection of additional 
representation when minority voters already enjoy representation does not 
totally foreclose the possibility of additional representation for minority 
voters. 
D. Control of the Governing Body at Stake 
There is, however, an important context in which preclearance should be 
denied when a plan already contains some districts that provide minority 
voters with an ability to elect.  The context is a situation where “minority” 
voters would have control over the majority of the governing body but for a 
redistricting plan that entrenches a white minority.  For a more concrete 
hypothetical, assume a five-member city council in a city with fifty-eight 
percent Latino citizens of voting age where councilmembers are elected 
from five single-member districts.
251
  Assume that the existing plan 
                                                 
plan on a regional basis). 
 249. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2006). 
 250. See Michael J. Pitts, Congressional Enforcement of Affirmative Democracy 
Through Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 185, 206–07 (2005) 
(noting similarities between the Supreme Court’s discriminatory purpose analysis and the 
Section 2 “results” test).  One way Section 2 might play a role is where minority 
representation is starkly disproportionate.  For instance, take a situation where Latinos make 
up forty percent of the citizen voting age population, there are ten districts and the 
redistricting plan provides Latinos with representation in only one of those ten districts.  In 
such a situation, using the discriminatory purpose standard would not be proper under the 
framework presented here.  However, a Section 2 finding of vote dilution that led to the 
creation of two or three additional districts for Latino voters might be proper.  
 251. There may be arguments over what the benchmark should be for determining 
whether “minority” voters comprise a majority within the jurisdiction.  There are several 
different potential measurements, including total population, voting age population, citizen 
voting age population, registration, and turnout.  In essence, the choices range from a formal 
majority (total population) to a theoretical majority (voting age and citizen voting age 
population) to a functional majority (registration and turnout).  While each of these 
measurements has merit, doctrinally, courts have tended to favor citizen voting age 
population as a measure of voting strength.  See, e.g., LULAC, 548 U.S. at 427–28 (using 
citizen voting age population in a Section 2 evaluation of whether Latinos could have 
constituted a majority of the population in a single member district and enjoyed an 
opportunity to elect a candidate of choice); see also id. at 434–38 (using citizen voting age 
population to assess whether a state redistricting plan provided proportionality to Latinos); 
cf. Johnson, 512 U.S. at 1021 n.18 (refusing to decide whether proportionality of minority 
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contains two districts providing Latinos with an ability to elect and three 
districts providing Anglos with an ability to elect, and that the incumbent 
Anglo councilmembers essentially draw a new plan  
that retains the same characteristics of the existing plan.  Here, it is 
appropriate to find a violation of the discriminatory purpose standard.
252
 
Indeed, some of the Attorney General’s denials of preclearance during 
the 1990s redistricting cycle reflected just this type of situation.  For 
example, take the 1992 denial of preclearance to the City of Selma’s 
redistricting plan.  The 1990 Census showed that Selma was 58.5 percent 
African American.
253
  The city had four single-member districts controlled 
by African Americans, four single member districts controlled by whites, 
and an at-large position controlled by whites.
254
  All together, whites held a 
5-4 majority of the seats on a council in a city that was nearly sixty percent 
African American and proposed a redistricting plan designed to perpetuate 
the status quo.  During the redistricting process, members of the African 
American community presented an alternative plan to provide for a fifth 
district controlled by African American voters.
255
  The members of the city 
council, however, rejected this proposal for “pretextual” reasons when the 
real motivation was a “desire to confine black population concentrations 
into a predetermined number of districts, and thus ensure a continuation of 
the current white majority on the council.”
256
 
Admittedly, one could look at such a situation and conclude that federal 
intervention should not occur.  Indeed, the denial of preclearance in Selma 
was based on the same basic premise as the denials of preclearance by the 
Attorney General in the 1990s that caused such consternation by the 
Supreme Court.  In Selma, there was racially polarized voting, and the city 
could have added an additional district for minority voters but did not do so 
because it wanted to preserve a white incumbent; therefore, a 
discriminatory purpose was at work.  Why, then, should the situation where 
control of the council is at stake be treated differently? 
                                                 
representation should be measured with regard to total population or citizen voting age 
population). 
 252. One can duly recognize that public choice theorists would maintain that the idea of 
a true majority will is incoherent. Issacharoff, Oversight, supra note 247, at 93. 
 253. Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Philip Henry 
Pitts, Esq. (Nov. 12, 1992), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & 
Purpose:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 109th Cong. 391–93 (2005). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. 
 256. Id.  I recognize that the above example raises questions in that there was an at-large 
seat that, perhaps, could have been won by the African American majority.  There may, 
however, be compelling reasons to compensate for lower minority political participation 
(i.e., registration and turnout).  Indeed, this may be especially true in a place like Selma, 
Alabama that has a quite visible and lengthy history of discrimination in voting. 
 The answer primarily lies in a structural analysis in that a political group 
should not be able to entrench itself when it does not enjoy the support of a 
majority of the electorate.
257
  One of the key values of representative 
government is that the majority should generally rule, and that governing 
bodies and elected officials should be responsive to the popular will.  
Indeed, this fundamental principal was recognized by the Supreme Court 
almost fifty years ago in the context of one person, one vote,
258
 and, a bit 
more recently, in the partisan gerrymandering context.
259
  If a majority of 
the populace cannot exert its influence at an election to switch the power in 
the legislative body, then why hold elections at all?  True, debates can be 
held about the extent to which a majority should be able to garner the most 
seats in an election, and whether a super-majority of the popular will 
should be a prerequisite for certain governmental activity.
260
  However, 
when it comes to representation in a governing body, the members of that 
governing body should be accountable to the majority of the populace; 
otherwise, the members of the governing body will essentially have carte 
blanche authority to disregard the will of the majority.
261
 
While the structural theory may be sound, there are only small shades of 
doctrinal justification for finding a violation of the discriminatory purpose 
standard in a redistricting that perpetuates white control over a governing 
body despite the fact that “minority” voters now comprise a majority of the 
electorate.  City of Richmond v. United States
262
 involved an annexation 
that reduced the city’s African American population from fifty-two percent 
                                                 
 257. Issacharoff, Oversight, supra note 247 at 95 (“There is little normative justification 
for permitting the sinecure of an entrenched unaccountable minority that cannot be 
dislodged [by the majority of voters] through the normal operation of the political 
process.”). 
 258. In the landmark case of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), the Court noted: 
[I]n a society ostensibly grounded on representative government, it would seem 
reasonable that a majority of the people of a State could elect a majority of that 
State’s legislators.  To conclude differently, and to sanction minority control of 
state legislative bodies, would appear to deny majority rights in a way that far 
surpasses any possible denial of minority rights that might otherwise be thought to 
result.  Since legislatures are responsible for enacting laws by which all citizens are 
to be governed, they should be bodies which are collectively responsive to the 
popular will. 
Id. at 565. 
 259. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 133 (1986) (plurality opinion) (noting that a 
constitutional violation for partisan gerrymandering can “be supported by evidence of 
continued frustration of the will of a majority of the voters”). 
 260. There are a couple of unique exceptions that spring easily to mind when it comes to 
American government.  The first is the United States Senate.  In the Senate, it is possible for 
the will of the majority of the American electorate to be thwarted by the fact that States with 
fewer persons, such as Wyoming, get the same amount of representation as States with 
substantially larger populaces, such as Florida.  The second is the Electoral College. 
 261. Cf. Issacharoff & Nagler, Protected from Politics, supra note 247, at 1135 (“By any 
reasonable measure, agents who have less to fear from oversight will act in their own 
interests and will feel freer to disregard the will of their principals.  That too is a cost of 
having increasingly insulated elected representatives.”). 
 262. 422 U.S. 358 (1975). 
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to forty-two percent.
263
  In remanding to the district court for additional 
findings as to whether the annexation was adopted with a discriminatory 
purpose, the Court entertained the viability of a theory that there could be 
an impermissible purpose in “perpetuating white majority power.”
264
  In 
addition, in commenting on the design of any remedy for a purposefully 
discriminatory annexation, the Court was loathe to create an electoral 
system that would allow African Americans to control a majority of the 
city council seats despite having only forty-two percent of the city’s 
population.
265
  In both instances, the Court highlighted its concern that 
electoral structures should be designed to allow for rule by the dominant 
racial group of the city. 
More recently, Justice Breyer adopted this theme of  
the importance of majority rule in the context of partisan gerrymandering.  
In Vieth v. Jubilerer,
266
 Justice Breyer laid out the primary arena where the 
use of political factors amounts to serious abuse:  “the unjustified use of 
political factors to entrench a minority in power.”
267
  In this context, 
“entrenchment” means “a situation in which a party that enjoys only 
minority support among the populace has nonetheless contrived to take, 
and hold, legislative power” and “unjustified” means “that the minority’s 
hold on power is purely the result of partisan manipulation.”
268
  The harm 
in this situation was self-evident to Justice Breyer in that he thinks the core 
value of representative government is that a majority should rule and there 
is no compelling countervailing justification for allowing the minority to 
rule.
269
 
                                                 
 263. Id. at 363. 
 264. Id. at 373. 
 265. Id. at 373–74. 
 266. 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
 267. Id. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 268. Id.  Justice Breyer would not intervene in situations where a partisan minority was 
justifiably able to obtain power by “sheer happenstance, the existence of more than two 
major parties, the unique constitutional requirements of certain representational bodies, such 
as the Senate, or reliance on traditional (geographic, communities of interest, etc.) districting 
criteria.”  Id. at 360–61. 
 269. Justice Breyer noted: 
The need for legislative stability cannot justify entrenchment, for stability is 
compatible with a system in which the loss of majority support implies a loss of 
power.  The need to secure minority representation in the legislature cannot justify 
entrenchment, for minority party representation is also compatible with a system in 
which the loss of minority support implies a loss of representation.  
Constitutionally specified principles of representation, such as that of two Senators 
per State, cannot justify entrenchment where the House of Representatives or 
similar state legislative body is at issue.  Unless some other justification can be 
found in particular circumstances, political gerrymandering that so entrenches a 
minority party in power violates basic democratic norms and lacks countervailing 
justification. 
Id. at 361. 
 Now, it is certainly true that Justice Breyer’s theory did not command a 
majority of the Court in the partisan gerrymandering context primarily 
because the theory did not lend itself to a judicially manageable standard,
270
 
but that does not necessarily mean that a majority of the Court would reject 
the theory in the context of race and redistricting.  Indeed, in rejecting the 
import of the standard for racial gerrymandering into the partisan 
gerrymandering context, a plurality of the Court noted several differences 
between the two constitutional commands, including:  racial redistricting 
problems are more rare than partisan gerrymandering problems, therefore 
requiring judicial intervention less often, and that the constitutional 
prohibition against racial discrimination has a clearer textual authority than 
the constitutional prohibition against political discrimination.
271
  In short, 
the current rejection of the minority entrenchment theory by the Court in 
the partisan gerrymandering context does not necessarily mean the Court 
would reject the theory in the context of race and redistricting.
272
  The 
protection of  
majority rule, a core democratic value, should lead to findings of 
discriminatory purpose whenever a white minority uses its control of the  
redistricting process to entrench itself.
273
 
E. Clearly Gerrymandered Lines 
Another instance where preclearance should be denied for failing to 
increase minority voting strength is when redistricting actors clearly go out 
of their way to avoid such an increase.  This happens when the redistricting 
lines chosen by the governing body are so bizarre that they are inexplicable 
except as an effort to thwart additional minority voting strength. 
The Attorney General’s 1994 objection to the City of Minden’s 
(Louisiana) redistricting plan provides an example of this type of behavior.  
In Minden, the minority population had risen steadily since 1970 and, by 
the 1990 Census, African Americans made up nearly half of the city’s 
                                                 
 270. See id. at 299–301 (plurality opinion) (“[W]e neither know precisely what Justice 
Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what fails the test.”). 
 271. See id. at 286 (“By contrast, the purpose of segregating voters on the basis of race . . 
. is much more rarely encountered. . . . Moreover, the fact that partisan districting is a lawful 
and common practice means that there is almost always room for an election-impeding 
lawsuit contending that partisan advantage was the predominant motivation; not so for 
claims of racial gerrymandering.  Finally, courts might be justified in accepting a modest 
degree of unmanageability to enforce a constitutional command which (like the Fourteenth 
Amendment obligation to refrain from racial discrimination) is clear . . . .”). 
 272. That said, one needs to recognize that intervention by the federal government in 
such a situation would seem to run counter to the conservative Justices trend toward 
“colorblindness” and limited federal intervention in state and local redistricting affairs.  
Nevertheless, if there is an area where the civil rights envelope should be pushed, this is it. 
 273. Cf. Issacharoff, Gerrymandering, supra note 23, at 606 (noting that frustration of 
the will of the majority “remains the core insight about the role of constitutional scrutiny in 
the political process”). 
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population.
274
  The existing plan had two safe white districts, two safe 
African American districts, and one district that was thirty percent African 
American.
275
  The city needed to redistrict so as to comply with the equal 
protection requirement of one person, one vote and could have easily cured 
the population imbalances among the districts with some minor tweaks in 
district lines.
276
  If the city officials had adopted such a “least-change” plan, 
the plain result would have been an increase in the proportion of African 
American population in the thirty percent district.
277
  Instead, the city chose 
to radically redraw its district lines, creating oddly shaped districts in the 
process and could provide no explanation for the decision to adopt such an 
unorthodox redistricting scheme.
278
 
Finding a violation of the discriminatory purpose standard in this context 
stands on firm doctrinal footing.  While all redistricting plans are ostensibly 
race-neutral, the Court has recognized that “[s]ometimes a clear pattern, 
inexplicable on grounds other than race, emerges from the effect of the 
state action even when the governing legislation appears neutral on its 
face.”
279
  The paradigm of this in the voting context being the City of 
Tuskegee’s gerrymandering of its boundary lines from a perfect square to 
an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure designed to fence out almost every 
single African American resident—an action that the Court condemned in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot.
280
  So, too, in the racial gerrymandering context the 
Court has noted that the shape of district lines can present an essentially 
open-and-shut case of discrimination.  In Shaw v. Reno,
281
 the Court wrote: 
 [I]t seems clear to us that proof [of a racial gerrymander] sometimes will 
not be difficult at all.  In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan 
may be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be 
understood as anything other than an effort to ‘segregate . . . voters’ on 
the basis of race.
282
 
In short, the Court has held that sometimes boundary lines themselves 
present a clear story of purposeful discrimination. 
There is also some legislative history, albeit weak, to support this sort of 
enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard.  While the House 
                                                 
 274. Letter from Deval L. Patrick, Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., to Gary Joiner 
(Oct. 17, 1994), in Voting Rights Act:  Section 5 of the Act—History, Scope, & Purpose:  
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. 1093–94 (2005). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Id. 
 277. Id. 
 278. Id. 
 279. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977); 
see also Personnel Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979) (“[T]here are cases 
in which impact alone can unmask an invidious classification.”). 
 280. 364 U.S. 339, 340, 347–48 (1960). 
 281. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 282. Id. at 646–47. 
 Report does not directly speak of bizarre boundaries as a problem under the 
discriminatory purpose standard,
283
 the Senate Report seems to.  The 
Senate Report notes: 
One traditional and important standard for identifying unconstitutional 
racial discrimination is to ask whether the challenged action departs from 
normal rules of decision.  Courts and the Justice Department should ask 
whether the decision not to create a black-majority district departed from 
ordinary districting rules.  If a state has a large minority population 
concentrated in a particular area, ordinary rules of districting—following 
political and geographic borders and keeping districts as compact as 
possible—would recommend that those voters be given a majority-
minority district.  If the State went out of its way to avoid creating such a 
majority-minority—one that would be created under ordinary rules—that 
is unconstitutional racial discrimination.
284
 
Of course, the most obvious manner in which a State can go “out of its 
way” to avoid creating a district for minority voters is by using bizarre 
boundaries.  That said, it bears repeating that the Senate Report likely has 
limited utility. 
There are, though, limits and possible objections to an approach focused 
on the shape of district lines.  Regarding the limits, it is going to be 
relatively rare when the district lines alone can be deemed res ipsa loquitor 
evidence of a violation of the discriminatory purpose standard.  Indeed, the 
Court has recognized this relative rareness in the racial gerrymandering 
context.
285
  Thus, bizarre lines are unlikely to form the basis for very many 
findings of a violation of the discriminatory purpose standard.
286
  
                                                 
 283. One might find such enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard implicit in 
the House Report comment that: 
[T]he factors set out in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan  
Housing Development Corporation, et. al. provide an adequate framework for 
determining whether voting changes submitted for preclearance were motivated by 
a discriminatory purpose, including determining whether a disproportionate impact 
exists; examining the historical background of the challenged decision; looking at 
the specific antecedent events; determining whether such change departs from the 
normal procedures; and examining contemporary statements of the decision-maker, 
if any. 
H.R. REP. NO. 109-478, at 68 (2006).  Here, bizarre lines could be considered a “depart[ure] 
from normal procedures.” 
 284. S. REP. NO. 109-295, at 17 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 285. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 646–47 (“In some exceptional cases, a reapportionment plan may 
be so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything other 
than an effort to segregate voters on the basis of race.”) (emphasis added) (internal 
quotations omitted); see also Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995) (“In the rare case, 
where the effect of government action is a pattern unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
the evidentiary inquiry is relatively easy. . . . Patterns of discrimination as conspicuous as 
[Gomillion] are rare . . . .”) (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 286. Of course, even when bizarre lines do not in-and-of themselves provide a basis for a 
finding of discriminatory purpose, they might be combined with other evidence, such as 
lack of any ability to elect a candidate of choice or direct evidence of racial animus, to 
strengthen a finding of discriminatory purpose.  Cf. Miller, 515 U.S. at 913 (“Shape is 
1640 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1575 
Regarding objections, one of the primary criticisms of the racial 
gerrymandering doctrine created by the Court in the 1990s was its failure to 
identify a concrete injury.
287
  Moreover, relying on the bizarre shape of 
district lines has a standardless “I know it when I see it” feel.  Nevertheless, 
most discriminatory purpose analysis in the redistricting context will result 
in difficult evidentiary decisions.  The goal here is to identify a broader 
framework for determining whether the discriminatory purpose standard 
has been met, not to come up with specific parameters of what constitutes 
bizarre lines.
288
  In sum, for primarily doctrinal reasons, one instance where 
discriminatory purpose should be found is when bizarre lines have been 
drawn to avoid providing additional representation to minority voters.
289
 
F. Coda:  Proportionality 
At the beginning of this discussion of a framework for enforcing the 
discriminatory purpose standard, I mentioned that in all the situations 
described above there were two prevailing evidentiary assumptions:  
racially (or ethnically) polarized voting, and a history of discrimination that 
would often be accompanied by a present-day reduced socio-economic 
status of the minority community.
290
  A third macro factor that necessitates 
discussion is proportionality—the idea that minority voters should have the 
same number of ability to elect districts as their relevant share of the 
population.
291
 
Proportionality has not been discussed much in the cases where the 
Supreme Court has opined on the presence or absence of an 
unconstitutional discriminatory purpose.  In these cases, the Court’s 
                                                 
relevant not because bizarreness is a necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a 
threshold requirement of proof, but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence 
that race for its own sake, and not other districting principles, was the legislature’s dominant 
and controlling rationale in drawing its district lines.”) 
 287. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years:  Voting Rights in 
the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 287 (1996) (examining the doctrinal instability of 
wrongful districting claims). 
 288. It is possible to create a more quantitative approach to measuring bizarreness.  See 
generally Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” 
and Voting Rights:  Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 
MICH. L. REV. 483, 495 (1993).  
 289. Politics as markets might also support rejection of a redistricting plan using the 
discriminatory purpose standard when based on the use of bizarre lines.  This is because 
bizarre lines might be indicative of a market failure and incumbent self-dealing.  Indeed, in 
an article published prior to more extensive development of the politics as markets 
framework, Professor Pildes advocated a focus on bizarre lines as a method for resolving 
racial gerrymandering claims—such claims being the flip side of the discriminatory purpose 
coin.  Pildes, Principled Limits, supra note 120, at 2549–50; see also id. at 2556 (“A better, 
if less traditional, approach [to constraining racial redistricting] would be for courts to focus 
on specifying extrinsic and more objectifiably definable legal constraints.”). 
 290. See supra notes 121–124 and accompanying text. 
 291. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1013–14 (1994) (discussing and defining 
proportionality). 
 discussion primarily amounts to foreswearing any desire to constitutionally 
mandate proportionality or proportional representation.  For example, 
Justice Potter Stewart’s plurality opinion in City of Mobile v. Bolden
292
 
noted that the “fact is that the Court has sternly set its face against the 
claim, however  
phrased, that the Constitution somehow guarantees proportional 
representation.”
293
 
What is absent from these discussions is any comprehensive guidance on 
how the existence of proportionality (or lack thereof) impacts the finding of 
discriminatory purpose.  In other words, these cases do not provide a good 
answer to a question such as this:  if direct evidence of racial animus exists 
and minority voters can be provided with additional representation but 
already enjoy proportional representation, is a judicial finding of 
discriminatory purpose appropriate? 
Discussion of proportionality has, however, appeared in the related 
context of the Section 2 “results” test.  In Johnson v. DeGrandy,
294
  the 
Court held that the existence or absence of proportionality should be 
considered in the analysis of whether a redistricting plan violates Section 
2.
295
  There, the Court noted that proportionality would be a “relevant 
fact,”
296
 but would not provide a “safe harbor”
297
 against liability for a 
defendant accused of enacting a redistricting plan that “resulted” in 
discrimination.
298
  Put simply, proportionality is a factor in determining a 
Section 2 violation, but is by no means the entire ballgame. 
When it comes to the discriminatory purpose standard, a similar rule 
should govern:  the existence of proportionality should not serve as a safe 
harbor defense.  Obviously, in contexts where minority voters do not have 
any ability to elect a candidate of choice, it is unlikely proportionality will 
be a defense.  Proportionality will also not be available as a defense in a 
situation where “minority” voters are the majority and do not have the 
ability to elect a majority of the governing body.  However, proportionality 
might be a viable defense when direct evidence of racial animus can be 
produced or  
                                                 
 292. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
 293. Id. at 79; see also Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (describing how 
lack of proportional representation alone does not amount to “invidious discrimination”); 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765–66 (1973) (“To sustain such a claim [of 
unconstitutional racial discrimination], it is not enough that the racial group allegedly 
discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential.”). 
 294. 512 U.S. 997 (1994). 
 295. Id. at 1000. 
 296. Id. at 1017. 
 297. See id. at 1017–18 (explaining that a violation would be assessed “based on the 
totality of circumstances”). 
 298. The Court later reiterated these sentiments in another Section 2 case.  LULAC, 548 
U.S. 399, 436–38 (2006). 
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when lines have been patently gerrymandered to avoid providing  
additional representation for minority voters.
299
  In these instances, 
proportionality should not serve as a defense against a violation of the 
purpose standard. 
 But proportionality is not entirely about a “safe-harbor” defense, as 
another side of the coin is what role a lack of proportionality should play in 
initially determining whether a discriminatory purpose is at work.  In other 
words, what role should the fact that minority  
voters do not, but could, enjoy proportional representation play  
in the discriminatory purpose analysis?
300
  And the question becomes 
particularly thorny when there is some representation but not proportional 
representation.  Take, for example, the following hypothetical:  a nine-
member governing body where Native Americans make up thirty-three 
percent of the population; Native American voters have the ability to elect 
a candidate of choice in one of the nine single-member districts in both the 
existing and proposed redistricting plans; it is possible to provide two 
additional seats (out of the nine) in which Native American voters would 
have the ability to elect a candidate of choice; there is no direct evidence of 
racial animus and no evidence that the lines were clearly gerrymandered to 
avoid the creation of another district for Native American voters; and the 
governing body has provided no reason for failing to draw the two 
additional districts other than, perhaps, incumbency protection which has 
been neutrally applied across the redistricting plan.  What role should a 
lack of proportionality play in analyzing the presence or absence of 
discriminatory purpose? 
Here, again, the Court provides little guidance in its discriminatory 
purpose decisions but has provided some discussion in a decision involving 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  Unfortunately, even in the Section 2 
context, the Court’s statements are not helpful in providing any clear 
direction.  In League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 
the Court punted on whether the fact  
that Latinos were two districts shy of proportionality in Texas’ 
congressional plan “weigh[ed] in favor of a § 2 violation,” choosing instead 
to ground its finding of Texas’ Section 2 liability on other factors.
301
 
                                                 
 299. One should not, however, allow direct evidence of animus or clearly gerrymandered 
lines to lead to a situation where “minority” voters are given an additional seat that gives 
them control over a majority on the governing body if they do not comprise a majority of 
the electorate.  In such an instance, majority rule should trump all else, just as it should 
trump all else if the situation was reversed. 
 300. Obviously, lack of proportionality plays a role in a couple of the scenarios 
mentioned in the posited framework for enforcement of the discriminatory purpose standard.  
Where minority voters have no representation or form a majority that lacks control over the 
majority of seats in the governing body, then lack of proportionality plays an important role. 
 301. LULAC, 548 U.S. at 438. 
 My answer, which can already be inferred from the framework 
presented, is that a lack of proportionality should play no role.  The trick 
when it comes to the discriminatory purpose standard (and, in some sense, 
the Voting Rights Act generally) has been to thread the needle between 
providing an ability for minority voters to  
elect candidates of choice and not mandating proportionality.  Put 
somewhat differently, the trick is to find a middle ground between 
“minimization” of minority voters’ ability to elect candidates of choice and 
“maximization” of that ability.  In the above hypothetical, the difficulty lies 
in the fact that minority voting strength is not minimized but it might be 
possible to do something short of maximization by, say, drawing one 
additional district for minority voters instead of two.  Here, the best course 
of action is to do nothing unless some other factor (direct evidence of racial 
animus, for example) can be found. 
Moreover, there is another good reason to steer clear of any framework 
for the discriminatory purpose standard that would approach a mandate of 
proportional representation.  Conservative Justices are likely to be very 
wary of such an approach, and the future of Section 5 may depend upon 
coming up with an enforcement framework for the discriminatory purpose 
standard that can satisfy a conservative Court.  Indeed, the importance of 
developing a framework for discriminatory purpose to the future of Section 
5 is a subject to which we now turn. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CREATING A FRAMEWORK FOR THE PURPOSE 
STANDARD 
Creating a framework for Section 5’s discriminatory purpose standard 
presents an enormous challenge.  Making determinations about 
discriminatory purpose in any context—whether it be employment or in the 
provision of government services or, as here, in the law of democracy—
typically involves a fact-intensive analysis that does not easily lend itself to 
clear rules.  Moreover, the redistricting context may be among the most 
difficult in which to make determinations regarding discriminatory 
purpose.   
Redistricting often involves multiple motivations on the part of 
numerous elected officials, most of whom will likely be running for re-
election under the redistricting plan they adopt.  Indeed, the difficulty of 
creating a judicially manageable standard has led the Supreme Court to 
eschew engaging in a purpose-type analysis to determine whether a 
redistricting plan violates constitutional norms related to partisan 
gerrymandering.
302
  In addition, when race and redistricting collide it can 
be difficult to determine the point at which racial considerations switch 
                                                 
 302. See generally Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 270–306 (2004).  
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from being legitimate to being illegitimate, for race is always a known 
factor when it comes to redistricting.
303
 
There are, however, many crucial reasons for academic commentators 
and, perhaps more importantly, executive branch officials charged with 
administering Section 5 to think deeply about the purpose standard soon. 
The foremost reason to create a workable framework for the 
discriminatory purpose standard is because doing so in a way that satisfies 
a conservative Supreme Court may be necessary to ensure the continued 
survival of Section 5.  This Article commenced by recounting how Section 
5’s constitutionality was recently on clear display in the AMUDO 
litigation and how the conservative  
majority blinked when it declined to find Section 5 unconstitutional,  
instead opting to trim the provision through creative statutory 
interpretation.
304
  Yet in ducking the constitutional issue in AMUDO, 
the Court used the power of its dicta pen to opine about Section 5’s 
potential constitutional infirmities.  By my count, the AMUDO Court 
used eight paragraphs of dicta to discuss the “substantial federalism costs” 
of Section 5, focusing on, among other things, the broad application of 
Section 5, its targeting of certain states for coverage, and the fact that times 
have changed in the Section 5 covered areas.
305
   
In the wake of the AMUDO dicta criticizing Section 5, several 
distinguished commentators suggested that the Court’s opinion be 
interpreted as a message to Congress to fix Section 5 and that Congress 
should heed this message.  Yale’s Heather Gerken wrote that “it’s hard not 
to read the decision as a shot across the bow, giving members of Congress 
a chance to fix the problem before the Court fixes it for them.”
306
  New 
York University’s Rick Pildes advised that following AMUDO, 
“Congress might conclude that it would be wise to update the act rather 
                                                 
 303. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 646 (1993) (“[R]edistricting differs from other 
kinds of state decision-making in that the legislature always is aware of race when it draws 
district lines . . . .”); see also id. at 660 (White, J., dissenting) (“‘Being aware,’ in this 
context, is shorthand for ‘taking into account,’ and it hardly can be doubted that legislators 
routinely engage in the business of making electoral predictions based on group 
characteristics—racial, ethnic, and the like.”); cf. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 995 (1996) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (describing racial gerrymandering doctrine as distinguishing 
between “the appropriate and reasonably necessary uses of race from its unjustified and 
excessive uses”). 
 304. See supra notes 2–5 and accompanying text. 
 305. AMUDO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2511–13 (2009).  In contrast, the Court wrote only a 
single paragraph of dicta on arguments for upholding Section 5, including deference to 
Congress’ judgment in exercising its enforcement power, the legislative record amassed to 
justify extension, and the fact that Section 5 “quietly but effectively deter[s] discriminatory 
changes.”  Id. at 2513. 
 306. See Gerken, supra note 4; see also posting of Heather Gerken to Election Law Blog, 
Can Congress Take a Hint?, http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013911.html (June 23, 
2009, 08:15 EST) (“To me, the fact that the four liberal Justices joined the opinion 
represents a pretty big hint that Congress needs to act.  The question is whether Congress 
can take the hint.”). 
 than remaining silent and leaving the next word to an obviously skeptical 
court.”
307
  Michigan’s Ellen Katz noted that the Court’s opinion “remands 
the VRA to Congress with a time limit and a warning . . . [putting] 
Congress on notice that the Court will scrap the statute in the next case, 
unless something significant about the statutory regime will have changed 
by then.”
308
 
Of course, all these calls by commentators for Congress to step up to the 
plate and revise Section 5 are premised upon the idea that the Court would 
actually be willing to declare Section 5 unconstitutional in the next case.  It 
would seem, though, that the votes do  
not currently exist to eliminate the preclearance provision.
309
  In 
AMUDO, the Court had Section 5 served up on an unconstitutional 
buffet, but decided to order off the statutory interpretation menu.  Most 
likely, the lack of five votes to strike down Section 5 reflects the fact that 
the occupant of the Court’s “swing” seat, Justice Anthony Kennedy, does 
not desire to declare a significant portion of the Voting Rights Act null and 
void.
310
 
 If these seemingly reasonable assumptions hold—that four members of 
the Court would declare Section 5 unconstitutional and Justice Kennedy 
does not want to provide the fifth vote—then the question becomes what 
would push Justice Kennedy over the edge?  In other words, what change 
in events between now and the next  
case would cause Justice Kennedy to say no mas to Section 5? 
 One answer—the one offered by Professors Gerken, Katz, and Pildes—is 
Congressional inaction, but that seems unlikely.  In this view, the 
AMUDO Court issued a polite, but firm invitation to Congress to revise 
Section 5, and if Congress declines to RSVP, then the Court could finally 
shut off the Section 5 spigot.  The primary problem with this view is that 
the Court, including Justice Kennedy, issued this invitation to Congress for 
                                                 
 307. Posting of Richard H. Pildes to N.Y. Times Room for Debate Blog, A Warning to 
Congress, http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/06/22/the-battle-not-the-war-on-
voting-rights/#richard (June 22, 2009, 13:15 EST).  For other commentary urging Congress 
to act, see Posting of Bruce Cain and Dan Tokaji to Election Law Blog, Promoting Equal 
Participation:  A Voting Rights Act for the 21st Century, 
http://electionlawblog.org/archives/013914.html ( June 23, 2009, 12:04 EST) (“Even though 
the [Voting Rights Act] has been left standing, at least for the moment, the current Congress 
should get to work . . . .”); Posting of Ellen Katz to Election Law Blog, Roberts Didn’t 
Blink, http://electionlawblog.org/ archives/013926.html (June 24, 2009, 08:05 EST) (“The 
Chief Justice believes Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional . . . . [The 
Court’s] contrived statutory holding remands the statute to Congress with a time limit and a 
warning.”). 
 308. Ellen D. Katz, From Bush v. Gore to NAMUDNO:  A Response to Professor Amar, 
61 FLA. L. REV. 991, 998 (2009). 
 309. David G. Savage, A Rare Week of Harmony on High Court, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 
2009, at A10 (quoting Stanford University’s Pamela Karlan as saying that Chief Justice 
Roberts “didn’t have the votes” to overturn the Voting Rights Act). 
 310. Id. 
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more than a decade leading up to the 2006 extension of Section 5.  From 
the line of cases in the 1990s dealing with racial gerrymandering
311
 to the 
2000 Bossier  
Parish II decision undercutting the Section 5 purpose standard,
312
 to 2003’s 
Georgia v. Ashcroft, which trimmed the sails of the Section 5 retrogression 
standard,
313
 the Court as a whole, and particularly Justice Kennedy, has 
issued warning upon warning upon warning regarding Section 5’s 
constitutional frailties.
314
  Congress, though, responded in its 2006 
extension of Section 5 not with conciliation toward the Court’s concerns 
but by poking the Court in the eye—overruling Bossier Parish II and 
Ashcroft.
315
  It would be strange for the Court and Justice Kennedy to think 
that this time—three years after Congress reconsidered Section 5—
AMUDO would finally get the message through.  Rather, it would have 
made much more sense for the Court to make good on its years of threats. 
Instead of congressional inaction, haphazard and overly aggressive 
administrative enforcement by the Executive Branch seems far more likely 
to push the Court over the edge.  The chief danger is enforcement by the 
Attorney General that intrudes on state sovereignty—particularly any 
action that is not suitably solicitous of the initial redistricting choices of 
state and local governments, and that pushes the envelope in the direction 
of maximization when it comes to the creation of additional districts that 
provide minority voters with an ability to elect candidates of their choice.
316
  
                                                 
 311. See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996). 
 312. Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. 320, 325–26 (2000). 
 313. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 478 (2003). 
 314. See id. at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“There is a fundamental flaw, I should 
think, in any scheme in which the Department of Justice is permitted or directed to 
encourage or ratify a course of unconstitutional conduct in order to find compliance with a 
statutory directive.”); Bossier Parish II, 528 U.S. at 336 (declining to adopt a particular 
statutory interpretation of Section 5 that would “exacerbate the ‘substantial’ federalism costs 
that the preclearance procedure already exacts . . . perhaps to the extent of raising concerns 
about § 5’s constitutionality”) (internal citations omitted); Bossier Parish I, 520 U.S. 471, 
480 (1997) (describing how interpreting Section 5 “[t]o require a jurisdiction to litigate 
whether its proposed redistricting plan also has a dilutive ‘result’ before it can implement 
that plan . . . is to increase further the serious federalism costs already implicated by § 5”); 
Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 926–27 (1995) (“We are especially reluctant to conclude 
that § 5 justifies [the Justice Department’s maximization] policy given the serious 
constitutional concerns it raises. . . . We need not, however, resolve these troubling and 
difficult constitutional questions today.  There is no indication Congress intended such a far-
reaching application of § 5, so we reject the Justice Department’s interpretation of the 
statute and avoid the constitutional problems that interpretation raises.”). 
 315. VRARA, Pub. L. No. 109-246, § 2(b)(6), 120 Stat. 577, 578 (2006) (finding that 
Bossier Parish II and Ashcroft had “misconstrued Congress’ original intent”).  In a less 
fundamental move, Congress also overruled a Supreme Court decision that limited plaintiffs 
who prevailed in Voting Rights Act litigation from collecting expert witness fees from 
defendants.  Id. § 6, 120 Stat. at 581 (amending Voting Rights Act to allow “reasonable 
expert fees, and other reasonable litigation expenses”). 
 316. One other major administrative enforcement avenue might also lead to the current 
Supreme Court striking down Section 5 as unconstitutional: an overly stringent 
interpretation of the criteria for escaping Section 5 coverage.  On a technical level, a 
 At bottom, I think that future Executive Branch action rather than 
Congressional inaction most likely would serve as the tipping point for 
shutting down Section 5.  Thus, the Court’s AMUDO opinion might 
better be viewed as a shot across the Attorney General’s bow rather than 
Congress’.
317
 
If Section 5’s constitutional fate lies in the Executive Branch’s hands, 
then it is important for the Attorney General to develop an orderly, non-
maximizing framework for enforcing the discriminatory purpose standard.  
To be sure, when it comes to the Section 5 retrogression standard, an 
opportunity exists for inadequate deference to state and local government 
sovereignty, partisan intrigue, and strong race-based dictates that would be 
anathema  
to a majority of the current Supreme Court.
318
  However, the most 
“mischief” in administrative enforcement can spring from the more open-
ended purpose standard.
319
   
Indeed, one need only take a thirty-thousand-foot overview of 
redistricting in the 1990s, where a retrogression standard and an 
unconstitutional purpose standard were in play, and redistricting in the 
2000s, where retrogression was essentially the sole name of the Section 5 
                                                 
jurisdiction escapes coverage (i.e., bails out) from Section 5 by filing a declaratory judgment 
action in the D.C. District Court.  42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (2006).  In recent practice, 
jurisdictions have bailed out by first working with the Attorney General to ensure eligibility 
for bailout, and then filing a consent agreement along with the complaint seeking the 
declaratory judgment in D.C. District Court.  See, e.g., City of Winchester v. Ashcroft, C.A. 
No. 1:00CV03073 (D.D.C. May 30, 2001), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/misc/ winchester_cd.pdf (entering a consent decree and 
judgment).  If the Attorney General makes this process overly difficult for jurisdictions, then 
the Court might be spurred to declare Section 5 unconstitutional.  That said, I think overly 
stringent bailout determinations are less likely to lead to the complete elimination of Section 
5 by the Court—although a combination of overly stringent bailout determinations in 
tandem with haphazard enforcement of the purpose standard might serve as a powerful 
motivator for the Court. 
 317. One of the potential criticisms of the framework for administering the 
discriminatory purpose standard proposed in Part II of this Article is that it fails to do more 
to create additional representation for minority voters.  When it comes to the idea of limiting 
Section 5 enforcement to prevent a conservative Supreme Court from striking it down 
entirely, one response might be: “Go ahead and let them.”  However, such a view over-
emphasizes the necessity of using Section 5 as a tool for additional representation.  Rather, 
the greatest importance of Section 5 is as a tool to prevent the backsliding of minority voting 
rights.  In short, just because Section 5 might need to be enforced in a way that makes it a 
more limited tool for the advancement of minority voters does not mean Section 5 has been 
rendered useless or impotent. 
 318. Cf. Persily, supra note 93, at 226 (“If the new law [concerning retrogression] is 
going to be successful (let alone upheld as constitutional), it cannot be seen as a tool for the 
systematic furtherance of certain partisan interests.”); see generally Zachary J. Sullivan, A 
Proposed Standard for Amended Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 As Applied to 
Redistricting, 85 N.D. L. REV. 1263 (2010) (proposing a framework for making decisions 
related to the retrogression standard). 
 319. Persily, supra note 93, at 217 n.165 (“It is quite possible that the Bossier Parish fix 
may turn out to be more important than the Ashcroft fix when it comes to (re)expanding 
DOJ authority.”). 
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game, to see that this is the case.  The 1990s saw a series of Court decisions 
excoriating the Attorney General for its many rejections of States’ 
redistricting plans aimed at “maximization” for (although the Court did not 
explicitly say this, academic commentators have speculated in this fashion) 
partisan ends.
320
   
In contrast, the 2000s saw one decision rebuking the Attorney General in a 
context where partisan forces might have been at play.
321
  In short, if 
Section 5 is going to fall because of administrative enforcement that is 
anathema to the Court, it will likely be through implementation of the 
purpose standard. 
Aside from Section 5’s continuing constitutional survival, creating a 
framework for the purpose standard should also help reduce the 
opportunity for partisanship.  One of the problems when it comes to a 
standard involving a “totality of the circumstances” is that it can allow 
partisan and ideological preferences to interfere in decision-making.  For 
example, the University of Chicago’s Adam Cox and Thomas Miles have 
demonstrated how the quite malleable totality of circumstances test from 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act seems to be manipulated to reach the 
preferred ideological position of judges in those cases.
322
  Indeed, one of 
the major criticisms of the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft 
was that the new doctrinal test for Section 5 retrogression developed in that 
case was unclear and more susceptible to partisan chicanery.
323
  So, too, the 
discriminatory purpose standard provides greater discretion to political 
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Hebert, Von Spakovsky, Obama, and the “Race Card” (Nov. 16, 2007), 
www.clcblog.org/blog_item_189.html (“[T]he Supreme Court of the United States 
ultimately found that the [Texas congressional redistricting] plan harmed Latino voters, 
exactly in the way the career [Department of Justice] staff had said it would.”).  LULAC, 
however, does not contain anything near the direct indictment of the Attorney General that 
the racial gerrymandering cases contained. 
 322. See Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (“Using the party of the appointing President as a rough proxy for 
ideology, we show that Democratic appointees are significantly more likely than Republican 
appointees to cast votes in favor of the plaintiffs under Section 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.”). 
 323. See Ashcroft, 539 U.S. at 494 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the retrogression 
test created by the Court’s majority as “practically unadministrable”); see also Tokaji, supra 
note 320, at 821 (“The absence of clear standards for assessing retrogression after Georgia 
v. Ashcroft further increases the opportunity for partisan manipulation of the preclearance 
process behind a veil of discretion.”). 
 actors in the Executive Branch and lends itself to the potential for partisan 
manipulation.
324
  While it would be naïve to think that creating a 
framework for the purpose standard will eliminate all opportunity for 
partisanship on the part of the Attorney General, it is possible that clearer 
standards could lead to a reduction in political opportunism. 
Creating a framework for the purpose standard also makes sense from an 
administrative enforcement perspective because of the compressed nature 
of Section 5 review.  After the Attorney General receives a redistricting 
plan for administrative review, the Attorney General has only a limited 
amount of time—sixty days—to make a preclearance decision.
325
  If the 
Attorney General fails to make a decision within sixty days, then the 
redistricting plan will be deemed approved.
326
  While the Attorney General 
can extend the time period for another sixty days by making what is, 
essentially, an abbreviated discovery request to the state or local 
government seeking preclearance, the Attorney General has a maximum of 
120 days for review.
327
 
While it may seem that 120 days should be plenty of time to make a 
determination on a redistricting plan, one need only look at the larger 
picture of the Attorney General’s “caseload” to see that 120 days may not 
be as long as it seems.  For starters, redistricting plans are the most 
complex voting changes analyzed by the Attorney General.  The 
complexity arises from, among other things, the need to use sophisticated 
computer mapping software, to engage in statistical analysis of voting 
patterns to determine the extent to which elections are marked by racially 
polarized voting, and to interview the multiple actors and assess the various 
considerations that  
contributed to the development of the plan.  In addition, these complex 
submissions come in a wave that occurs in the first few years following 
every redistricting cycle and thousands of jurisdictions—from states to 
counties to cities to school boards—engage in redistricting.  Moreover, 
while redistrictings are the most complex voting changes reviewed by the 
Attorney General, they are not the only voting changes reviewed by the 
Attorney General.  Indeed, the Attorney General, with a limited number of 
staff members devoted to Section 5, reviews between 15,000 and 24,000 
changes per year.
328
  The Attorney General is also responsible for dealing 
                                                 
 324. See Persily, supra note 93, at 217 n.165 (“There is a risk that the purpose inquiry 
will turn into another opportunity for partisan infection of the preclearance process—for 
example, with a Democratic-leaning DOJ determining that all Republican gerrymanders in 
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 325. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (2006). 
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 327. 28 C.F.R. § 51.37 (2009). 
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with jurisdictions seeking to exempt themselves (i.e., bail out) from Section 
5 coverage.
329
  Finally, Section 5 amounts to only one aspect of the 
Attorney General’s enforcement of federal election laws.
330
 
In short, when you compile all the factors that create a time-crunch on 
administrative review, the need to develop a framework for the purpose 
standard appears even more urgent.  Presumably, one wants a system where 
Section 5 “justice” is the same for the State of Texas’ redistricting as it is 
for Atlanta’s redistricting as it is for the Clay County, Alabama, School 
Board’s redistricting and, theoretically, a framework developed ahead of 
time should lead to more consistent outcomes from preclearance decision 
to preclearance decision.  Presumably, one also wants a system where the 
Attorney General focuses finite Section 5 resources on the redistricting 
plans most likely to violate the Section 5 rights of minority voters, and a 
framework should help the Attorney General perform the triage necessary 
to focus limited resources on the redistricting plans that matter most.  Of 
course, a framework for discriminatory purpose review will likely not make 
enforcement of Section 5 perfect—in any large undertaking, 
inconsistencies and mistakes are bound to occur—but it should help 
improve the administration of Section 5. 
Finally, creating a framework for Section 5’s purpose  
standard also makes sense from a federalism perspective.  Few, if any, 
commentators doubt the unique and substantial federalism intrusion 
presented by Section 5.  Indeed, all nine Justices on the Supreme Court 
recently signed off on a passage in AMUDO that examined in detail 
many of these federalism costs.
331
  In light of these costs, the Attorney 
General has always been necessarily concerned with striking a balance 
between protecting the fundamental democratic rights of minority voters 
while paying attention to the legitimate governance concerns of state and 
local entities.  Indeed, part of what animated the Supreme Court’s hostility 
toward the Attorney General’s enforcement of Section 5 during the 1990s 
                                                 
Division, http://www.justice.gov/crt/voting/sec_5/about.php (last visited May 24, 2010). 
 329. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(a)(1) (establishing bailout provision). Indeed, following 
AMUDO, the Attorney General may have to deal with an increase in the  
number of bailout applications.  See AMUDO, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2513–16 (2009) 
(interpreting the bailout provision to allow jurisdictions other than States and counties to 
seek a bailout).  The Attorney General can also bring litigation against state and local 
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 330. See generally The Statutes We Enforce, United States Department of Justice, Civil 
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 was a lack of solicitude for the redistricting choices of state and local 
governments. 
In striking this balance, one important measure the Attorney General can 
take to limit Section 5’s intrusion on federalism is to provide the ground 
rules of the redistricting game to state and local governments before the 
opening pitch.  When it comes to Section 5, the federal government 
intrudes into an area that some may consider to be the most fundamental 
function of state and local governments—the ability to establish the 
structural framework for representative government.  This intrusion is 
minimized and is less of a burden on state and local actors if these actors 
have a clearer understanding of what will run afoul of federal law since 
they will theoretically spend fewer resources complying with the federal 
mandates because they will have an opportunity to get redistricting right in 
the first instance.  Also, if state and local governments know the ground 
rules beforehand, it is less likely they will lose control of redistricting to 
(most likely federal) judicial actors in litigation.  Granted, when it comes to 
the discriminatory purpose standard, there likely can be no absolutely clear 
rules, but certainly some framework for the purpose standard would help 
limit the federalism burden. 
In sum, a number of reasons lead to the conclusion that it is important to 
develop a workable discriminatory purpose framework prior to the 
upcoming redistricting cycle.  Moreover, it is important that the framework 
adequately protect the legitimate rights of minority voters to effective 
representation and fair electoral structures while not totally ignoring more 
conservative notions of federalism and discomfort with enforcement efforts 
that appear to maximize the number of districts drawn that provide 
minority voters an ability to elect candidates of choice.  While such a 
framework may not be easy to develop, it is certainly worth trying. 
CONCLUSION:  NEXT STEPS 
This Article tackles a difficult task—the creation of a framework  
for deciding which redistricting plans should be blocked from 
implementation for failure to meet Section 5’s discriminatory purpose 
standard.  There may be imperfections with this framework and criticism 
might come from many quarters.  At the end of the day, the design of this 
Article is not necessarily to end the dialogue about enforcement of the 
discriminatory purpose standard but to spark the dialogue before it is too 
late.   
The 2010 Census is on the verge of being released.  Redistricting will 
commence in the spring of 2011.  Administrative review and litigation 
involving redistricting plans will reach its peak in the months that follow.  
Yet the fixation up to this point has been on Section 5’s overall 
constitutional survival rather than its enforcement in the upcoming 
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redistricting cycle.  However, a linkage exists between the two.  For 
Section 5 to survive, the Executive Branch needs to develop a suitable 
framework for enforcing the purpose standard in the redistricting context. 
At the very least, the Attorney General should take steps to issue 
guidance on the subject of discriminatory purpose and redistricting.  On the 
eve of the post-2000 round of redistricting, the Attorney General issued a 
notice in the Federal Register entitled Guidance Concerning Redistricting 
and Retrogression Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
332
  While this 
guidance was generalized, it served an important purpose.  First, it 
provided some important notice for redistricting actors about what the 
ground rules would be.  Second, it sent a message to judicial actors that the 
Attorney General was taking seriously its role as a surrogate for the D.C. 
District Court in  
making preclearance decisions.  Importantly, this guidance may have  
helped change the Supreme Court’s perception of administrative 
enforcement.  The one post-2000 case in which the Court rejected the 
Attorney General’s enforcement of Section 5 seemed less critical than the 
language of the Court’s post-1990 decisions.
333
   
Once again, it is important for the Attorney General to issue similar 
guidance concerning the purpose standard for the post-2010 round of 
redistricting.  The future of Section 5 may depend upon it. 
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  As this Article was in the finishing stages of editing, the Attorney General released 
proposed revisions to the procedures for administering Section 5.  Revision of the 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 
33205 (proposed June 11, 2010) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pts. 0, 51).  Those proposed 
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